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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-01-30 04:08:02 +0100
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-01-30 04:08:02 +0100
commit6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d (patch)
tree3f2d7fbaa9fe998787fa474c63fb1e6aa98090ab /kernel/module.c
parentMerge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/... (diff)
parentx86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() (diff)
downloadlinux-6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d.tar.xz
linux-6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d.zip
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Another set of melted spectrum related changes: - Code simplifications and cleanups for RSB and retpolines. - Make the indirect calls in KVM speculation safe. - Whitelist CPUs which are known not to speculate from Meltdown and prepare for the new CPUID flag which tells the kernel that a CPU is not affected. - A less rigorous variant of the module retpoline check which merily warns when a non-retpoline protected module is loaded and reflects that fact in the sysfs file. - Prepare for Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier support. - Prepare for exposure of the Speculation Control MSRs to guests, so guest OSes which depend on those "features" can use them. Includes a blacklist of the broken microcodes. The actual exposure of the MSRs through KVM is still being worked on" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg x86/nospec: Fix header guards names x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/module.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/module.c11
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index dea01ac9cb74..09e48eee4d55 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2863,6 +2863,15 @@ static int check_modinfo_livepatch(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */
+static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
+{
+ if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline")))
+ return;
+
+ pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n",
+ mod->name);
+}
+
/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */
static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
struct load_info *info)
@@ -3029,6 +3038,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags)
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
+ check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info);
+
if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) {
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality "