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| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2016-10-28 10:22:25 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2017-06-30 21:00:51 +0200 |
| commit | 3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9 (patch) | |
| tree | 850c019e6a6449857e864b6a545b053ffe2f99a9 /fs/mount.h | |
| parent | ARM: Prepare for randomized task_struct (diff) | |
| download | linux-3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9.tar.xz linux-3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9.zip | |
randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/mount.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/mount.h | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/mount.h b/fs/mount.h index bf1fda6eed8f..e406b286fba1 100644 --- a/fs/mount.h +++ b/fs/mount.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ struct mnt_namespace { u64 event; unsigned int mounts; /* # of mounts in the namespace */ unsigned int pending_mounts; -}; +} __randomize_layout; struct mnt_pcp { int mnt_count; @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ struct mount { struct hlist_head mnt_pins; struct fs_pin mnt_umount; struct dentry *mnt_ex_mountpoint; -}; +} __randomize_layout; #define MNT_NS_INTERNAL ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) /* distinct from any mnt_namespace */ |