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authorAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>2014-07-22 03:49:14 +0200
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2014-09-03 23:58:17 +0200
commita4412fc9486ec85686c6c7929e7e829f62ae377e (patch)
treea267720d880085452257406ecf6f672ec8cbdbf9 /kernel
parentMerge tag 'for-f2fs-3.17-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/gi... (diff)
downloadlinux-a4412fc9486ec85686c6c7929e7e829f62ae377e.tar.xz
linux-a4412fc9486ec85686c6c7929e7e829f62ae377e.zip
seccomp,x86,arm,mips,s390: Remove nr parameter from secure_computing
The secure_computing function took a syscall number parameter, but it only paid any attention to that parameter if seccomp mode 1 was enabled. Rather than coming up with a kludge to get the parameter to work in mode 2, just remove the parameter. To avoid churn in arches that don't have seccomp filters (and may not even support syscall_get_nr right now), this leaves the parameter in secure_computing_strict, which is now a real function. For ARM, this is a bit ugly due to the fact that ARM conditionally supports seccomp filters. Fixing that would probably only be a couple of lines of code, but it should be coordinated with the audit maintainers. This will be a slight slowdown on some arches. The right fix is to pass in all of seccomp_data instead of trying to make just the syscall nr part be fast. This is a prerequisite for making two-phase seccomp work cleanly. Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c64
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 44eb005c6695..5e738e0dd2e9 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@
/* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <asm/syscall.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
@@ -172,7 +175,7 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
*
* Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
*/
-static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
+static u32 seccomp_run_filters(void)
{
struct seccomp_filter *f = ACCESS_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter);
struct seccomp_data sd;
@@ -564,10 +567,43 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
};
#endif
-int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
+{
+ int *syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls;
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ if (is_compat_task())
+ syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls_32;
+#endif
+ do {
+ if (*syscall_whitelist == this_syscall)
+ return;
+ } while (*++syscall_whitelist);
+
+#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
+ dump_stack();
+#endif
+ audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
+{
+ int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
+
+ if (mode == 0)
+ return;
+ else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT)
+ __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
+ else
+ BUG();
+}
+#else
+int __secure_computing(void)
{
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+ int this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
int exit_sig = 0;
- int *syscall;
u32 ret;
/*
@@ -578,23 +614,12 @@ int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
switch (current->seccomp.mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
- syscall = mode1_syscalls;
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
- if (is_compat_task())
- syscall = mode1_syscalls_32;
-#endif
- do {
- if (*syscall == this_syscall)
- return 0;
- } while (*++syscall);
- exit_sig = SIGKILL;
- ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
- break;
+ __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
+ return 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: {
int data;
- struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
- ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall);
+ ret = seccomp_run_filters();
data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
ret &= SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
switch (ret) {
@@ -652,9 +677,10 @@ int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
skip:
audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
-#endif
return -1;
+#endif
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */
long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
{