bpf: Prevent escaping of kptr loaded from maps

While we can guarantee that even for unreferenced kptr, the object
pointer points to being freed etc. can be handled by the verifier's
exception handling (normal load patching to PROBE_MEM loads), we still
cannot allow the user to pass these pointers to BPF helpers and kfunc,
because the same exception handling won't be done for accesses inside
the kernel. The same is true if a referenced pointer is loaded using
normal load instruction. Since the reference is not guaranteed to be
held while the pointer is used, it must be marked as untrusted.

Hence introduce a new type flag, PTR_UNTRUSTED, which is used to mark
all registers loading unreferenced and referenced kptr from BPF maps,
and ensure they can never escape the BPF program and into the kernel by
way of calling stable/unstable helpers.

In check_ptr_to_btf_access, the !type_may_be_null check to reject type
flags is still correct, as apart from PTR_MAYBE_NULL, only MEM_USER,
MEM_PERCPU, and PTR_UNTRUSTED may be set for PTR_TO_BTF_ID. The first
two are checked inside the function and rejected using a proper error
message, but we still want to allow dereference of untrusted case.

Also, we make sure to inherit PTR_UNTRUSTED when chain of pointers are
walked, so that this flag is never dropped once it has been set on a
PTR_TO_BTF_ID (i.e. trusted to untrusted transition can only be in one
direction).

In convert_ctx_accesses, extend the switch case to consider untrusted
PTR_TO_BTF_ID in addition to normal PTR_TO_BTF_ID for PROBE_MEM
conversion for BPF_LDX.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220424214901.2743946-5-memxor@gmail.com

1 files changed, 28 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index c9ee44efed89..955c3125576a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -567,6 +567,8 @@ static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		strncpy(prefix, "user_", 32);
 	if (type & MEM_PERCPU)
 		strncpy(prefix, "percpu_", 32);
+	if (type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
+		strncpy(prefix, "untrusted_", 32);
 
 	snprintf(env->type_str_buf, TYPE_STR_BUF_LEN, "%s%s%s",
 		 prefix, str[base_type(type)], postfix);
@@ -3504,9 +3506,14 @@ static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			       struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno)
 {
 	const char *targ_name = kernel_type_name(off_desc->kptr.btf, off_desc->kptr.btf_id);
+	int perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
 	const char *reg_name = "";
 
-	if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || type_flag(reg->type) != PTR_MAYBE_NULL)
+	/* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */
+	if (off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF)
+		perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+
+	if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags))
 		goto bad_type;
 
 	if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
@@ -3553,7 +3560,12 @@ static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 bad_type:
 	verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno,
 		reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name);
-	verbose(env, "expected=%s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name);
+	verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name);
+	if (off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF)
+		verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED),
+			targ_name);
+	else
+		verbose(env, "\n");
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
@@ -3577,9 +3589,11 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-	/* We cannot directly access kptr_ref */
-	if (off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) {
-		verbose(env, "accessing referenced kptr disallowed\n");
+	/* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as
+	 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr.
+	 */
+	if (class != BPF_LDX && off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) {
+		verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n");
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
@@ -3589,7 +3603,7 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 		 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type.
 		 */
 		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, off_desc->kptr.btf,
-				off_desc->kptr.btf_id, PTR_MAYBE_NULL);
+				off_desc->kptr.btf_id, PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED);
 		/* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */
 		val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
 	} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
@@ -4358,6 +4372,12 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
+	/* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it
+	 * also inherit the untrusted flag.
+	 */
+	if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
+		flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+
 	if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
 		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag);
 
@@ -13076,7 +13096,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		if (!ctx_access)
 			continue;
 
-		switch (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) {
+		switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) {
 		case PTR_TO_CTX:
 			if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
 				continue;
@@ -13093,6 +13113,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
 			break;
 		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
+		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
 			if (type == BPF_READ) {
 				insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
 					BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);