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author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2014-06-26 01:08:24 +0200 |
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committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2014-07-18 21:13:37 +0200 |
commit | 48dc92b9fc3926844257316e75ba11eb5c742b2c (patch) | |
tree | 2f35355b95a7c1473fd8d361b4f15a9f368999b4 /kernel/sys_ni.c | |
parent | seccomp: split mode setting routines (diff) | |
download | linux-48dc92b9fc3926844257316e75ba11eb5c742b2c.tar.xz linux-48dc92b9fc3926844257316e75ba11eb5c742b2c.zip |
seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall
This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).
In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
filter the seccomp syscall itself.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/sys_ni.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c index 36441b51b5df..2904a2105914 100644 --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -213,3 +213,6 @@ cond_syscall(compat_sys_open_by_handle_at); /* compare kernel pointers */ cond_syscall(sys_kcmp); + +/* operate on Secure Computing state */ +cond_syscall(sys_seccomp); |