diff options
| author | Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> | 2017-06-01 03:16:00 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-06-02 20:24:40 +0200 |
| commit | 80b7d81912d807f161d55e9c2c9cc81061666f83 (patch) | |
| tree | a37d8f96dc9e71aedb6528138208bde42fbabf61 /kernel | |
| parent | bpf: Allow CGROUP_SKB eBPF program to access sk_buff (diff) | |
| download | linux-80b7d81912d807f161d55e9c2c9cc81061666f83.tar.xz linux-80b7d81912d807f161d55e9c2c9cc81061666f83.zip | |
bpf: Remove the capability check for cgroup skb eBPF program
Currently loading a cgroup skb eBPF program require a CAP_SYS_ADMIN
capability while attaching the program to a cgroup only requires the
user have CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. We can escape the capability
check when load the program just like socket filter program to make
the capability requirement consistent.
Change since v1:
Change the code style in order to be compliant with checkpatch.pl
preference
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 265a0d854e33..59da103adb85 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -815,7 +815,9 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr) attr->kern_version != LINUX_VERSION_CODE) return -EINVAL; - if (type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER && + type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; /* plain bpf_prog allocation */ |