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| author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2012-12-14 16:55:36 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2012-12-15 01:12:03 +0100 |
| commit | 5e4a08476b50fa39210fca82e03325cc46b9c235 (patch) | |
| tree | fb3a3c6b4c3f613abf354adefcff8a74051acdce /fs/namespace.c | |
| parent | Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps. (diff) | |
| download | linux-5e4a08476b50fa39210fca82e03325cc46b9c235.tar.xz linux-5e4a08476b50fa39210fca82e03325cc46b9c235.zip | |
userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns. With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.
However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.
Which made the following nasty sequence possible.
pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
char path[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
setns(fd, 0);
system("su -");
}
Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/namespace.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/namespace.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index c1bbe86f4920..398a50ff2438 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -2781,7 +2781,8 @@ static int mntns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns) struct path root; if (!ns_capable(mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || - !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT)) + !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT) || + !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (fs->users != 1) |