xen/privcmd: add IOCTL_PRIVCMD_RESTRICT

The purpose if this ioctl is to allow a user of privcmd to restrict its
operation such that it will no longer service arbitrary hypercalls via
IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL, and will check for a matching domid when
servicing IOCTL_PRIVCMD_DM_OP or IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP*. The aim of this
is to limit the attack surface for a compromised device model.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

1 files changed, 79 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
index 1a6f1860e008..2077a3ac7c0c 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
@@ -56,16 +56,25 @@ module_param_named(dm_op_buf_max_size, privcmd_dm_op_buf_max_size, uint,
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(dm_op_buf_max_size,
 		 "Maximum size of a dm_op hypercall buffer");
 
+struct privcmd_data {
+	domid_t domid;
+};
+
 static int privcmd_vma_range_is_mapped(
                struct vm_area_struct *vma,
                unsigned long addr,
                unsigned long nr_pages);
 
-static long privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(void __user *udata)
+static long privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
 {
+	struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
 	struct privcmd_hypercall hypercall;
 	long ret;
 
+	/* Disallow arbitrary hypercalls if restricted */
+	if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (copy_from_user(&hypercall, udata, sizeof(hypercall)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -242,8 +251,9 @@ static int mmap_gfn_range(void *data, void *state)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(void __user *udata)
+static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
 {
+	struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
 	struct privcmd_mmap mmapcmd;
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
@@ -258,6 +268,10 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(void __user *udata)
 	if (copy_from_user(&mmapcmd, udata, sizeof(mmapcmd)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	/* If restriction is in place, check the domid matches */
+	if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != mmapcmd.dom)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	rc = gather_array(&pagelist,
 			  mmapcmd.num, sizeof(struct privcmd_mmap_entry),
 			  mmapcmd.entry);
@@ -429,8 +443,10 @@ static int alloc_empty_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int numpgs)
 
 static const struct vm_operations_struct privcmd_vm_ops;
 
-static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(void __user *udata, int version)
+static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(
+	struct file *file, void __user *udata, int version)
 {
+	struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
 	int ret;
 	struct privcmd_mmapbatch_v2 m;
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
@@ -459,6 +475,10 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(void __user *udata, int version)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	/* If restriction is in place, check the domid matches */
+	if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != m.dom)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(m.num, XEN_PFN_PER_PAGE);
 	if ((m.num <= 0) || (nr_pages > (LONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT)))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -603,8 +623,9 @@ static void unlock_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned int nr_pages)
 	}
 }
 
-static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(void __user *udata)
+static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
 {
+	struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
 	struct privcmd_dm_op kdata;
 	struct privcmd_dm_op_buf *kbufs;
 	unsigned int nr_pages = 0;
@@ -616,6 +637,10 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(void __user *udata)
 	if (copy_from_user(&kdata, udata, sizeof(kdata)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	/* If restriction is in place, check the domid matches */
+	if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != kdata.dom)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (kdata.num == 0)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -683,6 +708,23 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static long privcmd_ioctl_restrict(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
+{
+	struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
+	domid_t dom;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&dom, udata, sizeof(dom)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* Set restriction to the specified domain, or check it matches */
+	if (data->domid == DOMID_INVALID)
+		data->domid = dom;
+	else if (data->domid != dom)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file,
 			  unsigned int cmd, unsigned long data)
 {
@@ -691,23 +733,27 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file,
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL:
-		ret = privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(udata);
+		ret = privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(file, udata);
 		break;
 
 	case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP:
-		ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap(udata);
+		ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap(file, udata);
 		break;
 
 	case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAPBATCH:
-		ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(udata, 1);
+		ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(file, udata, 1);
 		break;
 
 	case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAPBATCH_V2:
-		ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(udata, 2);
+		ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(file, udata, 2);
 		break;
 
 	case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_DM_OP:
-		ret = privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(udata);
+		ret = privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(file, udata);
+		break;
+
+	case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_RESTRICT:
+		ret = privcmd_ioctl_restrict(file, udata);
 		break;
 
 	default:
@@ -717,6 +763,28 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int privcmd_open(struct inode *ino, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct privcmd_data *data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* DOMID_INVALID implies no restriction */
+	data->domid = DOMID_INVALID;
+
+	file->private_data = data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int privcmd_release(struct inode *ino, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void privcmd_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	struct page **pages = vma->vm_private_data;
@@ -785,6 +853,8 @@ static int privcmd_vma_range_is_mapped(
 const struct file_operations xen_privcmd_fops = {
 	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = privcmd_ioctl,
+	.open = privcmd_open,
+	.release = privcmd_release,
 	.mmap = privcmd_mmap,
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_privcmd_fops);