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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-03-05 20:27:48 +0100
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-03-05 20:27:48 +0100
commit7f9ec7d8169b5281eff2b907d8ffb1bf56045f73 (patch)
treea48e3363789751bf9df08caf409248e04a9ce0c3 /arch
parentMerge tag 'irq-urgent-2023-03-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kerne... (diff)
parentvirt/sev-guest: Return -EIO if certificate buffer is not large enough (diff)
downloadlinux-7f9ec7d8169b5281eff2b907d8ffb1bf56045f73.tar.xz
linux-7f9ec7d8169b5281eff2b907d8ffb1bf56045f73.zip
Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2023-03-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 updates from Thomas Gleixner: "A small set of updates for x86: - Return -EIO instead of success when the certificate buffer for SEV guests is not large enough - Allow STIPB to be enabled with legacy IBSR. Legacy IBRS is cleared on return to userspace for performance reasons, but the leaves user space vulnerable to cross-thread attacks which STIBP prevents. Update the documentation accordingly" * tag 'x86-urgent-2023-03-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: virt/sev-guest: Return -EIO if certificate buffer is not large enough Documentation/hw-vuln: Document the interaction between IBRS and STIBP x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c25
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index cf81848b72f4..f9d060e71c3e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1133,14 +1133,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
- return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+ return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
}
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+}
+
static void __init
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
{
@@ -1203,12 +1207,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
}
/*
- * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
- * STIBP is not required.
+ * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP
+ * is not required.
+ *
+ * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target
+ * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which
+ * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS
+ * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return
+ * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection,
+ * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
!smt_possible ||
- spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return;
/*
@@ -2340,7 +2351,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
- if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {