diff options
author | Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> | 2014-07-22 03:49:14 +0200 |
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committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2014-09-03 23:58:17 +0200 |
commit | a4412fc9486ec85686c6c7929e7e829f62ae377e (patch) | |
tree | a267720d880085452257406ecf6f672ec8cbdbf9 /kernel/seccomp.c | |
parent | Merge tag 'for-f2fs-3.17-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/gi... (diff) | |
download | linux-a4412fc9486ec85686c6c7929e7e829f62ae377e.tar.xz linux-a4412fc9486ec85686c6c7929e7e829f62ae377e.zip |
seccomp,x86,arm,mips,s390: Remove nr parameter from secure_computing
The secure_computing function took a syscall number parameter, but
it only paid any attention to that parameter if seccomp mode 1 was
enabled. Rather than coming up with a kludge to get the parameter
to work in mode 2, just remove the parameter.
To avoid churn in arches that don't have seccomp filters (and may
not even support syscall_get_nr right now), this leaves the
parameter in secure_computing_strict, which is now a real function.
For ARM, this is a bit ugly due to the fact that ARM conditionally
supports seccomp filters. Fixing that would probably only be a
couple of lines of code, but it should be coordinated with the audit
maintainers.
This will be a slight slowdown on some arches. The right fix is to
pass in all of seccomp_data instead of trying to make just the
syscall nr part be fast.
This is a prerequisite for making two-phase seccomp work cleanly.
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/seccomp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 64 |
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 44eb005c6695..5e738e0dd2e9 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ /* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */ -#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER #include <asm/syscall.h> +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER #include <linux/filter.h> #include <linux/pid.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> @@ -172,7 +175,7 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) * * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes. */ -static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall) +static u32 seccomp_run_filters(void) { struct seccomp_filter *f = ACCESS_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter); struct seccomp_data sd; @@ -564,10 +567,43 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = { }; #endif -int __secure_computing(int this_syscall) +static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) +{ + int *syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls; +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + if (is_compat_task()) + syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls_32; +#endif + do { + if (*syscall_whitelist == this_syscall) + return; + } while (*++syscall_whitelist); + +#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG + dump_stack(); +#endif + audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL); + do_exit(SIGKILL); +} + +#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER +void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) +{ + int mode = current->seccomp.mode; + + if (mode == 0) + return; + else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT) + __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); + else + BUG(); +} +#else +int __secure_computing(void) { + struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current); + int this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, regs); int exit_sig = 0; - int *syscall; u32 ret; /* @@ -578,23 +614,12 @@ int __secure_computing(int this_syscall) switch (current->seccomp.mode) { case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: - syscall = mode1_syscalls; -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - if (is_compat_task()) - syscall = mode1_syscalls_32; -#endif - do { - if (*syscall == this_syscall) - return 0; - } while (*++syscall); - exit_sig = SIGKILL; - ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL; - break; + __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); + return 0; #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: { int data; - struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current); - ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall); + ret = seccomp_run_filters(); data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; ret &= SECCOMP_RET_ACTION; switch (ret) { @@ -652,9 +677,10 @@ int __secure_computing(int this_syscall) #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER skip: audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret); -#endif return -1; +#endif } +#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */ long prctl_get_seccomp(void) { |