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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-08-04 19:28:39 +0200 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-08-04 19:28:39 +0200 |
commit | 7e6880951da86928c7f6cecf26dcb8e8d9f826da (patch) | |
tree | 1ad8af6c52e06710f93847933c2720751100d668 /fs | |
parent | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/steve/gfs2-2.6-nmw (diff) | |
parent | AppArmor: fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_cred (diff) | |
download | linux-7e6880951da86928c7f6cecf26dcb8e8d9f826da.tar.xz linux-7e6880951da86928c7f6cecf26dcb8e8d9f826da.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (90 commits)
AppArmor: fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_cred
selinux: convert the policy type_attr_map to flex_array
AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module
TOMOYO: Use pathname specified by policy rather than execve()
AppArmor: update path_truncate method to latest version
AppArmor: core policy routines
AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects
AppArmor: LSM interface, and security module initialization
AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module
AppArmor: update Maintainer and Documentation
AppArmor: functions for domain transitions
AppArmor: file enforcement routines
AppArmor: userspace interfaces
AppArmor: dfa match engine
AppArmor: contexts used in attaching policy to system objects
AppArmor: basic auditing infrastructure.
AppArmor: misc. base functions and defines
TOMOYO: Update version to 2.3.0
TOMOYO: Fix quota check.
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/fuse/dir.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/namei.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/nfs/dir.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/open.c | 11 |
4 files changed, 9 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 3cdc5f78a406..431be0795b6b 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) exist. So if permissions are revoked this won't be noticed immediately, only after the attribute timeout has expired */ - } else if (mask & MAY_ACCESS) { + } else if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS | MAY_CHDIR)) { err = fuse_access(inode, mask); } else if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) { if (!(inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO)) { diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 868d0cb9d473..42d2d28fb827 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -282,8 +282,7 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (retval) return retval; - return security_inode_permission(inode, - mask & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND)); + return security_inode_permission(inode, mask); } /** @@ -1484,8 +1483,7 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct path *path) */ error = locks_verify_locked(inode); if (!error) - error = security_path_truncate(path, 0, - ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN); + error = security_path_truncate(path); if (!error) { error = do_truncate(path->dentry, 0, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN, diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c index e60416d3f818..832e9e239324 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c @@ -1953,7 +1953,7 @@ int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if ((mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)) == 0) goto out; /* Is this sys_access() ? */ - if (mask & MAY_ACCESS) + if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS | MAY_CHDIR)) goto force_lookup; switch (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) { diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 5463266db9e6..0d1fa3dc0efb 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static long do_sys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length) error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length); if (!error) - error = security_path_truncate(&path, length, 0); + error = security_path_truncate(&path); if (!error) error = do_truncate(path.dentry, length, 0, NULL); @@ -165,8 +165,7 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small) error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length); if (!error) - error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path, length, - ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME); + error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path); if (!error) error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, file); out_putf: @@ -367,7 +366,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chdir, const char __user *, filename) if (error) goto out; - error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS); + error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR); if (error) goto dput_and_out; @@ -396,7 +395,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd) if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) goto out_putf; - error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS); + error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR); if (!error) set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &file->f_path); out_putf: @@ -414,7 +413,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename) if (error) goto out; - error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS); + error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR); if (error) goto dput_and_out; |