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authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2019-02-17 07:56:34 +0100
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2019-02-17 07:56:34 +0100
commit885e63195980ab25abc67336f0c44d4cb4e6e72b (patch)
treee16c90fe7e0400646dc73771790b5be47d143012 /kernel/bpf
parentnet: stmmac: use correct define to get rx timestamp on GMAC4 (diff)
parenttools/libbpf: support bigger BTF data sizes (diff)
downloadlinux-885e63195980ab25abc67336f0c44d4cb4e6e72b.tar.xz
linux-885e63195980ab25abc67336f0c44d4cb4e6e72b.zip
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Alexei Starovoitov says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2019-02-16 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. The main changes are: 1) numerous libbpf API improvements, from Andrii, Andrey, Yonghong. 2) test all bpf progs in alu32 mode, from Jiong. 3) skb->sk access and bpf_sk_fullsock(), bpf_tcp_sock() helpers, from Martin. 4) support for IP encap in lwt bpf progs, from Peter. 5) remove XDP_QUERY_XSK_UMEM dead code, from Jan. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/offload.c10
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c168
2 files changed, 134 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/offload.c b/kernel/bpf/offload.c
index 39dba8c90331..ba635209ae9a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/offload.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/offload.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static DECLARE_RWSEM(bpf_devs_lock);
struct bpf_offload_dev {
const struct bpf_prog_offload_ops *ops;
struct list_head netdevs;
+ void *priv;
};
struct bpf_offload_netdev {
@@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ unlock:
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_offload_dev_netdev_unregister);
struct bpf_offload_dev *
-bpf_offload_dev_create(const struct bpf_prog_offload_ops *ops)
+bpf_offload_dev_create(const struct bpf_prog_offload_ops *ops, void *priv)
{
struct bpf_offload_dev *offdev;
int err;
@@ -688,6 +689,7 @@ bpf_offload_dev_create(const struct bpf_prog_offload_ops *ops)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
offdev->ops = ops;
+ offdev->priv = priv;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&offdev->netdevs);
return offdev;
@@ -700,3 +702,9 @@ void bpf_offload_dev_destroy(struct bpf_offload_dev *offdev)
kfree(offdev);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_offload_dev_destroy);
+
+void *bpf_offload_dev_priv(struct bpf_offload_dev *offdev)
+{
+ return offdev->priv;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_offload_dev_priv);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index b63bc77af2d1..1b9496c41383 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -331,10 +331,19 @@ static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META;
}
+static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
+{
+ return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
+ type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
+ type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK;
+}
+
static bool reg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
return type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL ||
- type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL;
+ type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL ||
+ type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL ||
+ type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL;
}
static bool type_is_refcounted(enum bpf_reg_type type)
@@ -377,6 +386,12 @@ static bool is_release_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_release;
}
+static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
+{
+ return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp ||
+ func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp;
+}
+
/* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */
static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
[NOT_INIT] = "?",
@@ -392,6 +407,10 @@ static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
[PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys",
[PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock",
[PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL] = "sock_or_null",
+ [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common",
+ [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL] = "sock_common_or_null",
+ [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock",
+ [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL] = "tcp_sock_or_null",
};
static char slot_type_char[] = {
@@ -618,13 +637,10 @@ static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
}
/* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */
-static int __release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id)
+static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id)
{
int i, last_idx;
- if (!ptr_id)
- return -EFAULT;
-
last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1;
for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) {
@@ -636,21 +652,7 @@ static int __release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id)
return 0;
}
}
- return -EFAULT;
-}
-
-/* variation on the above for cases where we expect that there must be an
- * outstanding reference for the specified ptr_id.
