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authorJann Horn <jannh@google.com>2020-04-17 02:00:07 +0200
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2020-04-21 03:41:34 +0200
commit8ff3571f7e1bf3f293cc5e3dc14f2943f4fa7fcf (patch)
treed1f5c6273b9160b4a90058afdd0271063f610a4c /kernel/bpf
parentbpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged users (diff)
downloadlinux-8ff3571f7e1bf3f293cc5e3dc14f2943f4fa7fcf.tar.xz
linux-8ff3571f7e1bf3f293cc5e3dc14f2943f4fa7fcf.zip
bpf: Fix handling of XADD on BTF memory
check_xadd() can cause check_ptr_to_btf_access() to be executed with atype==BPF_READ and value_regno==-1 (meaning "just check whether the access is okay, don't tell me what type it will result in"). Handle that case properly and skip writing type information, instead of indexing into the registers at index -1 and writing into out-of-bounds memory. Note that at least at the moment, you can't actually write through a BTF pointer, so check_xadd() will reject the program after calling check_ptr_to_btf_access with atype==BPF_WRITE; but that's after the verifier has already corrupted memory. This patch assumes that BTF pointers are not available in unprivileged programs. Fixes: 9e15db66136a ("bpf: Implement accurate raw_tp context access via BTF") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200417000007.10734-2-jannh@google.com
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 9e92d3d5ffd1..9382609147f5 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3099,7 +3099,7 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- if (atype == BPF_READ) {
+ if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
if (ret == SCALAR_VALUE) {
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
return 0;