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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-04 21:56:09 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-04 21:56:09 +0100 |
| commit | 594cc251fdd0d231d342d88b2fdff4bc42fb0690 (patch) | |
| tree | 259269a399e6504a7cf8739201cf172d1cbb197a /kernel/exit.c | |
| parent | i915: fix missing user_access_end() in page fault exception case (diff) | |
| download | linux-594cc251fdd0d231d342d88b2fdff4bc42fb0690.tar.xz linux-594cc251fdd0d231d342d88b2fdff4bc42fb0690.zip | |
make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'
Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
direct (optimized) user access.
But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
actually been range-checked.
If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But
nothing really forces the range check.
By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people
trying to avoid them.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/exit.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/exit.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 8a01b671dc1f..2d14979577ee 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -1604,10 +1604,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, int, which, pid_t, upid, struct siginfo __user *, if (!infop) return err; - if (!access_ok(infop, sizeof(*infop))) + if (!user_access_begin(infop, sizeof(*infop))) return -EFAULT; - user_access_begin(); unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault); unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault); unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault); @@ -1732,10 +1731,9 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, if (!infop) return err; - if (!access_ok(infop, sizeof(*infop))) + if (!user_access_begin(infop, sizeof(*infop))) return -EFAULT; - user_access_begin(); unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault); unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault); unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault); |