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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2014-12-06 01:26:30 +0100
committerEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2014-12-10 00:08:32 +0100
commit80dd00a23784b384ccea049bfb3f259d3f973b9d (patch)
tree40ff3ad2233bc6f08bcde250acc87a29af9ad0af /kernel
parentuserns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings (diff)
downloadlinux-80dd00a23784b384ccea049bfb3f259d3f973b9d.tar.xz
linux-80dd00a23784b384ccea049bfb3f259d3f973b9d.zip
userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping
setresuid allows the euid to be set to any of uid, euid, suid, and fsuid. Therefor it is safe to allow an unprivileged user to map their euid and use CAP_SETUID privileged with exactly that uid, as no new credentials can be obtained. I can not find a combination of existing system calls that allows setting uid, euid, suid, and fsuid from the fsuid making the previous use of fsuid for allowing unprivileged mappings a bug. This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/user_namespace.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 1ce6d67c07b7..9451b12a9b6c 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
- if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
+ if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->euid))
return true;
}
}