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author | Julien Tinnes <jt@cr0.org> | 2009-06-26 20:27:40 +0200 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2009-07-12 21:21:33 +0200 |
commit | f9fabcb58a6d26d6efde842d1703ac7cfa9427b6 (patch) | |
tree | 3bab868d1db85521932b77897983e7c673f7a669 /fs/nfs/read.c | |
parent | Don't use '-fwrapv' compiler option: it's buggy in gcc-4.1.x (diff) | |
download | linux-f9fabcb58a6d26d6efde842d1703ac7cfa9427b6.tar.xz linux-f9fabcb58a6d26d6efde842d1703ac7cfa9427b6.zip |
personality: fix PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
We have found that the current PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID mask on Linux doesn't
include neither ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT, nor MMAP_PAGE_ZERO.
The current mask is READ_IMPLIES_EXEC|ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE.
We believe it is important to add MMAP_PAGE_ZERO, because by using this
personality it is possible to have the first page mapped inside a
process running as setuid root. This could be used in those scenarios:
- Exploiting a NULL pointer dereference issue in a setuid root binary
- Bypassing the mmap_min_addr restrictions of the Linux kernel: by
running a setuid binary that would drop privileges before giving us
control back (for instance by loading a user-supplied library), we
could get the first page mapped in a process we control. By further
using mremap and mprotect on this mapping, we can then completely
bypass the mmap_min_addr restrictions.
Less importantly, we believe ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT should also be added
since on x86 32bits it will in practice disable most of the address
space layout randomization (only the stack will remain randomized).
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jt@cr0.org>
Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@sdf.lonestar.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugene@redhat.com>
[ Shortened lines and fixed whitespace as per Christophs' suggestion ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nfs/read.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions