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authorJake Edge <jake@lwn.net>2009-05-04 20:51:14 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2009-05-05 00:14:23 +0200
commitf83ce3e6b02d5e48b3a43b001390e2b58820389d (patch)
tree71c57abf4f9d259f5bfa22deaf724db85738f862 /fs/proc/base.c
parentNFS: Close page_mkwrite() races (diff)
downloadlinux-f83ce3e6b02d5e48b3a43b001390e2b58820389d.tar.xz
linux-f83ce3e6b02d5e48b3a43b001390e2b58820389d.zip
proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes
By using the same test as is used for /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps, only allow processes that can ptrace() a given process to see information that might be used to bypass address space layout randomization (ASLR). These include eip, esp, wchan, and start_stack in /proc/pid/stat as well as the non-symbolic output from /proc/pid/wchan. ASLR can be bypassed by sampling eip as shown by the proof-of-concept code at http://code.google.com/p/fuzzyaslr/ As part of a presentation (http://www.cr0.org/paper/to-jt-linux-alsr-leak.pdf) esp and wchan were also noted as possibly usable information leaks as well. The start_stack address also leaks potentially useful information. Cc: Stable Team <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jake Edge <jake@lwn.net> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c5
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index aa763ab00777..fb45615943c2 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -322,7 +322,10 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
wchan = get_wchan(task);
if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0)
- return sprintf(buffer, "%lu", wchan);
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return sprintf(buffer, "%lu", wchan);
else
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", symname);
}