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authorZhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>2021-05-25 04:56:59 +0200
committerAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>2021-05-25 06:13:05 +0200
commit8fb33b6055300a23f26868680c22a5726834785e (patch)
tree859ae2f446beff86d801bb218a613d0486c517a4 /kernel/bpf
parentsamples: bpf: Ix kernel-doc syntax in file header (diff)
downloadlinux-8fb33b6055300a23f26868680c22a5726834785e.tar.xz
linux-8fb33b6055300a23f26868680c22a5726834785e.zip
bpf: Fix spelling mistakes
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments: aother ==> another Netiher ==> Neither desribe ==> describe intializing ==> initializing funciton ==> function wont ==> won't and move the word 'the' at the end to the next line accross ==> across pathes ==> paths triggerred ==> triggered excute ==> execute ether ==> either conervative ==> conservative convetion ==> convention markes ==> marks interpeter ==> interpreter Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210525025659.8898-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/btf.c6
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/devmap.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/hashtab.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/trampoline.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c12
7 files changed, 16 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
index 2921ca39a93e..96ceed0e0fb5 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ void bpf_inode_storage_free(struct inode *inode)
return;
}
- /* Netiher the bpf_prog nor the bpf-map's syscall
+ /* Neither the bpf_prog nor the bpf-map's syscall
* could be modifying the local_storage->list now.
* Thus, no elem can be added-to or deleted-from the
* local_storage->list by the bpf_prog or by the bpf-map's syscall.
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index 85716327c375..a6e39c5ea0bf 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
* The BTF type section contains a list of 'struct btf_type' objects.
* Each one describes a C type. Recall from the above section
* that a 'struct btf_type' object could be immediately followed by extra
- * data in order to desribe some particular C types.
+ * data in order to describe some particular C types.
*
* type_id:
* ~~~~~~~
@@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@ static void *btf_show_obj_safe(struct btf_show *show,
/*
* We need a new copy to our safe object, either because we haven't
- * yet copied and are intializing safe data, or because the data
+ * yet copied and are initializing safe data, or because the data
* we want falls outside the boundaries of the safe object.
*/
if (!safe) {
@@ -3417,7 +3417,7 @@ static struct btf_kind_operations func_proto_ops = {
* BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO cannot be directly referred by
* a struct's member.
*
- * It should be a funciton pointer instead.
+ * It should be a function pointer instead.
* (i.e. struct's member -> BTF_KIND_PTR -> BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO)
*
* Hence, there is no btf_func_check_member().
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
index aa516472ce46..d60d617ec0d7 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
@@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ void __dev_flush(void)
}
/* rcu_read_lock (from syscall and BPF contexts) ensures that if a delete and/or
- * update happens in parallel here a dev_put wont happen until after reading the
- * ifindex.
+ * update happens in parallel here a dev_put won't happen until after reading
+ * the ifindex.
*/
static void *__dev_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key)
{
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
index 9da0a0413a53..6f6681b07364 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
@@ -46,12 +46,12 @@
* events, kprobes and tracing to be invoked before the prior invocation
* from one of these contexts completed. sys_bpf() uses the same mechanism
* by pinning the task to the current CPU and incrementing the recursion
- * protection accross the map operation.
+ * protection across the map operation.
*
* This has subtle implications on PREEMPT_RT. PREEMPT_RT forbids certain
* operations like memory allocations (even with GFP_ATOMIC) from atomic
* contexts. This is required because even with GFP_ATOMIC the memory
- * allocator calls into code pathes which acquire locks with long held lock
+ * allocator calls into code paths which acquire locks with long held lock
* sections. To ensure the deterministic behaviour these locks are regular
* spinlocks, which are converted to 'sleepable' spinlocks on RT. The only
* true atomic contexts on an RT kernel are the low level hardware
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c b/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c
index 4838922f723d..93a55391791a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static void reuseport_array_free(struct bpf_map *map)
/*
* ops->map_*_elem() will not be able to access this
* array now. Hence, this function only races with
- * bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() which was triggerred by
+ * bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() which was triggered by
* close() or disconnect().
*
* This function and bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() are
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
index 2d44b5aa0057..28a3630c48ee 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ static void notrace inc_misses_counter(struct bpf_prog *prog)
* __bpf_prog_enter returns:
* 0 - skip execution of the bpf prog
* 1 - execute bpf prog
- * [2..MAX_U64] - excute bpf prog and record execution time.
+ * [2..MAX_U64] - execute bpf prog and record execution time.
* This is start time.
*/
u64 notrace __bpf_prog_enter(struct bpf_prog *prog)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 9189eecb26dd..1de4b8c6ee42 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
* - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
* - out of bounds or malformed jumps
* The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
- * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
+ * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the
* analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
* insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
* Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
* If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
* .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
* R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
- * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL.
+ * returns either pointer to map value or NULL.
*
* When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
* insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
@@ -2616,7 +2616,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) {
/* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit
* stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of
- * scalar via different register has to be conervative.
+ * scalar via different register has to be conservative.
* Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise
* that contributed into 'reg' being a constant.
*/
@@ -9053,7 +9053,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
return 0;
- /* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
+ /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used
* to return the value from eBPF program.
* Make sure that it's readable at this time
* of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
@@ -9844,7 +9844,7 @@ static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring
* the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second
* time means that all states below this branch were already explored and
- * their final liveness markes are already propagated.
+ * their final liveness marks are already propagated.
* Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited()
* we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states
* as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state'
@@ -12464,7 +12464,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF;
/* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
- * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
+ * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal
* call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
* that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
*/