Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net

Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
 "I've been traveling so this accumulates more than week or so of bug
  fixing.  It perhaps looks a little worse than it really is.

   1) Fix deadlock in ath10k driver, from Ben Greear.

   2) Increase scan timeout in iwlwifi, from Luca Coelho.

   3) Unbreak STP by properly reinjecting STP packets back into the
      stack.  Regression fix from Ido Schimmel.

   4) Mediatek driver fixes (missing malloc failure checks, leaking of
      scratch memory, wrong indexing when mapping TX buffers, etc.) from
      John Crispin.

   5) Fix endianness bug in icmpv6_err() handler, from Hannes Frederic
      Sowa.

   6) Fix hashing of flows in UDP in the ruseport case, from Xuemin Su.

   7) Fix netlink notifications in ovs for tunnels, delete link messages
      are never emitted because of how the device registry state is
      handled.  From Nicolas Dichtel.

   8) Conntrack module leaks kmemcache on unload, from Florian Westphal.

   9) Prevent endless jump loops in nft rules, from Liping Zhang and
      Pablo Neira Ayuso.

  10) Not early enough spinlock initialization in mlx4, from Eric
      Dumazet.

  11) Bind refcount leak in act_ipt, from Cong WANG.

  12) Missing RCU locking in HTB scheduler, from Florian Westphal.

  13) Several small MACSEC bug fixes from Sabrina Dubroca (missing RCU
      barrier, using heap for SG and IV, and erroneous use of async flag
      when allocating AEAD conext.)

  14) RCU handling fix in TIPC, from Ying Xue.

  15) Pass correct protocol down into ipv4_{update_pmtu,redirect}() in
      SIT driver, from Simon Horman.

  16) Socket timer deadlock fix in TIPC from Jon Paul Maloy.

  17) Fix potential deadlock in team enslave, from Ido Schimmel.

  18) Memory leak in KCM procfs handling, from Jiri Slaby.

  19) ESN generation fix in ipv4 ESP, from Herbert Xu.

  20) Fix GFP_KERNEL allocations with locks held in act_ife, from Cong
      WANG.

  21) Use after free in netem, from Eric Dumazet.

  22) Uninitialized last assert time in multicast router code, from Tom
      Goff.

  23) Skip raw sockets in sock_diag destruction broadcast, from Willem
      de Bruijn.

  24) Fix link status reporting in thunderx, from Sunil Goutham.

  25) Limit resegmentation of retransmit queue so that we do not
      retransmit too large GSO frames.  From Eric Dumazet.

  26) Delay bpf program release after grace period, from Daniel
      Borkmann"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (141 commits)
  openvswitch: fix conntrack netlink event delivery
  qed: Protect the doorbell BAR with the write barriers.
  neigh: Explicitly declare RCU-bh read side critical section in neigh_xmit()
  e1000e: keep VLAN interfaces functional after rxvlan off
  cfg80211: fix proto in ieee80211_data_to_8023 for frames without LLC header
  qlcnic: use the correct ring in qlcnic_83xx_process_rcv_ring_diag()
  bpf, perf: delay release of BPF prog after grace period
  net: bridge: fix vlan stats continue counter
  tcp: do not send too big packets at retransmit time
  ibmvnic: fix to use list_for_each_safe() when delete items
  net: thunderx: Fix TL4 configuration for secondary Qsets
  net: thunderx: Fix link status reporting
  net/mlx5e: Reorganize ethtool statistics
  net/mlx5e: Fix number of PFC counters reported to ethtool
  net/mlx5e: Prevent adding the same vxlan port
  net/mlx5e: Check for BlueFlame capability before allocating SQ uar
  net/mlx5e: Change enum to better reflect usage
  net/mlx5: Add ConnectX-5 PCIe 4.0 to list of supported devices
  net/mlx5: Update command strings
  net: marvell: Add separate config ANEG function for Marvell 88E1111
  ...

3 files changed, 16 insertions, 37 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 668e07903c8f..eec9f90ba030 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -126,31 +126,6 @@
  * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
  */
 
-/* types of values stored in eBPF registers */
-enum bpf_reg_type {
-	NOT_INIT = 0,		 /* nothing was written into register */
-	UNKNOWN_VALUE,		 /* reg doesn't contain a valid pointer */
-	PTR_TO_CTX,		 /* reg points to bpf_context */
-	CONST_PTR_TO_MAP,	 /* reg points to struct bpf_map */
-	PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,	 /* reg points to map element value */
-	PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,/* points to map elem value or NULL */
-	FRAME_PTR,		 /* reg == frame_pointer */
-	PTR_TO_STACK,		 /* reg == frame_pointer + imm */
-	CONST_IMM,		 /* constant integer value */
-
-	/* PTR_TO_PACKET represents:
-	 * skb->data
-	 * skb->data + imm
-	 * skb->data + (u16) var
-	 * skb->data + (u16) var + imm
-	 * if (range > 0) then [ptr, ptr + range - off) is safe to access
-	 * if (id > 0) means that some 'var' was added
-	 * if (off > 0) menas that 'imm' was added
-	 */
-	PTR_TO_PACKET,
-	PTR_TO_PACKET_END,	 /* skb->data + headlen */
-};
-
 struct reg_state {
 	enum bpf_reg_type type;
 	union {
@@ -695,10 +670,10 @@ static int check_packet_access(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 
 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields */
 static int check_ctx_access(struct verifier_env *env, int off, int size,
-			    enum bpf_access_type t)
+			    enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type)
 {
 	if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access &&
-	    env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t)) {
+	    env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, reg_type)) {
 		/* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
 		if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
 			env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
@@ -798,21 +773,19 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
 
 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
+		enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
+
 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
 			verbose("R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
-		err = check_ctx_access(env, off, size, t);
+		err = check_ctx_access(env, off, size, t, &reg_type);
 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
 			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
-			if (off == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data) &&
-			    env->allow_ptr_leaks)
+			if (env->allow_ptr_leaks)
 				/* note that reg.[id|off|range] == 0 */
-				state->regs[value_regno].type = PTR_TO_PACKET;
-			else if (off == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end) &&
-				 env->allow_ptr_leaks)
-				state->regs[value_regno].type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
+				state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
 		}
 
 	} else if (reg->type == FRAME_PTR || reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 9c51ec3f0f44..85cd41878a74 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -7529,7 +7529,7 @@ static void perf_event_free_bpf_prog(struct perf_event *event)
 	prog = event->tp_event->prog;
 	if (prog) {
 		event->tp_event->prog = NULL;
-		bpf_prog_put(prog);
+		bpf_prog_put_rcu(prog);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 720b7bb01d43..26f603da7e26 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -209,6 +209,10 @@ static u64 bpf_perf_event_read(u64 r1, u64 index, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
 	    event->pmu->count)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (unlikely(event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE &&
+		     event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_RAW))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/*
 	 * we don't know if the function is run successfully by the
 	 * return value. It can be judged in other places, such as
@@ -349,7 +353,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *kprobe_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func
 }
 
 /* bpf+kprobe programs can access fields of 'struct pt_regs' */
-static bool kprobe_prog_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type)
+static bool kprobe_prog_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type,
+					enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type)
 {
 	/* check bounds */
 	if (off < 0 || off >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))
@@ -427,7 +432,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *tp_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
 	}
 }
 
-static bool tp_prog_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type)
+static bool tp_prog_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type,
+				    enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type)
 {
 	if (off < sizeof(void *) || off >= PERF_MAX_TRACE_SIZE)
 		return false;