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author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2007-11-27 00:47:46 +0100 |
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committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2007-12-05 14:24:30 +0100 |
commit | ab5a91a8364c3d6fc617abc47cc81d162c01d90a (patch) | |
tree | 0b7f4ef877f56be57f75b8b455b9f694f19da633 /mm/mmap.c | |
parent | SELinux: detect dead booleans (diff) | |
download | linux-ab5a91a8364c3d6fc617abc47cc81d162c01d90a.tar.xz linux-ab5a91a8364c3d6fc617abc47cc81d162c01d90a.zip |
Security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space
On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements
security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses
lower than mmap_min_addr. Based on a suggestion from a developer in the
openwall community this patch adds a check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO. It is
assumed that any process with this capability can harm the system a lot
more easily than writing some stuff on the zero page and then trying to
get the kernel to trip over itself. It also means that programs like X
on i686 which use vm86 emulation can work even with mmap_min_addr set.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/mmap.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions