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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-03-27 19:17:23 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-03-27 19:17:23 +0200
commit7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8 (patch)
tree65fbc9c0df5a2989b68882ce1d893a0d78134c6a /kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
parentMerge tag 'trace-v5.18-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ro... (diff)
parentkvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR (diff)
downloadlinux-7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8.tar.xz
linux-7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8.zip
Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra: "Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen), which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP. Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1]. CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides, as described above, speculation limits itself" [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html * tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits) kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0 x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0 kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions objtool: Validate IBT assumptions objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation x86: Annotate idtentry_df() x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h x86: Annotate call_on_stack() objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/trampoline.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/trampoline.c20
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
index 0b41fa993825..ada97751ae1b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
@@ -117,18 +117,6 @@ static void bpf_trampoline_module_put(struct bpf_trampoline *tr)
tr->mod = NULL;
}
-static int is_ftrace_location(void *ip)
-{
- long addr;
-
- addr = ftrace_location((long)ip);
- if (!addr)
- return 0;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(addr != (long)ip))
- return -EFAULT;
- return 1;
-}
-
static int unregister_fentry(struct bpf_trampoline *tr, void *old_addr)
{
void *ip = tr->func.addr;
@@ -160,12 +148,12 @@ static int modify_fentry(struct bpf_trampoline *tr, void *old_addr, void *new_ad
static int register_fentry(struct bpf_trampoline *tr, void *new_addr)
{
void *ip = tr->func.addr;
+ unsigned long faddr;
int ret;
- ret = is_ftrace_location(ip);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- tr->func.ftrace_managed = ret;
+ faddr = ftrace_location((unsigned long)ip);
+ if (faddr)
+ tr->func.ftrace_managed = true;
if (bpf_trampoline_module_get(tr))
return -ENOENT;