- */
-static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ptr_id)
-{
- struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env);
- int err;
-
- err = __release_reference_state(state, ptr_id);
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err != 0))
- verbose(env, "verifier internal error: can't release reference\n");
- return err;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
static int transfer_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst,
@@ -1209,6 +1211,10 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
return true;
default:
return false;
@@ -1640,12 +1646,14 @@ static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off,
return 0;
}
-static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
- int size, enum bpf_access_type t)
+static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
+ u32 regno, int off, int size,
+ enum bpf_access_type t)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
- struct bpf_insn_access_aux info;
+ struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {};
+ bool valid;
if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
@@ -1653,13 +1661,31 @@ static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
return -EACCES;
}
- if (!bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info)) {
- verbose(env, "invalid bpf_sock access off=%d size=%d\n",
- off, size);
- return -EACCES;
+ switch (reg->type) {
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
+ valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
+ break;
+ case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
+ valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
+ break;
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
+ valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
+ break;
+ default:
+ valid = false;
}
- return 0;
+
+ if (valid) {
+ env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size =
+ info.ctx_field_size;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n",
+ regno, reg_type_str[reg->type], off, size);
+
+ return -EACCES;
}
static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
@@ -1685,8 +1711,14 @@ static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
{
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
- return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
- reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCKET;
+ return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX;
+}
+
+static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
+{
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
+
+ return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type);
}
static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
@@ -1797,6 +1829,12 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
pointer_desc = "sock ";
break;
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
+ pointer_desc = "sock_common ";
+ break;
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
+ pointer_desc = "tcp_sock ";
+ break;
default:
break;
}
@@ -2000,11 +2038,14 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
* PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter
* case, we know the offset is zero.
*/
- if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE)
+ if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
- else
+ } else {
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs,
value_regno);
+ if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg_type))
+ regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen;
+ }
regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
}
@@ -2050,12 +2091,13 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
- } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCKET) {
+ } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) {
if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
- verbose(env, "cannot write into socket\n");
+ verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
+ regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
}
- err = check_sock_access(env, regno, off, size, t);
+ err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t);
if (!err && value_regno >= 0)
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
} else {
@@ -2099,7 +2141,8 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins
if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
- is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
+ is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
+ is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_XADD stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
insn->dst_reg,
reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]);
@@ -2366,6 +2409,11 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno);
if (err < 0)
return err;
+ } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON) {
+ expected_type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON;
+ /* Any sk pointer can be ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON */
+ if (!type_is_sk_pointer(type))
+ goto err_type;
} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET) {
expected_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
if (type != expected_type)
@@ -2780,7 +2828,7 @@ static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
release_reg_references(env, vstate->frame[i], meta->ptr_id);
- return release_reference_state(env, meta->ptr_id);
+ return release_reference_state(cur_func(env), meta->ptr_id);
}
static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
@@ -3046,8 +3094,11 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn
}
} else if (is_release_function(func_id)) {
err = release_reference(env, &meta);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
+ func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return err;
+ }
}
regs = cur_regs(env);
@@ -3096,12 +3147,23 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn
regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
}
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) {
- int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
- if (id < 0)
- return id;
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL;
- regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
+ if (is_acquire_function(func_id)) {
+ int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
+
+ if (id < 0)
+ return id;
+ /* For release_reference() */
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
+ } else {
+ /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
+ }
+ } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) {
+ mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL;
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
} else {
verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
@@ -3361,6 +3423,10 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
@@ -4594,6 +4660,10 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state,
}
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) {
reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
+ } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL) {
+ reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON;
+ } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) {
+ reg->type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK;
}
if (is_null || !(reg_is_refcounted(reg) ||
reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg))) {
@@ -4618,7 +4688,7 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno,
int i, j;
if (reg_is_refcounted_or_null(&regs[regno]) && is_null)
- __release_reference_state(state, id);
+ release_reference_state(state, id);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, &regs[i], id, is_null);
@@ -5787,6 +5857,10 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
* would have accepted
*/
@@ -6107,6 +6181,10 @@ static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type)
case PTR_TO_CTX:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
return false;
default:
return true;
@@ -7109,8 +7187,12 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access;
break;
case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
+ case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access;
break;
+ case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
+ convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
+ break;
default:
continue;
}