summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/kernel/module.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>2016-04-28 01:54:01 +0200
committerRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>2016-07-27 05:08:00 +0200
commitbca014caaa6130e57f69b5bf527967aa8ee70fdd (patch)
treea9f4b7fc841def5ac3dd4c872084fa7bef7a38c0 /kernel/module.c
parentmodule: Issue warnings when tainting kernel (diff)
downloadlinux-bca014caaa6130e57f69b5bf527967aa8ee70fdd.tar.xz
linux-bca014caaa6130e57f69b5bf527967aa8ee70fdd.zip
module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules
Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it was built for, not anything else. Loading a signed module meant for a kernel with a different ABI could have interesting effects. Therefore, treat all signatures as invalid when a module is force-loaded. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--kernel/module.c13
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 0b4f3a85d4fc..7f21ab238aa7 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2686,13 +2686,18 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
{
int err = -ENOKEY;
const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
const void *mod = info->hdr;
- if (info->len > markerlen &&
+ /*
+ * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
+ * removed is no longer the module that was signed
+ */
+ if (flags == 0 &&
+ info->len > markerlen &&
memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
info->len -= markerlen;
@@ -2711,7 +2716,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
return err;
}
#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -3506,7 +3511,7 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
long err;
char *after_dashes;
- err = module_sig_check(info);
+ err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
if (err)
goto free_copy;