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authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2014-12-10 00:12:03 +0100
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2014-12-10 00:12:03 +0100
commitb5f185f33d0432cef6ff78765e033dfa8f4de068 (patch)
tree33179c016b8fc3b4d57ed7a7786079ba00b6ef4a /net/bluetooth
parentsh_eth: Remove redundant alignment adjustment (diff)
parentMerge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linvil... (diff)
downloadlinux-b5f185f33d0432cef6ff78765e033dfa8f4de068.tar.xz
linux-b5f185f33d0432cef6ff78765e033dfa8f4de068.zip
Merge tag 'master-2014-12-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linville/wireless-next
John W. Linville says: ==================== pull request: wireless-next 2014-12-08 Please pull this last batch of pending wireless updates for the 3.19 tree... For the wireless bits, Johannes says: "This time I have Felix's no-status rate control work, which will allow drivers to work better with rate control even if they don't have perfect status reporting. In addition to this, a small hwsim fix from Patrik, one of the regulatory patches from Arik, and a number of cleanups and fixes I did myself. Of note is a patch where I disable CFG80211_WEXT so that compatibility is no longer selectable - this is intended as a wake-up call for anyone who's still using it, and is still easily worked around (it's a one-line patch) before we fully remove the code as well in the future." For the Bluetooth bits, Johan says: "Here's one more bluetooth-next pull request for 3.19: - Minor cleanups for ieee802154 & mac802154 - Fix for the kernel warning with !TASK_RUNNING reported by Kirill A. Shutemov - Support for another ath3k device - Fix for tracking link key based security level - Device tree bindings for btmrvl + a state update fix - Fix for wrong ACL flags on LE links" And... "In addition to the previous one this contains two more cleanups to mac802154 as well as support for some new HCI features from the Bluetooth 4.2 specification. From the original request: 'Here's what should be the last bluetooth-next pull request for 3.19. It's rather large but the majority of it is the Low Energy Secure Connections feature that's part of the Bluetooth 4.2 specification. The specification went public only this week so we couldn't publish the corresponding code before that. The code itself can nevertheless be considered fairly mature as it's been in development for over 6 months and gone through several interoperability test events. Besides LE SC the pull request contains an important fix for command complete events for mgmt sockets which also fixes some leaks of hci_conn objects when powering off or unplugging Bluetooth adapters. A smaller feature that's part of the pull request is service discovery support. This is like normal device discovery except that devices not matching specific UUIDs or strong enough RSSI are filtered out. Other changes that the pull request contains are firmware dump support to the btmrvl driver, firmware download support for Broadcom BCM20702A0 variants, as well as some coding style cleanups in 6lowpan & ieee802154/mac802154 code.'" For the NFC bits, Samuel says: "With this one we get: - NFC digital improvements for DEP support: Chaining, NACK and ATN support added. - NCI improvements: Support for p2p target, SE IO operand addition, SE operands extensions to support proprietary implementations, and a few fixes. - NFC HCI improvements: OPEN_PIPE and NOTIFY_ALL_CLEARED support, and SE IO operand addition. - A bunch of minor improvements and fixes for STMicro st21nfcb and st21nfca" For the iwlwifi bits, Emmanuel says: "Major works are CSA and TDLS. On top of that I have a new firmware API for scan and a few rate control improvements. Johannes find a few tricks to improve our CPU utilization and adds support for a new spin of 7265 called 7265D. Along with this a few random things that don't stand out." And... "I deprecate here -8.ucode since -9 has been published long ago. Along with that I have a new activity, we have now better a infrastructure for firmware debugging. This will allow to have configurable probes insides the firmware. Luca continues his work on NetDetect, this feature is now complete. All the rest is minor fixes here and there." For the Atheros bits, Kalle says: "Only ath10k changes this time and no major changes. Most visible are: o new debugfs interface for runtime firmware debugging (Yanbo) o fix shared WEP (Sujith) o don't rebuild whenever kernel version changes (Johannes) o lots of refactoring to make it easier to add new hw support (Michal) There's also smaller fixes and improvements with no point of listing here." In addition, there are a few last minute updates to ath5k, ath9k, brcmfmac, brcmsmac, mwifiex, rt2x00, rtlwifi, and wil6210. Also included is a pull of the wireless tree to pick-up the fixes originally included in "pull request: wireless 2014-12-03"... Please let me know if there are problems! ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth')
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c2
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/ecc.c816
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/ecc.h54
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c1
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_core.c239
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_event.c155
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c55
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/mgmt.c869
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/smp.c1543
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/smp.h51
12 files changed, 3193 insertions, 595 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/Kconfig b/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
index 5e97a8ff850b..29bcafc41adf 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
+++ b/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ menuconfig BT
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_CMAC
select CRYPTO_ECB
select CRYPTO_SHA256
help
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/Makefile b/net/bluetooth/Makefile
