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| author | Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com> | 2023-12-07 05:11:50 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> | 2023-12-07 22:58:10 +0100 |
| commit | 1d38a9ee81570c4bd61f557832dead4d6f816760 (patch) | |
| tree | ceead968fb8ab47e59d6c55e3bc087a68736c8a8 /kernel/bpf | |
| parent | bpf: Add verifier regression test for previous patch (diff) | |
| download | linux-1d38a9ee81570c4bd61f557832dead4d6f816760.tar.xz linux-1d38a9ee81570c4bd61f557832dead4d6f816760.zip | |
bpf: Guard stack limits against 32bit overflow
This patch promotes the arithmetic around checking stack bounds to be
done in the 64-bit domain, instead of the current 32bit. The arithmetic
implies adding together a 64-bit register with a int offset. The
register was checked to be below 1<<29 when it was variable, but not
when it was fixed. The offset either comes from an instruction (in which
case it is 16 bit), from another register (in which case the caller
checked it to be below 1<<29 [1]), or from the size of an argument to a
kfunc (in which case it can be a u32 [2]). Between the register being
inconsistently checked to be below 1<<29, and the offset being up to an
u32, it appears that we were open to overflowing the `int`s which were
currently used for arithmetic.
[1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/815fb87b753055df2d9e50f6cd80eb10235fe3e9/kernel/bpf/verifier.c#L7494-L7498
[2] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/815fb87b753055df2d9e50f6cd80eb10235fe3e9/kernel/bpf/verifier.c#L11904
Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231207041150.229139-4-andreimatei1@gmail.com
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 85e4ab61084f..0e77bb52542d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -6577,7 +6577,7 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and * -state->allocated_stack for reads. */ -static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off, +static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(s64 off, struct bpf_func_state *state, enum bpf_access_type t) { @@ -6606,7 +6606,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); - int min_off, max_off; + s64 min_off, max_off; int err; char *err_extra; @@ -6619,7 +6619,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( err_extra = " write to"; if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { - min_off = reg->var_off.value + off; + min_off = (s64)reg->var_off.value + off; max_off = min_off + access_size; } else { if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || |