diff options
| author | Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> | 2017-12-19 05:11:57 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2017-12-21 02:15:41 +0100 |
| commit | ea25f914dc164c8d56b36147ecc86bc65f83c469 (patch) | |
| tree | ae74d60039bef82d303017c162822f4fa8ddbf02 /kernel | |
| parent | bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification (diff) | |
| download | linux-ea25f914dc164c8d56b36147ecc86bc65f83c469.tar.xz linux-ea25f914dc164c8d56b36147ecc86bc65f83c469.zip | |
bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()
Prevent indirect stack accesses at non-constant addresses, which would
permit reading and corrupting spilled pointers.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index ecdc265244ca..77e4b5223867 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1303,6 +1303,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off); verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n", regno, tn_buf); + return -EACCES; } off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value; if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 || |