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author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2019-07-22 18:26:22 +0200 |
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committer | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2019-08-13 04:33:50 +0200 |
commit | 3fda4c617e84c21c8a03b7cc2b3dbfe6c6461592 (patch) | |
tree | f46447d98e4087e1c3b7a7240c44a80b5fd1ed6c /fs/verity/enable.c | |
parent | fs-verity: add data verification hooks for ->readpages() (diff) | |
download | linux-3fda4c617e84c21c8a03b7cc2b3dbfe6c6461592.tar.xz linux-3fda4c617e84c21c8a03b7cc2b3dbfe6c6461592.zip |
fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl
Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl. This ioctl enables fs-verity on a file.
See the "FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section of
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/verity/enable.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/enable.c | 363 |
1 files changed, 363 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..df5dab03f0c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/verity/enable.c @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * fs/verity/enable.c: ioctl to enable verity on a file + * + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC + */ + +#include "fsverity_private.h" + +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> + +static int build_merkle_tree_level(struct inode *inode, unsigned int level, + u64 num_blocks_to_hash, + const struct merkle_tree_params *params, + u8 *pending_hashes, + struct ahash_request *req) +{ + const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop; + unsigned int pending_size = 0; + u64 dst_block_num; + u64 i; + int err; + + if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE)) /* checked earlier too */ + return -EINVAL; + + if (level < params->num_levels) { + dst_block_num = params->level_start[level]; + } else { + if (WARN_ON(num_blocks_to_hash != 1)) + return -EINVAL; + dst_block_num = 0; /* unused */ + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_blocks_to_hash; i++) { + struct page *src_page; + + if ((pgoff_t)i % 10000 == 0 || i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash) + pr_debug("Hashing block %llu of %llu for level %u\n", + i + 1, num_blocks_to_hash, level); + + if (level == 0) { + /* Leaf: hashing a data block */ + src_page = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, i, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(src_page)) { + err = PTR_ERR(src_page); + fsverity_err(inode, + "Error %d reading data page %llu", + err, i); + return err; + } + } else { + /* Non-leaf: hashing hash block from level below */ + src_page = vops->read_merkle_tree_page(inode, + params->level_start[level - 1] + i); + if (IS_ERR(src_page)) { + err = PTR_ERR(src_page); + fsverity_err(inode, + "Error %d reading Merkle tree page %llu", + err, params->level_start[level - 1] + i); + return err; + } + } + + err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, src_page, + &pending_hashes[pending_size]); + put_page(src_page); + if (err) + return err; + pending_size += params->digest_size; + + if (level == params->num_levels) /* Root hash? */ + return 0; + + if (pending_size + params->digest_size > params->block_size || + i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash) { + /* Flush the pending hash block */ + memset(&pending_hashes[pending_size], 0, + params->block_size - pending_size); + err = vops->write_merkle_tree_block(inode, + pending_hashes, + dst_block_num, + params->log_blocksize); + if (err) { + fsverity_err(inode, + "Error %d writing Merkle tree block %llu", + err, dst_block_num); + return err; + } + dst_block_num++; + pending_size = 0; + } + + if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) + return -EINTR; + cond_resched(); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Build the Merkle tree for the given inode using the given parameters, and + * return the root hash in @root_hash. + * + * The tree is written to a filesystem-specific location as determined by the + * ->write_merkle_tree_block() method. However, the blocks that comprise the + * tree are the same for all filesystems. + */ +static int build_merkle_tree(struct inode *inode, + const struct merkle_tree_params *params, + u8 *root_hash) +{ + u8 *pending_hashes; + struct ahash_request *req; + u64 blocks; + unsigned int level; + int err = -ENOMEM; + + if (inode->i_size == 0) { + /* Empty file is a special case; root hash is all 0's */ + memset(root_hash, 0, params->digest_size); + return 0; + } + + pending_hashes = kmalloc(params->block_size, GFP_KERNEL); + req = ahash_request_alloc(params->hash_alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pending_hashes || !req) + goto out; + + /* + * Build each level of the Merkle tree, starting at the leaf level + * (level 0) and ascending to the root node (level 'num_levels - 1'). + * Then at the end (level 'num_levels'), calculate the root hash. + */ + blocks = (inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >> + params->log_blocksize; + for (level = 0; level <= params->num_levels; level++) { + err = build_merkle_tree_level(inode, level, blocks, params, + pending_hashes, req); + if (err) + goto out; + blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >> + params->log_arity; + } + memcpy(root_hash, pending_hashes, params->digest_size); + err = 0; +out: + kfree(pending_hashes); + ahash_request_free(req); + return err; +} + +static int enable_verity(struct file *filp, + const struct fsverity_enable_arg *arg) +{ + struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); + const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop; + struct merkle_tree_params params = { }; + struct fsverity_descriptor *desc; + size_t desc_size = sizeof(*desc); + struct fsverity_info *vi; + int err; + + /* Start initializing the fsverity_descriptor */ + desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) + return -ENOMEM; + desc->version = 1; + desc->hash_algorithm = arg->hash_algorithm; + desc->log_blocksize = ilog2(arg->block_size); + + /* Get the salt if the user provided one */ + if (arg->salt_size && + copy_from_user(desc->salt, + (const u8 __user *)(uintptr_t)arg->salt_ptr, + arg->salt_size)) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + desc->salt_size = arg->salt_size; + + desc->data_size = cpu_to_le64(inode->i_size); + + /* Prepare the Merkle tree parameters */ + err = fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(¶ms, inode, + arg->hash_algorithm, + desc->log_blocksize, + desc->salt, desc->salt_size); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* + * Start enabling verity on this file, serialized by the inode lock. + * Fail if verity is already enabled or is already being enabled. + */ + inode_lock(inode); + if (IS_VERITY(inode)) + err = -EEXIST; + else + err = vops->begin_enable_verity(filp); + inode_unlock(inode); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* + * Build the Merkle tree. Don't hold the inode lock during this, since + * on huge files this may take a very long time and we don't want to + * force unrelated syscalls like chown() to block forever. We don't + * need the inode lock here because deny_write_access() already prevents + * the file from being written to or truncated, and we still serialize + * ->begin_enable_verity() and ->end_enable_verity() using the inode + * lock and only allow one process to be here at a time on a given file. + */ + pr_debug("Building Merkle tree...\n"); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(desc->root_hash) < FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); + err = build_merkle_tree(inode, ¶ms, desc->root_hash); + if (err) { + fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d building Merkle tree", err); + goto rollback; + } + pr_debug("Done building Merkle tree. Root hash is %s:%*phN\n", + params.hash_alg->name, params.digest_size, desc->root_hash); + + /* + * Create the fsverity_info. Don't bother trying to save work by + * reusing the merkle_tree_params from above. Instead, just create the + * fsverity_info from the fsverity_descriptor as if it were just loaded + * from disk. This is simpler, and it serves as an extra check that the + * metadata we're writing is valid before actually enabling verity. + */ + vi = fsverity_create_info(inode, desc, desc_size); + if (IS_ERR(vi)) { + err = PTR_ERR(vi); + goto rollback; + } + + /* + * Tell the filesystem to finish enabling verity on the file. + * Serialized with ->begin_enable_verity() by the inode lock. + */ + inode_lock(inode); + err = vops->end_enable_verity(filp, desc, desc_size, params.tree_size); + inode_unlock(inode); + if (err) { + fsverity_err(inode, "%ps() failed with err %d", + vops->end_enable_verity, err); + fsverity_free_info(vi); + } else if (WARN_ON(!IS_VERITY(inode))) { + err = -EINVAL; + fsverity_free_info(vi); + } else { + /* Successfully enabled verity */ + + /* + * Readers can start using ->i_verity_info immediately, so it + * can't be rolled back once set. So don't set it until just + * after the filesystem has successfully enabled verity. + */ + fsverity_set_info(inode, vi); + } +out: + kfree(params.hashstate); + kfree(desc); + return err; + +rollback: + inode_lock(inode); + (void)vops->end_enable_verity(filp, NULL, 0, params.tree_size); + inode_unlock(inode); + goto out; +} + +/** + * fsverity_ioctl_enable() - enable verity on a file + * + * Enable fs-verity on a file. See the "FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section of + * Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation. + * + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure + */ +int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg) +{ + struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); + struct fsverity_enable_arg arg; + int err; + + if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (arg.version != 1) + return -EINVAL; + + if (arg.__reserved1 || + memchr_inv(arg.__reserved2, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved2))) + return -EINVAL; + + if (arg.block_size != PAGE_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + if (arg.salt_size > FIELD_SIZEOF(struct fsverity_descriptor, salt)) + return -EMSGSIZE; + + if (arg.sig_size) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Require a regular file with write access. But the actual fd must + * still be readonly so that we can lock out all writers. This is + * needed to guarantee that no writable fds exist to the file once it + * has verity enabled, and to stabilize the data being hashed. + */ + + err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE); + if (err) + return err; + + if (IS_APPEND(inode)) + return -EPERM; + + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) + return -EISDIR; + + if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return -EINVAL; + + err = mnt_want_write_file(filp); + if (err) /* -EROFS */ + return err; + + err = deny_write_access(filp); + if (err) /* -ETXTBSY */ + goto out_drop_write; + + err = enable_verity(filp, &arg); + if (err) + goto out_allow_write_access; + + /* + * Some pages of the file may have been evicted from pagecache after + * being used in the Merkle tree construction, then read into pagecache + * again by another process reading from the file concurrently. Since + * these pages didn't undergo verification against the file measurement + * which fs-verity now claims to be enforcing, we have to wipe the + * pagecache to ensure that all future reads are verified. + */ + filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping); + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); + + /* + * allow_write_access() is needed to pair with deny_write_access(). + * Regardless, the filesystem won't allow writing to verity files. + */ +out_allow_write_access: + allow_write_access(filp); +out_drop_write: + mnt_drop_write_file(filp); + return err; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_ioctl_enable); |