diff options
| author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2009-08-13 15:44:57 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2009-08-14 03:18:37 +0200 |
| commit | 9188499cdb117d86a1ea6b04374095b098d56936 (patch) | |
| tree | 7c0dd23f2c98630c426cbd0bfbf5e46cc689091e /kernel/kmod.c | |
| parent | Networking: use CAP_NET_ADMIN when deciding to call request_module (diff) | |
| download | linux-9188499cdb117d86a1ea6b04374095b098d56936.tar.xz linux-9188499cdb117d86a1ea6b04374095b098d56936.zip | |
security: introducing security_request_module
Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a
new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process
able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe
binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to
request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability
to call request_module().
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/kmod.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/kmod.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c index 385c31a1bdbf..5a7ae57f983f 100644 --- a/kernel/kmod.c +++ b/kernel/kmod.c @@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...) #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50 /* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */ static int kmod_loop_msg; + ret = security_kernel_module_request(); + if (ret) + return ret; + va_start(args, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args); va_end(args); |