diff options
author | Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> | 2020-09-01 14:19:48 +0200 |
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committer | Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> | 2020-09-01 14:19:48 +0200 |
commit | ead5d1f4d877e92c051e1a1ade623d0d30e71619 (patch) | |
tree | cb9db5698a546e7b96f7d5bef5ce544629dd37a2 /fs/proc/base.c | |
parent | scif: Fix spelling of EACCES (diff) | |
parent | Merge tag 'docs-5.9-3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux (diff) | |
download | linux-ead5d1f4d877e92c051e1a1ade623d0d30e71619.tar.xz linux-ead5d1f4d877e92c051e1a1ade623d0d30e71619.zip |
Merge branch 'master' into for-next
Sync with Linus' branch in order to be able to apply fixups
of more recent patches.
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/base.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 264 |
1 files changed, 133 insertions, 131 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index c7c64272b0fa..617db4e0faa0 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -405,11 +405,11 @@ print0: static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task) { - int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); if (err) return err; if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) { - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); return -EPERM; } return 0; @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task) static void unlock_trace(struct task_struct *task) { - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); } #ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE @@ -551,8 +551,17 @@ static int proc_oom_score(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, { unsigned long totalpages = totalram_pages() + total_swap_pages; unsigned long points = 0; + long badness; + + badness = oom_badness(task, totalpages); + /* + * Special case OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN for all others scale the + * badness value into [0, 2000] range which we have been + * exporting for a long time so userspace might depend on it. + */ + if (badness != LONG_MIN) + points = (1000 + badness * 1000 / (long)totalpages) * 2 / 3; - points = oom_badness(task, totalpages) * 1000 / totalpages; seq_printf(m, "%lu\n", points); return 0; @@ -697,13 +706,21 @@ int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) * May current process learn task's sched/cmdline info (for hide_pid_min=1) * or euid/egid (for hide_pid_min=2)? */ -static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid, +static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct task_struct *task, - int hide_pid_min) + enum proc_hidepid hide_pid_min) { - if (pid->hide_pid < hide_pid_min) + /* + * If 'hidpid' mount option is set force a ptrace check, + * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall + * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS + */ + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) + return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); + + if (fs_info->hide_pid < hide_pid_min) return true; - if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid)) + if (in_group_p(fs_info->pid_gid)) return true; return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); } @@ -711,18 +728,18 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid, static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { - struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *task; bool has_perms; task = get_proc_task(inode); if (!task) return -ESRCH; - has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS); + has_perms = has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS); put_task_struct(task); if (!has_perms) { - if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { /* * Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open() * consistent with each other. If a process @@ -746,7 +763,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_def_inode_operations = { static int proc_single_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct inode *inode = m->private; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); struct pid *pid = proc_pid(inode); struct task_struct *task; int ret; @@ -1415,7 +1432,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fail_nth_operations = { static int sched_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct inode *inode = m->private; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *p; p = get_proc_task(inode); @@ -1573,6 +1590,7 @@ static ssize_t timens_offsets_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, noffsets = 0; for (pos = kbuf; pos; pos = next_line) { struct proc_timens_offset *off = &offsets[noffsets]; + char clock[10]; int err; /* Find the end of line and ensure we don't look past it */ @@ -1584,10 +1602,21 @@ static ssize_t timens_offsets_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, next_line = NULL; } - err = sscanf(pos, "%u %lld %lu", &off->clockid, + err = sscanf(pos, "%9s %lld %lu", clock, &off->val.tv_sec, &off->val.tv_nsec); if (err != 3 || off->val.tv_nsec >= NSEC_PER_SEC) goto out; + + clock[sizeof(clock) - 1] = 0; + if (strcmp(clock, "monotonic") == 0 || + strcmp(clock, __stringify(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)) == 0) + off->clockid = CLOCK_MONOTONIC; + else if (strcmp(clock, "boottime") == 0 || + strcmp(clock, __stringify(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)) == 0) + off->clockid = CLOCK_BOOTTIME; + else + goto out; + noffsets++; if (noffsets == ARRAY_SIZE(offsets)) { if (next_line) @@ -1834,11 +1863,25 @@ void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, *rgid = gid; } +void proc_pid_evict_inode(struct proc_inode *ei) +{ + struct pid *pid = ei->pid; + + if (S_ISDIR(ei->vfs_inode.i_mode)) { + spin_lock(&pid->lock); + hlist_del_init_rcu(&ei->sibling_inodes); + spin_unlock(&pid->lock); + } + + put_pid(pid); +} + struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode) { struct inode * inode; struct proc_inode *ei; + struct pid *pid; /* We need a new inode */ @@ -1856,10 +1899,18 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, /* * grab the reference to task. */ - ei->pid = get_task_pid(task, PIDTYPE_PID); - if (!ei->pid) + pid = get_task_pid(task, PIDTYPE_PID); + if (!pid) goto out_unlock; + /* Let the pid remember us for quick removal */ + ei->pid = pid; + if (S_ISDIR(mode)) { + spin_lock(&pid->lock); + hlist_add_head_rcu(&ei->sibling_inodes, &pid->inodes); + spin_unlock(&pid->lock); + } + task_dump_owner(task, 0, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); security_task_to_inode(task, inode); @@ -1875,7 +1926,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry); - struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *task; generic_fillattr(inode, stat); @@ -1885,7 +1936,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, rcu_read_lock(); task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); if (task) { - if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) { + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) { rcu_read_unlock(); /* * This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists, @@ -2070,11 +2121,11 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) goto out; if (!dname_to_vma_addr(dentry, &vm_start, &vm_end)) { - status = down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem); + status = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); if (!status) { exact_vma_exists = !!find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, vm_end); - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); } } @@ -2121,7 +2172,7 @@ static int map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) if (rc) goto out_mmput; - rc = down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem); + rc = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); if (rc) goto out_mmput; @@ -2132,7 +2183,7 @@ static int map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) path_get(path); rc = 0; } - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); out_mmput: mmput(mm); @@ -2147,16 +2198,16 @@ struct map_files_info { }; /* - * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the - * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the - * path to the file in question. + * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due + * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on + * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question. */ static const char * proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct delayed_call *done) { - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(&init_user_ns)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); return proc_pid_get_link(dentry, inode, done); @@ -2222,7 +2273,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, goto out_put_task; result = ERR_PTR(-EINTR); - if (down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem)) + if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm)) goto out_put_mm; result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -2235,7 +2286,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, (void *)(unsigned long)vma->vm_file->f_mode); out_no_vma: - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); out_put_mm: mmput(mm); out_put_task: @@ -2280,7 +2331,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) if (!mm) goto out_put_task; - ret = down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem); + ret = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); if (ret) { mmput(mm); goto out_put_task; @@ -2291,11 +2342,11 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) /* * We need two passes here: * - * 1) Collect vmas of mapped files with mmap_sem taken - * 2) Release mmap_sem and instantiate entries + * 1) Collect vmas of mapped files with mmap_lock taken + * 2) Release mmap_lock and instantiate entries * * otherwise we get lockdep complained, since filldir() - * routine might require mmap_sem taken in might_fault(). + * routine might require mmap_lock taken in might_fault(). */ for (vma = mm->mmap, pos = 2; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { @@ -2307,7 +2358,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) p = genradix_ptr_alloc(&fa, nr_files++, GFP_KERNEL); if (!p) { ret = -ENOMEM; - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); mmput(mm); goto out_put_task; } @@ -2316,7 +2367,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) p->end = vma->vm_end; p->mode = vma->vm_file->f_mode; } - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); mmput(mm); for (i = 0; i < nr_files; i++) { @@ -2436,7 +2487,7 @@ static int proc_timers_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return -ENOMEM; tp->pid = proc_pid(inode); - tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); return 0; } @@ -2736,6 +2787,15 @@ static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = { LSM_DIR_OPS(smack); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR +static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = { + ATTR("apparmor", "current", 0666), + ATTR("apparmor", "prev", 0444), + ATTR("apparmor", "exec", 0666), +}; +LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor); +#endif + static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { ATTR(NULL, "current", 0666), ATTR(NULL, "prev", 0444), @@ -2747,6 +2807,10 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { DIR("smack", 0555, proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR + DIR("apparmor", 0555, + proc_apparmor_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_apparmor_attr_dir_ops), +#endif }; static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -2861,7 +2925,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh unsigned long flags; int result; - result = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + result = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); if (result) return result; @@ -2897,7 +2961,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh result = 0; out_unlock: - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); return result; } @@ -3230,90 +3294,28 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_tgid_base_inode_operations = { .permission = proc_pid_permission, }; -static void proc_flush_task_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt, pid_t pid, pid_t tgid) -{ - struct dentry *dentry, *leader, *dir; - char buf[10 + 1]; - struct qstr name; - - name.name = buf; - name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", pid); - /* no ->d_hash() rejects on procfs */ - dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(mnt->mnt_root, &name); - if (dentry) { - d_invalidate(dentry); - dput(dentry); - } - - if (pid == tgid) - return; - - name.name = buf; - name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", tgid); - leader = d_hash_and_lookup(mnt->mnt_root, &name); - if (!leader) - goto out; - - name.name = "task"; - name.len = strlen(name.name); - dir = d_hash_and_lookup(leader, &name); - if (!dir) - goto