Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)

Merge patch-bomb from Andrew Morton:

 - inotify tweaks

 - some ocfs2 updates (many more are awaiting review)

 - various misc bits

 - kernel/watchdog.c updates

 - Some of mm.  I have a huge number of MM patches this time and quite a
   lot of it is quite difficult and much will be held over to next time.

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (162 commits)
  selftests: vm: add tests for lock on fault
  mm: mlock: add mlock flags to enable VM_LOCKONFAULT usage
  mm: introduce VM_LOCKONFAULT
  mm: mlock: add new mlock system call
  mm: mlock: refactor mlock, munlock, and munlockall code
  kasan: always taint kernel on report
  mm, slub, kasan: enable user tracking by default with KASAN=y
  kasan: use IS_ALIGNED in memory_is_poisoned_8()
  kasan: Fix a type conversion error
  lib: test_kasan: add some testcases
  kasan: update reference to kasan prototype repo
  kasan: move KASAN_SANITIZE in arch/x86/boot/Makefile
  kasan: various fixes in documentation
  kasan: update log messages
  kasan: accurately determine the type of the bad access
  kasan: update reported bug types for kernel memory accesses
  kasan: update reported bug types for not user nor kernel memory accesses
  mm/kasan: prevent deadlock in kasan reporting
  mm/kasan: don't use kasan shadow pointer in generic functions
  mm/kasan: MODULE_VADDR is not available on all archs
  ...

3 files changed, 98 insertions, 58 deletions

diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
index 8da211411b57..d41b21bce6a0 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
  * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
  *
- * Some of code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/linux by
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
  *        Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_2(unsigned long addr)
 		if (memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 1))
 			return true;
 
+		/*
+		 * If single shadow byte covers 2-byte access, we don't
+		 * need to do anything more. Otherwise, test the first
+		 * shadow byte.
+		 */
 		if (likely(((addr + 1) & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) != 0))
 			return false;
 
@@ -103,6 +108,11 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_4(unsigned long addr)
 		if (memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 3))
 			return true;
 
+		/*
+		 * If single shadow byte covers 4-byte access, we don't
+		 * need to do anything more. Otherwise, test the first
+		 * shadow byte.
+		 */
 		if (likely(((addr + 3) & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >= 3))
 			return false;
 
@@ -120,7 +130,12 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_8(unsigned long addr)
 		if (memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 7))
 			return true;
 
-		if (likely(((addr + 7) & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >= 7))
+		/*
+		 * If single shadow byte covers 8-byte access, we don't
+		 * need to do anything more. Otherwise, test the first
+		 * shadow byte.
+		 */
+		if (likely(IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)))
 			return false;
 
 		return unlikely(*(u8 *)shadow_addr);
@@ -139,7 +154,12 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(unsigned long addr)
 		if (unlikely(shadow_first_bytes))
 			return true;
 
-		if (likely(IS_ALIGNED(addr, 8)))
+		/*
+		 * If two shadow bytes covers 16-byte access, we don't
+		 * need to do anything more. Otherwise, test the last
+		 * shadow byte.
+		 */
+		if (likely(IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)))
 			return false;
 
 		return memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15);
@@ -203,7 +223,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(unsigned long addr,
 		s8 *last_shadow = (s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)last_byte);
 
 		if (unlikely(ret != (unsigned long)last_shadow ||
-			((last_byte & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >= *last_shadow)))
+			((long)(last_byte & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >= *last_shadow)))
 			return true;
 	}
 	return false;
@@ -235,18 +255,12 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
 static __always_inline void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr,
 						size_t size, bool write)
 {
-	struct kasan_access_info info;
-
 	if (unlikely(size == 0))
 		return;
 
 	if (unlikely((void *)addr <
 		kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) {
-		info.access_addr = (void *)addr;
-		info.access_size = size;
-		info.is_write = write;
-		info.ip = _RET_IP_;
-		kasan_report_user_access(&info);
+		kasan_report(addr, size, write, _RET_IP_);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -524,7 +538,7 @@ static int kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
 
 static int __init kasan_memhotplug_init(void)
 {
-	pr_err("WARNING: KASan doesn't support memory hot-add\n");
+	pr_err("WARNING: KASAN doesn't support memory hot-add\n");
 	pr_err("Memory hot-add will be disabled\n");
 
 	hotplug_memory_notifier(kasan_mem_notifier, 0);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index c242adf6bc85..4f6c62e5c21e 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -54,16 +54,13 @@ struct kasan_global {
 #endif
 };
 
-void kasan_report_error(struct kasan_access_info *info);
-void kasan_report_user_access(struct kasan_access_info *info);
-
 static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr)
 {
 	return (void *)(((unsigned long)shadow_addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
 		<< KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
 }
 
