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| author | Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> | 2019-12-29 07:24:50 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2020-01-02 22:03:45 +0100 |
| commit | 2882d53c9c6f3b8311d225062522f03772cf0179 (patch) | |
| tree | 28a5e06d8dac7c2df05519ddd05c91a601767a5e /kernel/seccomp.c | |
| parent | selftests/seccomp: Zero out seccomp_notif (diff) | |
| download | linux-2882d53c9c6f3b8311d225062522f03772cf0179.tar.xz linux-2882d53c9c6f3b8311d225062522f03772cf0179.zip | |
seccomp: Check that seccomp_notif is zeroed out by the user
This patch is a small change in enforcement of the uapi for
SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV ioctl. Specifically, the datastructure which
is passed (seccomp_notif) must be zeroed out. Previously any of its
members could be set to nonsense values, and we would ignore it.
This ensures all fields are set to their zero value.
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191229062451.9467-2-sargun@sargun.me
Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/seccomp.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 12d2227e5786..b6ea3dcb57bf 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -1026,6 +1026,13 @@ static long seccomp_notify_recv(struct seccomp_filter *filter, struct seccomp_notif unotif; ssize_t ret; + /* Verify that we're not given garbage to keep struct extensible. */ + ret = check_zeroed_user(buf, sizeof(unotif)); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (!ret) + return -EINVAL; + memset(&unotif, 0, sizeof(unotif)); ret = down_interruptible(&filter->notif->request); |