index 886e9aa3ecf1..a5432a6a0ae6 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/Makefile
+++ b/net/bluetooth/Makefile
@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ bluetooth_6lowpan-y := 6lowpan.o
bluetooth-y := af_bluetooth.o hci_core.o hci_conn.o hci_event.o mgmt.o \
hci_sock.o hci_sysfs.o l2cap_core.o l2cap_sock.o smp.o sco.o lib.o \
- a2mp.o amp.o
+ a2mp.o amp.o ecc.o
subdir-ccflags-y += -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c
index 0a7cc565f93e..012e3b03589d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
-#define VERSION "2.19"
+#define VERSION "2.20"
/* Bluetooth sockets */
#define BT_MAX_PROTO 8
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecc.c b/net/bluetooth/ecc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e1709f8467ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,816 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Kenneth MacKay
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
+ * met:
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/random.h>
+
+#include "ecc.h"
+
+/* 256-bit curve */
+#define ECC_BYTES 32
+
+#define MAX_TRIES 16
+
+/* Number of u64's needed */
+#define NUM_ECC_DIGITS (ECC_BYTES / 8)
+
+struct ecc_point {
+ u64 x[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ u64 y[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ u64 m_low;
+ u64 m_high;
+} uint128_t;
+
+#define CURVE_P_32 { 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFull, 0x00000000FFFFFFFFull, \
+ 0x0000000000000000ull, 0xFFFFFFFF00000001ull }
+
+#define CURVE_G_32 { \
+ { 0xF4A13945D898C296ull, 0x77037D812DEB33A0ull, \
+ 0xF8BCE6E563A440F2ull, 0x6B17D1F2E12C4247ull }, \
+ { 0xCBB6406837BF51F5ull, 0x2BCE33576B315ECEull, \
+ 0x8EE7EB4A7C0F9E16ull, 0x4FE342E2FE1A7F9Bull } \
+}
+
+#define CURVE_N_32 { 0xF3B9CAC2FC632551ull, 0xBCE6FAADA7179E84ull, \
+ 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFull, 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ull }
+
+static u64 curve_p[NUM_ECC_DIGITS] = CURVE_P_32;
+static struct ecc_point curve_g = CURVE_G_32;
+static u64 curve_n[NUM_ECC_DIGITS] = CURVE_N_32;
+
+static void vli_clear(u64 *vli)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_ECC_DIGITS; i++)
+ vli[i] = 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if vli == 0, false otherwise. */
+static bool vli_is_zero(const u64 *vli)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_ECC_DIGITS; i++) {
+ if (vli[i])
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Returns nonzero if bit bit of vli is set. */
+static u64 vli_test_bit(const u64 *vli, unsigned int bit)
+{
+ return (vli[bit / 64] & ((u64) 1 << (bit % 64)));
+}
+
+/* Counts the number of 64-bit "digits" in vli. */
+static unsigned int vli_num_digits(const u64 *vli)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* Search from the end until we find a non-zero digit.
+ * We do it in reverse because we expect that most digits will
+ * be nonzero.
+ */
+ for (i = NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1; i >= 0 && vli[i] == 0; i--);
+
+ return (i + 1);
+}
+
+/* Counts the number of bits required for vli. */
+static unsigned int vli_num_bits(const u64 *vli)
+{
+ unsigned int i, num_digits;
+ u64 digit;
+
+ num_digits = vli_num_digits(vli);
+ if (num_digits == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ digit = vli[num_digits - 1];
+ for (i = 0; digit; i++)
+ digit >>= 1;
+
+ return ((num_digits - 1) * 64 + i);
+}
+
+/* Sets dest = src. */
+static void vli_set(u64 *dest, const u64 *src)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_ECC_DIGITS; i++)
+ dest[i] = src[i];
+}
+
+/* Returns sign of left - right. */
+static int vli_cmp(const u64 *left, const u64 *right)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (left[i] > right[i])
+ return 1;
+ else if (left[i] < right[i])
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Computes result = in << c, returning carry. Can modify in place
+ * (if result == in). 0 < shift < 64.
+ */
+static u64 vli_lshift(u64 *result, const u64 *in,
+ unsigned int shift)
+{
+ u64 carry = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_ECC_DIGITS; i++) {
+ u64 temp = in[i];
+
+ result[i] = (temp << shift) | carry;
+ carry = temp >> (64 - shift);
+ }
+
+ return carry;
+}
+
+/* Computes vli = vli >> 1. */
+static void vli_rshift1(u64 *vli)
+{
+ u64 *end = vli;
+ u64 carry = 0;
+
+ vli += NUM_ECC_DIGITS;
+
+ while (vli-- > end) {
+ u64 temp = *vli;
+ *vli = (temp >> 1) | carry;
+ carry = temp << 63;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes result = left + right, returning carry. Can modify in place. */
+static u64 vli_add(u64 *result, const u64 *left,
+ const u64 *right)
+{
+ u64 carry = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_ECC_DIGITS; i++) {
+ u64 sum;
+
+ sum = left[i] + right[i] + carry;
+ if (sum != left[i])
+ carry = (sum < left[i]);
+
+ result[i] = sum;
+ }
+
+ return carry;
+}
+
+/* Computes result = left - right, returning borrow. Can modify in place. */
+static u64 vli_sub(u64 *result, const u64 *left, const u64 *right)
+{
+ u64 borrow = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_ECC_DIGITS; i++) {
+ u64 diff;
+
+ diff = left[i] - right[i] - borrow;
+ if (diff != left[i])
+ borrow = (diff > left[i]);
+
+ result[i] = diff;
+ }
+
+ return borrow;
+}
+
+static uint128_t mul_64_64(u64 left, u64 right)
+{
+ u64 a0 = left & 0xffffffffull;
+ u64 a1 = left >> 32;
+ u64 b0 = right & 0xffffffffull;
+ u64 b1 = right >> 32;
+ u64 m0 = a0 * b0;
+ u64 m1 = a0 * b1;
+ u64 m2 = a1 * b0;
+ u64 m3 = a1 * b1;
+ uint128_t result;
+
+ m2 += (m0 >> 32);
+ m2 += m1;
+
+ /* Overflow */
+ if (m2 < m1)
+ m3 += 0x100000000ull;
+
+ result.m_low = (m0 & 0xffffffffull) | (m2 << 32);
+ result.m_high = m3 + (m2 >> 32);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static uint128_t add_128_128(uint128_t a, uint128_t b)
+{
+ uint128_t result;
+
+ result.m_low = a.m_low + b.m_low;
+ result.m_high = a.m_high + b.m_high + (result.m_low < a.m_low);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static void vli_mult(u64 *result, const u64 *left, const u64 *right)
+{
+ uint128_t r01 = { 0, 0 };
+ u64 r2 = 0;
+ unsigned int i, k;
+
+ /* Compute each digit of result in sequence, maintaining the
+ * carries.
+ */
+ for (k = 0; k < NUM_ECC_DIGITS * 2 - 1; k++) {
+ unsigned int min;
+
+ if (k < NUM_ECC_DIGITS)
+ min = 0;
+ else
+ min = (k + 1) - NUM_ECC_DIGITS;
+
+ for (i = min; i <= k && i < NUM_ECC_DIGITS; i++) {
+ uint128_t product;
+
+ product = mul_64_64(left[i], right[k - i]);
+
+ r01 = add_128_128(r01, product);
+ r2 += (r01.m_high < product.m_high);
+ }
+
+ result[k] = r01.m_low;
+ r01.m_low = r01.m_high;
+ r01.m_high = r2;
+ r2 = 0;
+ }
+
+ result[NUM_ECC_DIGITS * 2 - 1] = r01.m_low;
+}
+
+static void vli_square(u64 *result, const u64 *left)
+{
+ uint128_t r01 = { 0, 0 };
+ u64 r2 = 0;
+ int i, k;
+
+ for (k = 0; k < NUM_ECC_DIGITS * 2 - 1; k++) {
+ unsigned int min;
+
+ if (k < NUM_ECC_DIGITS)
+ min = 0;
+ else
+ min = (k + 1) - NUM_ECC_DIGITS;
+
+ for (i = min; i <= k && i <= k - i; i++) {
+ uint128_t product;
+
+ product = mul_64_64(left[i], left[k - i]);
+
+ if (i < k - i) {
+ r2 += product.m_high >> 63;
+ product.m_high = (product.m_high << 1) |
+ (product.m_low >> 63);
+ product.m_low <<= 1;
+ }
+
+ r01 = add_128_128(r01, product);
+ r2 += (r01.m_high < product.m_high);
+ }
+
+ result[k] = r01.m_low;
+ r01.m_low = r01.m_high;
+ r01.m_high = r2;
+ r2 = 0;
+ }
+
+ result[NUM_ECC_DIGITS * 2 - 1] = r01.m_low;
+}
+
+/* Computes result = (left + right) % mod.
+ * Assumes that left < mod and right < mod, result != mod.
+ */
+static void vli_mod_add(u64 *result, const u64 *left, const u64 *right,
+ const u64 *mod)
+{
+ u64 carry;
+
+ carry = vli_add(result, left, right);
+
+ /* result > mod (result = mod + remainder), so subtract mod to
+ * get remainder.
+ */
+ if (carry || vli_cmp(result, mod) >= 0)
+ vli_sub(result, result, mod);
+}
+
+/* Computes result = (left - right) % mod.
+ * Assumes that left < mod and right < mod, result != mod.
+ */
+static void vli_mod_sub(u64 *result, const u64 *left, const u64 *right,
+ const u64 *mod)
+{
+ u64 borrow = vli_sub(result, left, right);
+
+ /* In this case, p_result == -diff == (max int) - diff.
+ * Since -x % d == d - x, we can get the correct result from
+ * result + mod (with overflow).
