diff options
| author | Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> | 2015-03-09 22:11:12 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-03-17 17:31:30 +0100 |
| commit | ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce (patch) | |
| tree | 93fdcd656a687ca3fa5f717f9ce078cd8aea6c70 /fs/proc | |
| parent | Linux 4.0-rc4 (diff) | |
| download | linux-ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce.tar.xz linux-ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce.zip | |
pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index 956b75d61809..6dee68d013ff 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -1325,6 +1325,9 @@ out: static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { + /* do not disclose physical addresses: attack vector */ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; pr_warn_once("Bits 55-60 of /proc/PID/pagemap entries are about " "to stop being page-shift some time soon. See the " "linux/Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt for details.\n"); |