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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2014-12-02 19:27:26 +0100
committerEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2014-12-12 01:06:36 +0100
commit9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8 (patch)
treed996dd9c6d422e723af0da786add936bd7ec1c91 /kernel/user_namespace.c
parentuserns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex (diff)
downloadlinux-9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8.tar.xz
linux-9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8.zip
userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis
- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the future in this user namespace. A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled. - Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from their parents. - A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do not allow checking the permissions at open time. - Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map for the user namespace is set. This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace level will never remove the ability to call setgroups from a process that already has that ability. A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled. Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/user_namespace.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/user_namespace.c85
1 files changed, 85 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 44a555ac6104..6e80f4c1322b 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -100,6 +100,11 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
+ /* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */
+ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ ns->flags = parent_ns->flags;
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
@@ -839,6 +844,84 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
return false;
}
+int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+ unsigned long userns_flags = ACCESS_ONCE(ns->flags);
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n",
+ (userns_flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) ?
+ "allow" : "deny");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+ char kbuf[8], *pos;
+ bool setgroups_allowed;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ /* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf)))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* What was written? */
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+ kbuf[count] = '\0';
+ pos = kbuf;
+
+ /* What is being requested? */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (strncmp(pos, "allow", 5) == 0) {
+ pos += 5;
+ setgroups_allowed = true;
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(pos, "deny", 4) == 0) {
+ pos += 4;
+ setgroups_allowed = false;
+ }
+ else
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
+ pos = skip_spaces(pos);
+ if (*pos != '\0')
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ if (setgroups_allowed) {
+ /* Enabling setgroups after setgroups has been disabled
+ * is not allowed.
+ */
+ if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED))
+ goto out_unlock;
+ } else {
+ /* Permanently disabling setgroups after setgroups has
+ * been enabled by writing the gid_map is not allowed.
+ */
+ if (ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+
+ /* Report a successful write */
+ *ppos = count;
+ ret = count;
+out:
+ return ret;
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ goto out;
+}
+
bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
{
bool allowed;
@@ -848,6 +931,8 @@ bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
* the user namespace has been established.
*/
allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
+ /* Is setgroups allowed? */
+ allowed = allowed && (ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED);
mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
return allowed;