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| author | Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> | 2022-03-08 19:20:17 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> | 2022-03-13 02:00:56 +0100 |
| commit | a96cfe2d427064325ecbf56df8816c6b871ec285 (patch) | |
| tree | c165d1d037274d16dbbc8703e4f8ffa4ade14b32 /drivers/char | |
| parent | random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator (diff) | |
| download | linux-a96cfe2d427064325ecbf56df8816c6b871ec285.tar.xz linux-a96cfe2d427064325ecbf56df8816c6b871ec285.zip | |
random: make consistent usage of crng_ready()
Rather than sometimes checking `crng_init < 2`, we should always use the
crng_ready() macro, so that should we change anything later, it's
consistent. Additionally, that macro already has a likely() around it,
which means we don't need to open code our own likely() and unlikely()
annotations.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 19 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 50973a074d2d..19a602c69f2f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -122,18 +122,13 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void); */ int wait_for_random_bytes(void) { - if (likely(crng_ready())) - return 0; - - do { + while (!crng_ready()) { int ret; ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ); if (ret) return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret; - try_to_generate_entropy(); - } while (!crng_ready()); - + } return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); @@ -288,7 +283,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(bool force) ++next_gen; WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); - if (crng_init < 2) { + if (!crng_ready()) { crng_init = 2; finalize_init = true; } @@ -351,7 +346,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS], * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because * this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init. */ - if (unlikely(!crng_ready())) { + if (!crng_ready()) { bool ready; spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); @@ -794,7 +789,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); - if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) + if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) crng_reseed(false); } @@ -956,7 +951,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); ++base_crng.generation; - if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { + if (arch_init && trust_cpu && !crng_ready()) { crng_init = 2; pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } @@ -1558,7 +1553,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) case RNDRESEEDCRNG: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - if (crng_init < 2) + if (!crng_ready()) return -ENODATA; crng_reseed(false); return 0; |