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author | Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> | 2014-09-05 21:19:55 +0200 |
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committer | Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> | 2014-09-08 19:07:56 +0200 |
commit | b28b4943660f4e36f118b751ec606c103ba6b1cc (patch) | |
tree | 8a9b4f821044f982f878b74019098fa946aa0863 /net/bluetooth/smp.h | |
parent | Bluetooth: Fix calling smp_distribute_keys() when still waiting for keys (diff) | |
download | linux-b28b4943660f4e36f118b751ec606c103ba6b1cc.tar.xz linux-b28b4943660f4e36f118b751ec606c103ba6b1cc.zip |
Bluetooth: Add strict checks for allowed SMP PDUs
SMP defines quite clearly when certain PDUs are to be expected/allowed
and when not, but doesn't have any explicit request/response definition.
So far the code has relied on each PDU handler to behave correctly if
receiving PDUs at an unexpected moment, however this requires many
different checks and is prone to errors.
This patch introduces a generic way to keep track of allowed PDUs and
thereby reduces the responsibility & load on individual command
handlers. The tracking is implemented using a simple bit-mask where each
opcode maps to its own bit. If the bit is set the corresponding PDU is
allow and if the bit is not set the PDU is not allowed.
As a simple example, when we send the Pairing Request we'd set the bit
for Pairing Response, and when we receive the Pairing Response we'd
clear the bit for Pairing Response.
Since the disallowed PDU rejection is now done in a single central place
we need to be a bit careful of which action makes most sense to all
cases. Previously some, such as Security Request, have been simply
ignored whereas others have caused an explicit disconnect.
The only PDU rejection action that keeps good interoperability and can
be used for all the applicable use cases is to drop the data. This may
raise some concerns of us now being more lenient for misbehaving (and
potentially malicious) devices, but the policy of simply dropping data
has been a successful one for many years e.g. in L2CAP (where this is
the *only* policy for such cases - we never request disconnection in
l2cap_core.c because of bad data). Furthermore, we cannot prevent
connected devices from creating the SMP context (through a Security or
Pairing Request), and once the context exists looking up the
corresponding bit for the received opcode and deciding to reject it is
essentially an equally lightweight operation as the kind of rejection
that l2cap_core.c already successfully does.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.h')
-rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/smp.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/net/bluetooth/smp.h index cf1094617c69..5240537efde3 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.h +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.h @@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req { __u8 auth_req; } __packed; +#define SMP_CMD_MAX 0x0b + #define SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED 0x01 #define SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL 0x02 #define SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS 0x03 |