+ */
+ if (borrow)
+ vli_add(result, result, mod);
+}
+
+/* Computes result = product % curve_p
+ from http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/nist-routines.pdf */
+static void vli_mmod_fast(u64 *result, const u64 *product)
+{
+ u64 tmp[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ int carry;
+
+ /* t */
+ vli_set(result, product);
+
+ /* s1 */
+ tmp[0] = 0;
+ tmp[1] = product[5] & 0xffffffff00000000ull;
+ tmp[2] = product[6];
+ tmp[3] = product[7];
+ carry = vli_lshift(tmp, tmp, 1);
+ carry += vli_add(result, result, tmp);
+
+ /* s2 */
+ tmp[1] = product[6] << 32;
+ tmp[2] = (product[6] >> 32) | (product[7] << 32);
+ tmp[3] = product[7] >> 32;
+ carry += vli_lshift(tmp, tmp, 1);
+ carry += vli_add(result, result, tmp);
+
+ /* s3 */
+ tmp[0] = product[4];
+ tmp[1] = product[5] & 0xffffffff;
+ tmp[2] = 0;
+ tmp[3] = product[7];
+ carry += vli_add(result, result, tmp);
+
+ /* s4 */
+ tmp[0] = (product[4] >> 32) | (product[5] << 32);
+ tmp[1] = (product[5] >> 32) | (product[6] & 0xffffffff00000000ull);
+ tmp[2] = product[7];
+ tmp[3] = (product[6] >> 32) | (product[4] << 32);
+ carry += vli_add(result, result, tmp);
+
+ /* d1 */
+ tmp[0] = (product[5] >> 32) | (product[6] << 32);
+ tmp[1] = (product[6] >> 32);
+ tmp[2] = 0;
+ tmp[3] = (product[4] & 0xffffffff) | (product[5] << 32);
+ carry -= vli_sub(result, result, tmp);
+
+ /* d2 */
+ tmp[0] = product[6];
+ tmp[1] = product[7];
+ tmp[2] = 0;
+ tmp[3] = (product[4] >> 32) | (product[5] & 0xffffffff00000000ull);
+ carry -= vli_sub(result, result, tmp);
+
+ /* d3 */
+ tmp[0] = (product[6] >> 32) | (product[7] << 32);
+ tmp[1] = (product[7] >> 32) | (product[4] << 32);
+ tmp[2] = (product[4] >> 32) | (product[5] << 32);
+ tmp[3] = (product[6] << 32);
+ carry -= vli_sub(result, result, tmp);
+
+ /* d4 */
+ tmp[0] = product[7];
+ tmp[1] = product[4] & 0xffffffff00000000ull;
+ tmp[2] = product[5];
+ tmp[3] = product[6] & 0xffffffff00000000ull;
+ carry -= vli_sub(result, result, tmp);
+
+ if (carry < 0) {
+ do {
+ carry += vli_add(result, result, curve_p);
+ } while (carry < 0);
+ } else {
+ while (carry || vli_cmp(curve_p, result) != 1)
+ carry -= vli_sub(result, result, curve_p);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes result = (left * right) % curve_p. */
+static void vli_mod_mult_fast(u64 *result, const u64 *left, const u64 *right)
+{
+ u64 product[2 * NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+
+ vli_mult(product, left, right);
+ vli_mmod_fast(result, product);
+}
+
+/* Computes result = left^2 % curve_p. */
+static void vli_mod_square_fast(u64 *result, const u64 *left)
+{
+ u64 product[2 * NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+
+ vli_square(product, left);
+ vli_mmod_fast(result, product);
+}
+
+#define EVEN(vli) (!(vli[0] & 1))
+/* Computes result = (1 / p_input) % mod. All VLIs are the same size.
+ * See "From Euclid's GCD to Montgomery Multiplication to the Great Divide"
+ * https://labs.oracle.com/techrep/2001/smli_tr-2001-95.pdf
+ */
+static void vli_mod_inv(u64 *result, const u64 *input, const u64 *mod)
+{
+ u64 a[NUM_ECC_DIGITS], b[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ u64 u[NUM_ECC_DIGITS], v[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ u64 carry;
+ int cmp_result;
+
+ if (vli_is_zero(input)) {
+ vli_clear(result);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vli_set(a, input);
+ vli_set(b, mod);
+ vli_clear(u);
+ u[0] = 1;
+ vli_clear(v);
+
+ while ((cmp_result = vli_cmp(a, b)) != 0) {
+ carry = 0;
+
+ if (EVEN(a)) {
+ vli_rshift1(a);
+
+ if (!EVEN(u))
+ carry = vli_add(u, u, mod);
+
+ vli_rshift1(u);
+ if (carry)
+ u[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1] |= 0x8000000000000000ull;
+ } else if (EVEN(b)) {
+ vli_rshift1(b);
+
+ if (!EVEN(v))
+ carry = vli_add(v, v, mod);
+
+ vli_rshift1(v);
+ if (carry)
+ v[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1] |= 0x8000000000000000ull;
+ } else if (cmp_result > 0) {
+ vli_sub(a, a, b);
+ vli_rshift1(a);
+
+ if (vli_cmp(u, v) < 0)
+ vli_add(u, u, mod);
+
+ vli_sub(u, u, v);
+ if (!EVEN(u))
+ carry = vli_add(u, u, mod);
+
+ vli_rshift1(u);
+ if (carry)
+ u[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1] |= 0x8000000000000000ull;
+ } else {
+ vli_sub(b, b, a);
+ vli_rshift1(b);
+
+ if (vli_cmp(v, u) < 0)
+ vli_add(v, v, mod);
+
+ vli_sub(v, v, u);
+ if (!EVEN(v))
+ carry = vli_add(v, v, mod);
+
+ vli_rshift1(v);
+ if (carry)
+ v[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1] |= 0x8000000000000000ull;
+ }
+ }
+
+ vli_set(result, u);
+}
+
+/* ------ Point operations ------ */
+
+/* Returns true if p_point is the point at infinity, false otherwise. */
+static bool ecc_point_is_zero(const struct ecc_point *point)
+{
