diff options
| author | Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc> | 2018-06-22 01:15:34 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2018-07-18 03:32:48 +0200 |
| commit | 3672476edaa0660eb833f54fa9edeb505417b75c (patch) | |
| tree | d60f9e1875ca9fe64a831be8ec83bebcc416257a /lib/vsprintf.c | |
| parent | vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key (diff) | |
| download | linux-3672476edaa0660eb833f54fa9edeb505417b75c.tar.xz linux-3672476edaa0660eb833f54fa9edeb505417b75c.zip | |
vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be
available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case
resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being printed. This
makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the
requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging.
This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel
behaviour the same.
If new command line option debug_boot_weak_hash is enabled use
cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/vsprintf.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/vsprintf.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c index 6c1fb395bddf..1ee2829f3b54 100644 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -1651,6 +1651,17 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn, return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); } +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */ +static int debug_boot_weak_hash __ro_after_init; + +static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable(char *str) +{ + debug_boot_weak_hash = 1; + pr_info("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n"); + return 0; +} +early_param("debug_boot_weak_hash", debug_boot_weak_hash_enable); + static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key); static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly; @@ -1703,6 +1714,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec) const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)"; unsigned long hashval; + /* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash. */ + if (unlikely(debug_boot_weak_hash)) { + hashval = hash_long((unsigned long)ptr, 32); + return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec); + } + if (static_branch_unlikely(¬_filled_random_ptr_key)) { spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); /* string length must be less than default_width */ |