diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-07-27 05:23:44 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-07-27 05:23:44 +0200 |
commit | 4836e3007882984279ca63d3c42bf0b14616eb78 (patch) | |
tree | 28bf22726964e068b825491d71a141eefedbe5f8 /fs/proc/base.c | |
parent | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kkeil/ISDN-2.6 (diff) | |
parent | [PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handling (diff) | |
download | linux-4836e3007882984279ca63d3c42bf0b14616eb78.tar.xz linux-4836e3007882984279ca63d3c42bf0b14616eb78.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (39 commits)
[PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handling
[PATCH] get rid of corner case in dup3() entirely
[PATCH] remove remaining namei_{32,64}.h crap
[PATCH] get rid of indirect users of namei.h
[PATCH] get rid of __user_path_lookup_open
[PATCH] f_count may wrap around
[PATCH] dup3 fix
[PATCH] don't pass nameidata to __ncp_lookup_validate()
[PATCH] don't pass nameidata to gfs2_lookupi()
[PATCH] new (local) helper: user_path_parent()
[PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al.
[PATCH] preparation to __user_walk_fd cleanup
[PATCH] kill nameidata passing to permission(), rename to inode_permission()
[PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that care
Re: [PATCH 3/6] vfs: open_exec cleanup
[patch 4/4] vfs: immutable inode checking cleanup
[patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_change
[patch 2/4] vfs: utimes cleanup
[patch 1/4] vfs: utimes: move owner check into inode_change_ok()
[PATCH] vfs: use kstrdup() and check failing allocation
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/base.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index d744aa3c9f74..e74308bdabd3 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -1859,8 +1859,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fd_operations = { * /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still * access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid(). */ -static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, - struct nameidata *nd) +static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { int rv; |