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| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2016-10-28 10:22:25 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2017-06-30 21:00:51 +0200 |
| commit | 3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9 (patch) | |
| tree | 850c019e6a6449857e864b6a545b053ffe2f99a9 /kernel/futex.c | |
| parent | ARM: Prepare for randomized task_struct (diff) | |
| download | linux-3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9.tar.xz linux-3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9.zip | |
randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/futex.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/futex.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index 357348a6cf6b..5616511abf39 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ struct futex_pi_state { atomic_t refcount; union futex_key key; -}; +} __randomize_layout; /** * struct futex_q - The hashed futex queue entry, one per waiting task @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ struct futex_q { struct rt_mutex_waiter *rt_waiter; union futex_key *requeue_pi_key; u32 bitset; -}; +} __randomize_layout; static const struct futex_q futex_q_init = { /* list gets initialized in queue_me()*/ |