+ return (vli_is_zero(point->x) && vli_is_zero(point->y));
+}
+
+/* Point multiplication algorithm using Montgomery's ladder with co-Z
+ * coordinates. From http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/338.pdf
+ */
+
+/* Double in place */
+static void ecc_point_double_jacobian(u64 *x1, u64 *y1, u64 *z1)
+{
+ /* t1 = x, t2 = y, t3 = z */
+ u64 t4[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ u64 t5[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+
+ if (vli_is_zero(z1))
+ return;
+
+ vli_mod_square_fast(t4, y1); /* t4 = y1^2 */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(t5, x1, t4); /* t5 = x1*y1^2 = A */
+ vli_mod_square_fast(t4, t4); /* t4 = y1^4 */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(y1, y1, z1); /* t2 = y1*z1 = z3 */
+ vli_mod_square_fast(z1, z1); /* t3 = z1^2 */
+
+ vli_mod_add(x1, x1, z1, curve_p); /* t1 = x1 + z1^2 */
+ vli_mod_add(z1, z1, z1, curve_p); /* t3 = 2*z1^2 */
+ vli_mod_sub(z1, x1, z1, curve_p); /* t3 = x1 - z1^2 */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(x1, x1, z1); /* t1 = x1^2 - z1^4 */
+
+ vli_mod_add(z1, x1, x1, curve_p); /* t3 = 2*(x1^2 - z1^4) */
+ vli_mod_add(x1, x1, z1, curve_p); /* t1 = 3*(x1^2 - z1^4) */
+ if (vli_test_bit(x1, 0)) {
+ u64 carry = vli_add(x1, x1, curve_p);
+ vli_rshift1(x1);
+ x1[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1] |= carry << 63;
+ } else {
+ vli_rshift1(x1);
+ }
+ /* t1 = 3/2*(x1^2 - z1^4) = B */
+
+ vli_mod_square_fast(z1, x1); /* t3 = B^2 */
+ vli_mod_sub(z1, z1, t5, curve_p); /* t3 = B^2 - A */
+ vli_mod_sub(z1, z1, t5, curve_p); /* t3 = B^2 - 2A = x3 */
+ vli_mod_sub(t5, t5, z1, curve_p); /* t5 = A - x3 */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(x1, x1, t5); /* t1 = B * (A - x3) */
+ vli_mod_sub(t4, x1, t4, curve_p); /* t4 = B * (A - x3) - y1^4 = y3 */
+
+ vli_set(x1, z1);
+ vli_set(z1, y1);
+ vli_set(y1, t4);
+}
+
+/* Modify (x1, y1) => (x1 * z^2, y1 * z^3) */
+static void apply_z(u64 *x1, u64 *y1, u64 *z)
+{
+ u64 t1[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+
+ vli_mod_square_fast(t1, z); /* z^2 */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(x1, x1, t1); /* x1 * z^2 */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(t1, t1, z); /* z^3 */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(y1, y1, t1); /* y1 * z^3 */
+}
+
+/* P = (x1, y1) => 2P, (x2, y2) => P' */
+static void xycz_initial_double(u64 *x1, u64 *y1, u64 *x2, u64 *y2,
+ u64 *p_initial_z)
+{
+ u64 z[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+
+ vli_set(x2, x1);
+ vli_set(y2, y1);
+
+ vli_clear(z);
+ z[0] = 1;
+
+ if (p_initial_z)
+ vli_set(z, p_initial_z);
+
+ apply_z(x1, y1, z);
+
+ ecc_point_double_jacobian(x1, y1, z);
+
+ apply_z(x2, y2, z);
+}
+
+/* Input P = (x1, y1, Z), Q = (x2, y2, Z)
+ * Output P' = (x1', y1', Z3), P + Q = (x3, y3, Z3)
+ * or P => P', Q => P + Q
+ */
+static void xycz_add(u64 *x1, u64 *y1, u64 *x2, u64 *y2)
+{
+ /* t1 = X1, t2 = Y1, t3 = X2, t4 = Y2 */
+ u64 t5[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+
+ vli_mod_sub(t5, x2, x1, curve_p); /* t5 = x2 - x1 */
+ vli_mod_square_fast(t5, t5); /* t5 = (x2 - x1)^2 = A */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(x1, x1, t5); /* t1 = x1*A = B */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(x2, x2, t5); /* t3 = x2*A = C */
+ vli_mod_sub(y2, y2, y1, curve_p); /* t4 = y2 - y1 */
+ vli_mod_square_fast(t5, y2); /* t5 = (y2 - y1)^2 = D */
+
+ vli_mod_sub(t5, t5, x1, curve_p); /* t5 = D - B */
+ vli_mod_sub(t5, t5, x2, curve_p); /* t5 = D - B - C = x3 */
+ vli_mod_sub(x2, x2, x1, curve_p); /* t3 = C - B */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(y1, y1, x2); /* t2 = y1*(C - B) */
+ vli_mod_sub(x2, x1, t5, curve_p); /* t3 = B - x3 */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(y2, y2, x2); /* t4 = (y2 - y1)*(B - x3) */
+ vli_mod_sub(y2, y2, y1, curve_p); /* t4 = y3 */
+
+ vli_set(x2, t5);
+}
+
+/* Input P = (x1, y1, Z), Q = (x2, y2, Z)
+ * Output P + Q = (x3, y3, Z3), P - Q = (x3', y3', Z3)
+ * or P => P - Q, Q => P + Q
+ */
+static void xycz_add_c(u64 *x1, u64 *y1, u64 *x2, u64 *y2)
+{
+ /* t1 = X1, t2 = Y1, t3 = X2, t4 = Y2 */
+ u64 t5[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ u64 t6[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ u64 t7[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+
+ vli_mod_sub(t5, x2, x1, curve_p); /* t5 = x2 - x1 */
+ vli_mod_square_fast(t5, t5); /* t5 = (x2 - x1)^2 = A */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(x1, x1, t5); /* t1 = x1*A = B */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(x2, x2, t5); /* t3 = x2*A = C */
+ vli_mod_add(t5, y2, y1, curve_p); /* t4 = y2 + y1 */
+ vli_mod_sub(y2, y2, y1, curve_p); /* t4 = y2 - y1 */
+
+ vli_mod_sub(t6, x2, x1, curve_p); /* t6 = C - B */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(y1, y1, t6); /* t2 = y1 * (C - B) */
+ vli_mod_add(t6, x1, x2, curve_p); /* t6 = B + C */
+ vli_mod_square_fast(x2, y2); /* t3 = (y2 - y1)^2 */
+ vli_mod_sub(x2, x2, t6, curve_p); /* t3 = x3 */
+
+ vli_mod_sub(t7, x1, x2, curve_p); /* t7 = B - x3 */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(y2, y2, t7); /* t4 = (y2 - y1)*(B - x3) */
+ vli_mod_sub(y2, y2, y1, curve_p); /* t4 = y3 */
+
+ vli_mod_square_fast(t7, t5); /* t7 = (y2 + y1)^2 = F */
+ vli_mod_sub(t7, t7, t6, curve_p); /* t7 = x3' */
+ vli_mod_sub(t6, t7, x1, curve_p); /* t6 = x3' - B */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(t6, t6, t5); /* t6 = (y2 + y1)*(x3' - B) */
+ vli_mod_sub(y1, t6, y1, curve_p); /* t2 = y3' */
+
+ vli_set(x1, t7);
+}
+
+static void ecc_point_mult(struct ecc_point *result,
+ const struct ecc_point *point, u64 *scalar,
+ u64 *initial_z, int num_bits)
+{
+ /* R0 and R1 */
+ u64 rx[2][NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ u64 ry[2][NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ u64 z[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ int i, nb;
+
+ vli_set(rx[1], point->x);
+ vli_set(ry[1], point->y);
+
+ xycz_initial_double(rx[1], ry[1], rx[0], ry[0], initial_z);
+
+ for (i = num_bits - 2; i > 0; i--) {
+ nb = !vli_test_bit(scalar, i);
+ xycz_add_c(rx[1 - nb], ry[1 - nb], rx[nb], ry[nb]);
+ xycz_add(rx[nb], ry[nb], rx[1 - nb], ry[1 - nb]);
+ }
+
+ nb = !vli_test_bit(scalar, 0);
+ xycz_add_c(rx[1 - nb], ry[1 - nb], rx[nb], ry[nb]);
+
+ /* Find final 1/Z value. */
+ vli_mod_sub(z, rx[1], rx[0], curve_p); /* X1 - X0 */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(z, z, ry[1 - nb]); /* Yb * (X1 - X0) */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(z, z, point->x); /* xP * Yb * (X1 - X0) */
+ vli_mod_inv(z, z, curve_p); /* 1 / (xP * Yb * (X1 - X0)) */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(z, z, point->y); /* yP / (xP * Yb * (X1 - X0)) */
+ vli_mod_mult_fast(z, z, rx[1 - nb]); /* Xb * yP / (xP * Yb * (X1 - X0)) */
+ /* End 1/Z calculation */
+
+ xycz_add(rx[nb], ry[nb], rx[1 - nb], ry[1 - nb]);
+
+ apply_z(rx[0], ry[0], z);
+
+ vli_set(result->x, rx[0]);
+ vli_set(result->y, ry[0]);
+}
+
+static void ecc_bytes2native(const u8 bytes[ECC_BYTES],
+ u64 native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_ECC_DIGITS; i++) {
+ const u8 *digit = bytes + 8 * (NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i);
+
+ native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i] =
+ ((u64) digit[0] << 0) |
+ ((u64) digit[1] << 8) |
+ ((u64) digit[2] << 16) |
+ ((u64) digit[3] << 24) |
+ ((u64) digit[4] << 32) |
+ ((u64) digit[5] << 40) |
+ ((u64) digit[6] << 48) |
+ ((u64) digit[7] << 56);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ecc_native2bytes(const u64 native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS],
+ u8 bytes[ECC_BYTES])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_ECC_DIGITS; i++) {
+ u8 *digit = bytes + 8 * (NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i);
+
+ digit[0] = native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i] >> 0;
+ digit[1] = native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i] >> 8;
+ digit[2] = native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i] >> 16;
+ digit[3] = native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i] >> 24;
+ digit[4] = native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i] >> 32;
+ digit[5] = native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i] >> 40;
+ digit[6] = native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i] >> 48;
+ digit[7] = native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS - 1 - i] >> 56;
+ }
+}
+
+bool ecc_make_key(u8 public_key[64], u8 private_key[32])
+{
+ struct ecc_point pk;
+ u64 priv[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ unsigned int tries = 0;
+
+ do {
+ if (tries++ >= MAX_TRIES)
+ return false;
+
+ get_random_bytes(priv, ECC_BYTES);
+
+ if (vli_is_zero(priv))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Make sure the private key is in the range [1, n-1]. */
+ if (vli_cmp(curve_n, priv) != 1)
+ continue;
+
+ ecc_point_mult(&pk, &curve_g, priv, NULL, vli_num_bits(priv));
+ } while (ecc_point_is_zero(&pk));
+
+ ecc_native2bytes(priv, private_key);
+ ecc_native2bytes(pk.x, public_key);
+ ecc_native2bytes(pk.y, &public_key[32]);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool ecdh_shared_secret(const u8 public_key[64], const u8 private_key[32],
+ u8 secret[32])
+{
+ u64 priv[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ u64 rand[NUM_ECC_DIGITS];
+ struct ecc_point product, pk;
+
+ get_random_bytes(rand, ECC_BYTES);
+
+ ecc_bytes2native(public_key, pk.x);
+ ecc_bytes2native(&public_key[32], pk.y);
+ ecc_bytes2native(private_key, priv);
+
+ ecc_point_mult(&product, &pk, priv, rand, vli_num_bits(priv));
+
+ ecc_native2bytes(product.x, secret);
+
+ return !ecc_point_is_zero(&product);
+}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecc.h b/net/bluetooth/ecc.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8d6a2f4d1905
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Kenneth MacKay
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
+ * met:
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* Create a public/private key pair.
+ * Outputs:
+ * public_key - Will be filled in with the public key.
+ * private_key - Will be filled in with the private key.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the key pair was generated successfully, false
+ * if an error occurred. The keys are with the LSB first.
+ */
+bool ecc_make_key(u8 public_key[64], u8 private_key[32]);
+
+/* Compute a shared secret given your secret key and someone else's
+ * public key.
+ * Note: It is recommended that you hash the result of ecdh_shared_secret
+ * before using it for symmetric encryption or HMAC.
+ *
+ * Inputs:
+ * public_key - The public key of the remote party
+ * private_key - Your private key.
+ *
+ * Outputs:
+ * secret - Will be filled in with the shared secret value.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the shared secret was generated successfully, false
+ * if an error occurred. Both input and output parameters are with the
+ * LSB first.
+ */
+bool ecdh_shared_secret(const u8 public_key[64], const u8 private_key[32],
+ u8 secret[32]);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index 96887ae8375b..79d84b88b8f0 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -449,6 +449,7 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_conn_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst,
conn->io_capability = hdev->io_capability;
conn->remote_auth = 0xff;
conn->key_type = 0xff;
+ conn->rssi = HCI_RSSI_INVALID;
conn->tx_power = HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID;
conn->max_tx_power = HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
index d786958a1dec..93f92a085506 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
@@ -274,15 +274,13 @@ static const struct file_operations inquiry_cache_fops = {
static int link_keys_show(struct seq_file *f, void *ptr)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = f->private;
- struct list_head *p, *n;
+ struct link_key *key;
- hci_dev_lock(hdev);
- list_for_each_safe(p, n, &hdev->link_keys) {
- struct link_key *key = list_entry(p, struct link_key, list);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &hdev->link_keys, list)
seq_printf(f, "%pMR %u %*phN %u\n", &key->bdaddr, key->type,
HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE, key->val, key->pin_len);
- }
- hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
@@ -408,6 +406,49 @@ static const struct file_operations force_sc_support_fops = {
.llseek = default_llseek,
};
+static ssize_t force_lesc_support_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+ char buf[3];
+
+ buf[0] = test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags) ? 'Y': 'N';
+ buf[1] = '\n';
+ buf[2] = '\0';
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
+}
+
+static ssize_t force_lesc_support_write(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+ char buf[32];
+ size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf)-1));
+ bool enable;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ buf[buf_size] = '\0';
+ if (strtobool(buf, &enable))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (enable == test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+ return -EALREADY;
+
+ change_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags);
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations force_lesc_support_fops = {
+ .open = simple_open,
+ .read = force_lesc_support_read,
+ .write = force_lesc_support_write,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
static ssize_t sc_only_mode_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -1128,6 +1169,7 @@ struct sk_buff *__hci_cmd_sync_ev(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 opcode, u32 plen,
err = hci_req_run(&req, hci_req_sync_complete);
if (err < 0) {
remove_wait_queue(&hdev->req_wait_q, &wait);
+ set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
@@ -1196,6 +1238,7 @@ static int __hci_req_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev,
hdev->req_status = 0;
remove_wait_queue(&hdev->req_wait_q, &wait);
+ set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
/* ENODATA means the HCI request command queue is empty.
