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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-12-15 05:36:37 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-12-15 05:36:37 +0100 |
commit | 67e2c3883828b39548cee2091b36656787775d95 (patch) | |
tree | 975a0f546a604beda30d4ede34f8e9cca9a88b71 /fs/read_write.c | |
parent | Merge tag 'char-misc-3.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/g... (diff) | |
parent | Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next (diff) | |
download | linux-67e2c3883828b39548cee2091b36656787775d95.tar.xz linux-67e2c3883828b39548cee2091b36656787775d95.zip |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
SELinux, and integrity code.
The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading
keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: Remove security_ops extern
security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
VFS: refactor vfs_read()
ima: require signature based appraisal
integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
ima: added error messages to template-related functions
ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
ima: report policy load status
ima: use path names cache
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/read_write.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/read_write.c | 24 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c index 7d9318c3d43c..c0805c93b6fa 100644 --- a/fs/read_write.c +++ b/fs/read_write.c @@ -412,6 +412,23 @@ ssize_t new_sync_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *p EXPORT_SYMBOL(new_sync_read); +ssize_t __vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, + loff_t *pos) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + if (file->f_op->read) + ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos); + else if (file->f_op->aio_read) + ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos); + else if (file->f_op->read_iter) + ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos); + else + ret = -EINVAL; + + return ret; +} + ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos) { ssize_t ret; @@ -426,12 +443,7 @@ ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos) ret = rw_verify_area(READ, file, pos, count); if (ret >= 0) { count = ret; - if (file->f_op->read) - ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos); - else if (file->f_op->aio_read) - ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos); - else - ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos); + ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, pos); if (ret > 0) { fsnotify_access(file); add_rchar(current, ret); |