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| author | Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> | 2017-06-08 04:34:26 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2017-06-20 04:06:28 +0200 |
| commit | 6787ab81b29115b6d2e7d17fe8a8017da66197d6 (patch) | |
| tree | c926aac68602cbf76c6aa121fcacf5902cfc749f /drivers/crypto | |
| parent | cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random (diff) | |
| download | linux-6787ab81b29115b6d2e7d17fe8a8017da66197d6.tar.xz linux-6787ab81b29115b6d2e7d17fe8a8017da66197d6.zip | |
iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
It's not safe to use weak random data here, especially for the challenge
response randomness. Since we're always in process context, it's safe to
simply wait until we have enough randomness to carry out the
authentication correctly.
While we're at it, we clean up a small memleak during an error
condition.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: "Nicholas A. Bellinger" <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Cc: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/crypto')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions