dm crypt: add TCW IV mode for old CBC TCRYPT containers

dm-crypt can already activate TCRYPT (TrueCrypt compatible) containers
in LRW or XTS block encryption mode.

TCRYPT containers prior to version 4.1 use CBC mode with some additional
tweaks, this patch adds support for these containers.

This new mode is implemented using special IV generator named TCW
(TrueCrypt IV with whitening).  TCW IV only supports containers that are
encrypted with one cipher (Tested with AES, Twofish, Serpent, CAST5 and
TripleDES).

While this mode is legacy and is known to be vulnerable to some
watermarking attacks (e.g. revealing of hidden disk existence) it can
still be useful to activate old containers without using 3rd party
software or for independent forensic analysis of such containers.

(Both the userspace and kernel code is an independent implementation
based on the format documentation and it completely avoids use of
original source code.)

The TCW IV generator uses two additional keys: Kw (whitening seed, size
is always 16 bytes - TCW_WHITENING_SIZE) and Kiv (IV seed, size is
always the IV size of the selected cipher).  These keys are concatenated
at the end of the main encryption key provided in mapping table.

While whitening is completely independent from IV, it is implemented
inside IV generator for simplification.

The whitening value is always 16 bytes long and is calculated per sector
from provided Kw as initial seed, xored with sector number and mixed
with CRC32 algorithm.  Resulting value is xored with ciphertext sector
content.

IV is calculated from the provided Kiv as initial IV seed and xored with
sector number.

Detailed calculation can be found in the Truecrypt documentation for
version < 4.1 and will also be described on dm-crypt site, see:
http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMCrypt

The experimental support for activation of these containers is already
present in git devel brach of cryptsetup.

Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 183 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index e0c61a326550..50ea7ed24dce 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2003 Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
  * Copyright (C) 2006-2009 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
  *
  * This file is released under the GPL.
  */
@@ -98,6 +99,13 @@ struct iv_lmk_private {
 	u8 *seed;
 };
 
+#define TCW_WHITENING_SIZE 16
+struct iv_tcw_private {
+	struct crypto_shash *crc32_tfm;
+	u8 *iv_seed;
+	u8 *whitening;
+};
+
 /*
  * Crypt: maps a linear range of a block device
  * and encrypts / decrypts at the same time.
@@ -139,6 +147,7 @@ struct crypt_config {
 		struct iv_essiv_private essiv;
 		struct iv_benbi_private benbi;
 		struct iv_lmk_private lmk;
+		struct iv_tcw_private tcw;
 	} iv_gen_private;
 	sector_t iv_offset;
 	unsigned int iv_size;
@@ -231,6 +240,16 @@ static struct crypto_ablkcipher *any_tfm(struct crypt_config *cc)
  *         version 3: the same as version 2 with additional IV seed
  *                   (it uses 65 keys, last key is used as IV seed)
  *
+ * tcw:  Compatible implementation of the block chaining mode used
+ *       by the TrueCrypt device encryption system (prior to version 4.1).
+ *       For more info see: http://www.truecrypt.org
+ *       It operates on full 512 byte sectors and uses CBC
+ *       with an IV derived from initial key and the sector number.
+ *       In addition, whitening value is applied on every sector, whitening
+ *       is calculated from initial key, sector number and mixed using CRC32.
+ *       Note that this encryption scheme is vulnerable to watermarking attacks
+ *       and should be used for old compatible containers access only.
+ *
  * plumb: unimplemented, see:
  * http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.device-mapper.dm-crypt/454
  */
@@ -609,6 +628,153 @@ static int crypt_iv_lmk_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 	return r;
 }
 
+static void crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
+{
+	struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
+
+	kzfree(tcw->iv_seed);
+	tcw->iv_seed = NULL;
+	kzfree(tcw->whitening);
+	tcw->whitening = NULL;
+
+	if (tcw->crc32_tfm && !IS_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm))
+		crypto_free_shash(tcw->crc32_tfm);
+	tcw->crc32_tfm = NULL;
+}
+
+static int crypt_iv_tcw_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
+			    const char *opts)
+{
+	struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
+
+	if (cc->key_size <= (cc->iv_size + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE)) {
+		ti->error = "Wrong key size for TCW";
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tcw->crc32_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("crc32", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm)) {
+		ti->error = "Error initializing CRC32 in TCW";
+		return PTR_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm);
+	}
+
+	tcw->iv_seed = kzalloc(cc->iv_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	tcw->whitening = kzalloc(TCW_WHITENING_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcw->iv_seed || !tcw->whitening) {
+		crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(cc);
+		ti->error = "Error allocating seed storage in TCW";
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypt_iv_tcw_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
+{
+	struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
+	int key_offset = cc->key_size - cc->iv_size - TCW_WHITENING_SIZE;
+
+	memcpy(tcw->iv_seed, &cc->key[key_offset], cc->iv_size);
+	memcpy(tcw->whitening, &cc->key[key_offset + cc->iv_size],
+	       TCW_WHITENING_SIZE);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypt_iv_tcw_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
+{
+	struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
+
+	memset(tcw->iv_seed, 0, cc->iv_size);
+	memset(tcw->whitening, 0, TCW_WHITENING_SIZE);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(struct crypt_config *cc,
+				  struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq,
+				  u8 *data)
+{
+	struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
+	u64 sector = cpu_to_le64((u64)dmreq->iv_sector);
+	u8 buf[TCW_WHITENING_SIZE];
+	struct {
+		struct shash_desc desc;
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tcw->crc32_tfm)];
+	} sdesc;
+	int i, r;
+
+	/* xor whitening with sector number */
+	memcpy(buf, tcw->whitening, TCW_WHITENING_SIZE);
+	crypto_xor(buf, (u8 *)&sector, 8);
+	crypto_xor(&buf[8], (u8 *)&sector, 8);
+
+	/* calculate crc32 for every 32bit part and xor it */
+	sdesc.desc.tfm = tcw->crc32_tfm;
+	sdesc.desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+		r = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc.desc);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+		r = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc.desc, &buf[i * 4], 4);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+		r = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc.desc, &buf[i * 4]);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	crypto_xor(&buf[0], &buf[12], 4);
+	crypto_xor(&buf[4], &buf[8], 4);
+
+	/* apply whitening (8 bytes) to whole sector */
+	for (i = 0; i < ((1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) / 8); i++)
+		crypto_xor(data + i * 8, buf, 8);
+out:
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int crypt_iv_tcw_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
+			    struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
+{
+	struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
+	u64 sector = cpu_to_le64((u64)dmreq->iv_sector);
+	u8 *src;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	/* Remove whitening from ciphertext */
+	if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) {
+		src = kmap_atomic(sg_page(&dmreq->sg_in));
+		r = crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(cc, dmreq, src + dmreq->sg_in.offset);
+		kunmap_atomic(src);
+	}
+
+	/* Calculate IV */
+	memcpy(iv, tcw->iv_seed, cc->iv_size);
+	crypto_xor(iv, (u8 *)&sector, 8);
+	if (cc->iv_size > 8)
+		crypto_xor(&iv[8], (u8 *)&sector, cc->iv_size - 8);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int crypt_iv_tcw_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
+			     struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
+{
+	u8 *dst;
+	int r;
+
+	if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Apply whitening on ciphertext */
+	dst = kmap_atomic(sg_page(&dmreq->sg_out));
+	r = crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(cc, dmreq, dst + dmreq->sg_out.offset);
+	kunmap_atomic(dst);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
 static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain_ops = {
 	.generator = crypt_iv_plain_gen
 };
@@ -644,6 +810,15 @@ static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_lmk_ops = {
 	.post	   = crypt_iv_lmk_post
 };
 
+static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_tcw_ops = {
+	.ctr	   = crypt_iv_tcw_ctr,
+	.dtr	   = crypt_iv_tcw_dtr,
+	.init	   = crypt_iv_tcw_init,
+	.wipe	   = crypt_iv_tcw_wipe,
+	.generator = crypt_iv_tcw_gen,
+	.post	   = crypt_iv_tcw_post
+};
+
 static void crypt_convert_init(struct crypt_config *cc,
 			       struct convert_context *ctx,
 			       struct bio *bio_out, struct bio *bio_in,
@@ -1491,14 +1666,20 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher(struct dm_target *ti,
 		cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_null_ops;
 	else if (strcmp(ivmode, "lmk") == 0) {
 		cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_lmk_ops;
-		/* Version 2 and 3 is recognised according
+		/*
+		 * Version 2 and 3 is recognised according
 		 * to length of provided multi-key string.
 		 * If present (version 3), last key is used as IV seed.
+		 * All keys (including IV seed) are always the same size.
 		 */
 		if (cc->key_size % cc->key_parts) {
 			cc->key_parts++;
 			cc->key_extra_size = cc->key_size / cc->key_parts;
 		}
+	} else if (strcmp(ivmode, "tcw") == 0) {
+		cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_tcw_ops;
+		cc->key_parts += 2; /* IV + whitening */
+		cc->key_extra_size = cc->iv_size + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE;
 	} else {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		ti->error = "Invalid IV mode";
@@ -1824,7 +2005,7 @@ static int crypt_iterate_devices(struct dm_target *ti,
 
 static struct target_type crypt_target = {
 	.name   = "crypt",
-	.version = {1, 12, 1},
+	.version = {1, 13, 0},
 	.module = THIS_MODULE,
 	.ctr    = crypt_ctr,
 	.dtr    = crypt_dtr,