diff options
author | Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> | 2019-03-20 07:49:38 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2019-03-20 19:09:47 +0100 |
commit | ef82bcfa671b9a635bab5fa669005663d8b177c5 (patch) | |
tree | ad226efc0e220034faa6f67bf2f40af834119bbd /block/ioprio.c | |
parent | ipv6: make ip6_create_rt_rcu return ip6_null_entry instead of NULL (diff) | |
download | linux-ef82bcfa671b9a635bab5fa669005663d8b177c5.tar.xz linux-ef82bcfa671b9a635bab5fa669005663d8b177c5.zip |
sctp: use memdup_user instead of vmemdup_user
In sctp_setsockopt_bindx()/__sctp_setsockopt_connectx(), it allocates
memory with addrs_size which is passed from userspace. We used flag
GFP_USER to put some more restrictions on it in Commit cacc06215271
("sctp: use GFP_USER for user-controlled kmalloc").
However, since Commit c981f254cc82 ("sctp: use vmemdup_user() rather
than badly open-coding memdup_user()"), vmemdup_user() has been used,
which doesn't check GFP_USER flag when goes to vmalloc_*(). So when
addrs_size is a huge value, it could exhaust memory and even trigger
oom killer.
This patch is to use memdup_user() instead, in which GFP_USER would
work to limit the memory allocation with a huge addrs_size.
Note we can't fix it by limiting 'addrs_size', as there's no demand
for it from RFC.
Reported-by: syzbot+ec1b7575afef85a0e5ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c981f254cc82 ("sctp: use vmemdup_user() rather than badly open-coding memdup_user()")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'block/ioprio.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions