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author | Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2017-01-18 11:53:44 +0100 |
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committer | Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2017-04-18 20:42:36 +0200 |
commit | 5f0d5a3ae7cff0d7fa943c199c3a2e44f23e1fac (patch) | |
tree | b7ba2116923723e193dfe7c633ec10056c6b1b53 /include/net/sock.h | |
parent | Linux 4.11-rc2 (diff) | |
download | linux-5f0d5a3ae7cff0d7fa943c199c3a2e44f23e1fac.tar.xz linux-5f0d5a3ae7cff0d7fa943c199c3a2e44f23e1fac.zip |
mm: Rename SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
A group of Linux kernel hackers reported chasing a bug that resulted
from their assumption that SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU provided an existence
guarantee, that is, that no block from such a slab would be reallocated
during an RCU read-side critical section. Of course, that is not the
case. Instead, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU only prevents freeing of an entire
slab of blocks.
However, there is a phrase for this, namely "type safety". This commit
therefore renames SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU in order
to avoid future instances of this sort of confusion.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
[ paulmck: Add comments mentioning the old name, as requested by Eric
Dumazet, in order to help people familiar with the old name find
the new one. ]
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/sock.h')
-rw-r--r-- | include/net/sock.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index 5e5997654db6..59cdccaa30e7 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -993,7 +993,7 @@ struct smc_hashinfo; struct module; /* - * caches using SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU should let .next pointer from nulls nodes + * caches using SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU should let .next pointer from nulls nodes * un-modified. Special care is taken when initializing object to zero. */ static inline void sk_prot_clear_nulls(struct sock *sk, int size) |