out_put_leader; - - name.name = buf; - name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", pid); - dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(dir, &name); - if (dentry) { - d_invalidate(dentry); - dput(dentry); - } - - dput(dir); -out_put_leader: - dput(leader); -out: - return; -} - /** - * proc_flush_task - Remove dcache entries for @task from the /proc dcache. - * @task: task that should be flushed. - * - * When flushing dentries from proc, one needs to flush them from global - * proc (proc_mnt) and from all the namespaces' procs this task was seen - * in. This call is supposed to do all of this job. + * proc_flush_pid - Remove dcache entries for @pid from the /proc dcache. + * @pid: pid that should be flushed. * - * Looks in the dcache for - * /proc/@pid - * /proc/@tgid/task/@pid - * if either directory is present flushes it and all of it'ts children - * from the dcache. + * This function walks a list of inodes (that belong to any proc + * filesystem) that are attached to the pid and flushes them from + * the dentry cache. * * It is safe and reasonable to cache /proc entries for a task until * that task exits. After that they just clog up the dcache with * useless entries, possibly causing useful dcache entries to be - * flushed instead. This routine is proved to flush those useless - * dcache entries at process exit time. + * flushed instead. This routine is provided to flush those useless + * dcache entries when a process is reaped. * * NOTE: This routine is just an optimization so it does not guarantee - * that no dcache entries will exist at process exit time it - * just makes it very unlikely that any will persist. + * that no dcache entries will exist after a process is reaped + * it just makes it very unlikely that any will persist. */ -void proc_flush_task(struct task_struct *task) +void proc_flush_pid(struct pid *pid) { - int i; - struct pid *pid, *tgid; - struct upid *upid; - - pid = task_pid(task); - tgid = task_tgid(task); - - for (i = 0; i <= pid->level; i++) { - upid = &pid->numbers[i]; - proc_flush_task_mnt(upid->ns->proc_mnt, upid->nr, - tgid->numbers[i].nr); - } + proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache(&pid->inodes, &pid->lock); } static struct dentry *proc_pid_instantiate(struct dentry * dentry, @@ -3340,6 +3342,7 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { struct task_struct *task; unsigned tgid; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; struct pid_namespace *ns; struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3347,7 +3350,8 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) if (tgid == ~0U) goto out; - ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info; + fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb); + ns = fs_info->pid_ns; rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tgid, ns); if (task) @@ -3356,7 +3360,14 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) if (!task) goto out; + /* Limit procfs to only ptraceable tasks */ + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) { + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS)) + goto out_put_task; + } + result = proc_pid_instantiate(dentry, task, NULL); +out_put_task: put_task_struct(task); out: return result; @@ -3382,20 +3393,8 @@ retry: pid = find_ge_pid(iter.tgid, ns); if (pid) { iter.tgid = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns); - iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID); - /* What we to know is if the pid we have find is the - * pid of a thread_group_leader. Testing for task - * being a thread_group_leader is the obvious thing - * todo but there is a window when it fails, due to - * the pid transfer logic in de_thread. - * - * So we perform the straight forward test of seeing - * if the pid we have found is the pid of a thread - * group leader, and don't worry if the task we have - * found doesn't happen to be a thread group leader. - * As we don't care in the case of readdir. - */ - if (!iter.task || !has_group_leader_pid(iter.task)) { + iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID); + if (!iter.task) { iter.tgid += 1; goto retry; } @@ -3411,20 +3410,21 @@ retry: int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) { struct tgid_iter iter; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file)); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(file_inode(file)->i_sb); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file)->i_sb); loff_t pos = ctx->pos; if (pos >= PID_MAX_LIMIT + TGID_OFFSET) return 0; if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 2) { - struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_self); + struct inode *inode = d_inode(fs_info->proc_self); if (!dir_emit(ctx, "self", 4, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK)) return 0; ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1; } if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 1) { - struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_thread_self); + struct inode *inode = d_inode(fs_info->proc_thread_self); if (!dir_emit(ctx, "thread-self", 11, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK)) return 0; ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1; @@ -3438,7 +3438,7 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) unsigned int len; cond_resched(); - if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) continue; len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%u", iter.tgid); @@ -3638,6 +3638,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry struct task_struct *task; struct task_struct *leader = get_proc_task(dir); unsigned tid; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; struct pid_namespace *ns; struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3648,7 +3649,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry if (tid == ~0U) goto out; - ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info; + fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb); + ns = fs_info->pid_ns; rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tid, ns); if (task) @@ -3762,7 +3764,7 @@ static int proc_task_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) /* f_version caches the tgid value that the last readdir call couldn't * return. lseek aka telldir automagically resets f_version to 0. */ - ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); tid = (int)file->f_version; file->f_version = 0; for (task = first_tid(proc_pid(inode), tid, ctx->pos - 2, ns); |