-static inline bool kasan_enabled(void)
+static inline bool kasan_report_enabled(void)
 {
 	return !current->kasan_depth;
 }
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index e07c94fbd0ac..12f222d0224b 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
  * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
  *
- * Some of code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/linux by
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
  *        Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 
@@ -48,34 +49,49 @@ static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
 
 static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 {
-	const char *bug_type = "unknown crash";
-	u8 shadow_val;
+	const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
+	u8 *shadow_addr;
 
 	info->first_bad_addr = find_first_bad_addr(info->access_addr,
 						info->access_size);
 
-	shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
+	shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
 
-	switch (shadow_val) {
-	case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
-	case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
-		bug_type = "use after free";
+	/*
+	 * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look
+	 * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
+	 */
+	if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
+		shadow_addr++;
+
+	switch (*shadow_addr) {
+	case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
+		/*
+		 * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
+		 * due to a data race in the kernel code.
+		 */
+		bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
 		break;
 	case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
 	case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
+		bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
 	case KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE:
-	case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
-		bug_type = "out of bounds access";
+		bug_type = "global-out-of-bounds";
 		break;
 	case KASAN_STACK_LEFT:
 	case KASAN_STACK_MID:
 	case KASAN_STACK_RIGHT:
 	case KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL:
-		bug_type = "out of bounds on stack";
+		bug_type = "stack-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
+	case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
+		bug_type = "use-after-free";
 		break;
 	}
 
-	pr_err("BUG: KASan: %s in %pS at addr %p\n",
+	pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s in %pS at addr %p\n",
 		bug_type, (void *)info->ip,
 		info->access_addr);
 	pr_err("%s of size %zu by task %s/%d\n",
@@ -85,9 +101,11 @@ static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 
 static inline bool kernel_or_module_addr(const void *addr)
 {
-	return (addr >= (void *)_stext && addr < (void *)_end)
-		|| (addr >= (void *)MODULES_VADDR
-			&& addr < (void *)MODULES_END);
+	if (addr >= (void *)_stext && addr < (void *)_end)
+		return true;
+	if (is_module_address((unsigned long)addr))
+		return true;
+	return false;
 }
 
 static inline bool init_task_stack_addr(const void *addr)
@@ -161,15 +179,19 @@ static void print_shadow_for_address(const void *addr)
 	for (i = -SHADOW_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR; i <= SHADOW_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR; i++) {
 		const void *kaddr = kasan_shadow_to_mem(shadow_row);
 		char buffer[4 + (BITS_PER_LONG/8)*2];
+		char shadow_buf[SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW];
 
 		snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer),
 			(i == 0) ? ">%p: " : " %p: ", kaddr);
-
-		kasan_disable_current();
+		/*
+		 * We should not pass a shadow pointer to generic
+		 * function, because generic functions may try to
+		 * access kasan mapping for the passed address.
+		 */
+		memcpy(shadow_buf, shadow_row, SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW);
 		print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, buffer,
 			DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW, 1,
-			shadow_row, SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW, 0);
-		kasan_enable_current();
+			shadow_buf, SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW, 0);
 
 		if (row_is_guilty(shadow_row, shadow))
 			pr_err("%*c\n",
@@ -182,37 +204,43 @@ static void print_shadow_for_address(const void *addr)
 
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(report_lock);
 
-void kasan_report_error(struct kasan_access_info *info)
-{
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, flags);
-	pr_err("================================="
-		"=================================\n");
-	print_error_description(info);
-	print_address_description(info);
-	print_shadow_for_address(info->first_bad_addr);
-	pr_err("================================="
-		"=================================\n");
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, flags);
-}
-
-void kasan_report_user_access(struct kasan_access_info *info)
+static void kasan_report_error(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
+	const char *bug_type;
 
+	/*
+	 * Make sure we don't end up in loop.
+	 */
+	kasan_disable_current();
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, flags);
 	pr_err("================================="
 		"=================================\n");
-	pr_err("BUG: KASan: user-memory-access on address %p\n",
-		info->access_addr);
-	pr_err("%s of size %zu by task %s/%d\n",
-		info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read",
-		info->access_size, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
-	dump_stack();
+	if (info->access_addr <
+			kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START)) {
+		if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
+			bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
+		else if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < TASK_SIZE)
+			bug_type = "user-memory-access";
+		else
+			bug_type = "wild-memory-access";
+		pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s on address %p\n",
+			bug_type, info->access_addr);
+		pr_err("%s of size %zu by task %s/%d\n",
+			info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read",
+			info->access_size, current->comm,
+			task_pid_nr(current));
+		dump_stack();
+	} else {
+		print_error_description(info);
+		print_address_description(info);
+		print_shadow_for_address(info->first_bad_addr);
+	}
 	pr_err("================================="
 		"=================================\n");
+	add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, flags);
+	kasan_enable_current();
 }
 
 void kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
@@ -220,13 +248,14 @@ void kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
 {
 	struct kasan_access_info info;
 
-	if (likely(!kasan_enabled()))
+	if (likely(!kasan_report_enabled()))
 		return;
 
 	info.access_addr = (void *)addr;
 	info.access_size = size;
 	info.is_write = is_write;
 	info.ip = ip;
+
 	kasan_report_error(&info);
 }