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| author | Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> | 2016-05-10 00:48:51 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-05-10 02:57:12 +0200 |
| commit | 0161028b7c8aebef64194d3d73e43bc3b53b5c66 (patch) | |
| tree | 6e7ffbfc92345548730fb7b33f8168760f99fa28 /kernel | |
| parent | Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew) (diff) | |
| download | linux-0161028b7c8aebef64194d3d73e43bc3b53b5c66.tar.xz linux-0161028b7c8aebef64194d3d73e43bc3b53b5c66.zip | |
perf/core: Change the default paranoia level to 2
Allowing unprivileged kernel profiling lets any user dump follow kernel
control flow and dump kernel registers. This most likely allows trivial
kASLR bypassing, and it may allow other mischief as well. (Off the top
of my head, the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR output during /dev/urandom reads
could be quite interesting.)
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/events/core.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 4e2ebf6f2f1f..c0ded2416615 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static struct srcu_struct pmus_srcu; * 1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv * 2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv */ -int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 1; +int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2; /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */ int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */ |