diff options
| author | Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> | 2018-08-17 00:17:03 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2018-09-04 19:35:48 +0200 |
| commit | 964c9dff0091893a9a74a88edf984c6da0b779f7 (patch) | |
| tree | 162d45af3ac44401db524294e67e396ddee476f4 /kernel | |
| parent | doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature (diff) | |
| download | linux-964c9dff0091893a9a74a88edf984c6da0b779f7.tar.xz linux-964c9dff0091893a9a74a88edf984c6da0b779f7.zip | |
stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE option, which provides
'stack_erasing' sysctl. It can be used in runtime to control kernel
stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/stackleak.c | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sysctl.c | 15 |
2 files changed, 52 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c index f66239572c89..e42892926244 100644 --- a/kernel/stackleak.c +++ b/kernel/stackleak.c @@ -12,6 +12,41 @@ #include <linux/stackleak.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE +#include <linux/jump_label.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> + +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass); + +int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + int ret = 0; + int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass); + int prev_state = state; + + table->data = &state; + table->maxlen = sizeof(int); + ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + state = !!state; + if (ret || !write || state == prev_state) + return ret; + + if (state) + static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass); + else + static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass); + + pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n", + state ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + return ret; +} + +#define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass) +#else +#define skip_erasing() false +#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */ + asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void) { /* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */ @@ -20,6 +55,9 @@ asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void) unsigned int poison_count = 0; const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long); + if (skip_erasing()) + return; + /* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */ if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE)) kstack_ptr = boundary; diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index cc02050fd0c4..3ae223f7b5df 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_CHR_DEV_SG #include <scsi/sg.h> #endif - +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE +#include <linux/stackleak.h> +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR #include <linux/nmi.h> #endif @@ -1233,6 +1235,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .extra2 = &one, }, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE + { + .procname = "stack_erasing", + .data = NULL, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = stack_erasing_sysctl, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &one, + }, +#endif { } }; |