* This can happen when a request with conditionals doesn't
@@ -1692,6 +1735,28 @@ static void hci_init3_req(struct hci_request *req, unsigned long opt)
* Parameter Request
*/
+ /* If the controller supports Extended Scanner Filter
+ * Policies, enable the correspondig event.
+ */
+ if (hdev->le_features[0] & HCI_LE_EXT_SCAN_POLICY)
+ events[1] |= 0x04; /* LE Direct Advertising
+ * Report
+ */
+
+ /* If the controller supports the LE Read Local P-256
+ * Public Key command, enable the corresponding event.
+ */
+ if (hdev->commands[34] & 0x02)
+ events[0] |= 0x80; /* LE Read Local P-256
+ * Public Key Complete
+ */
+
+ /* If the controller supports the LE Generate DHKey
+ * command, enable the corresponding event.
+ */
+ if (hdev->commands[34] & 0x04)
+ events[1] |= 0x01; /* LE Generate DHKey Complete */
+
hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_EVENT_MASK, sizeof(events),
events);
@@ -1734,9 +1799,7 @@ static void hci_init4_req(struct hci_request *req, unsigned long opt)
hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_READ_SYNC_TRAIN_PARAMS, 0, NULL);
/* Enable Secure Connections if supported and configured */
- if ((lmp_sc_capable(hdev) ||
- test_bit(HCI_FORCE_SC, &hdev->dbg_flags)) &&
- test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ if (bredr_sc_enabled(hdev)) {
u8 support = 0x01;
hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_WRITE_SC_SUPPORT,
sizeof(support), &support);
@@ -1819,6 +1882,10 @@ static int __hci_init(struct hci_dev *hdev)
hdev, &force_sc_support_fops);
debugfs_create_file("sc_only_mode", 0444, hdev->debugfs,
hdev, &sc_only_mode_fops);
+ if (lmp_le_capable(hdev))
+ debugfs_create_file("force_lesc_support", 0644,
+ hdev->debugfs, hdev,
+ &force_lesc_support_fops);
}
if (lmp_sniff_capable(hdev)) {
@@ -2115,7 +2182,7 @@ u32 hci_inquiry_cache_update(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct inquiry_data *data,
BT_DBG("cache %p, %pMR", cache, &data->bdaddr);
- hci_remove_remote_oob_data(hdev, &data->bdaddr);
+ hci_remove_remote_oob_data(hdev, &data->bdaddr, BDADDR_BREDR);
if (!data->ssp_mode)
flags |= MGMT_DEV_FOUND_LEGACY_PAIRING;
@@ -3099,15 +3166,11 @@ void hci_uuids_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev)
void hci_link_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
- struct list_head *p, *n;
-
- list_for_each_safe(p, n, &hdev->link_keys) {
- struct link_key *key;
-
- key = list_entry(p, struct link_key, list);
+ struct link_key *key;
- list_del(p);
- kfree(key);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &hdev->link_keys, list) {
+ list_del_rcu(&key->list);
+ kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
}
}
@@ -3135,9 +3198,14 @@ struct link_key *hci_find_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
{
struct link_key *k;
- list_for_each_entry(k, &hdev->link_keys, list)
- if (bacmp(bdaddr, &k->bdaddr) == 0)
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(k, &hdev->link_keys, list) {
+ if (bacmp(bdaddr, &k->bdaddr) == 0) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return k;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return NULL;
}
@@ -3161,6 +3229,10 @@ static bool hci_persistent_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn,
if (!conn)
return true;
+ /* BR/EDR key derived using SC from an LE link */
+ if (conn->type == LE_LINK)
+ return true;
+
/* Neither local nor remote side had no-bonding as requirement */
if (conn->auth_type > 0x01 && conn->remote_auth > 0x01)
return true;
@@ -3186,37 +3258,17 @@ static u8 ltk_role(u8 type)
return HCI_ROLE_SLAVE;
}
-struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, __le16 ediv, __le64 rand,
- u8 role)
+struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
+ u8 addr_type, u8 role)
{
struct smp_ltk *k;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(k, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) {
- if (k->ediv != ediv || k->rand != rand)
- continue;
-
- if (ltk_role(k->type) != role)
+ if (addr_type != k->bdaddr_type || bacmp(bdaddr, &k->bdaddr))
continue;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return k;
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk_by_addr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
- u8 addr_type, u8 role)
-{
- struct smp_ltk *k;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(k, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) {
- if (addr_type == k->bdaddr_type &&
- bacmp(bdaddr, &k->bdaddr) == 0 &&
- ltk_role(k->type) == role) {
+ if (smp_ltk_is_sc(k) || ltk_role(k->type) == role) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return k;
}
@@ -3288,7 +3340,7 @@ struct link_key *hci_add_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn,
key = kzalloc(sizeof(*key), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
return NULL;
- list_add(&key->list, &hdev->link_keys);
+ list_add_rcu(&key->list, &hdev->link_keys);
}
BT_DBG("%s key for %pMR type %u", hdev->name, bdaddr, type);
@@ -3326,7 +3378,7 @@ struct smp_ltk *hci_add_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
struct smp_ltk *key, *old_key;
u8 role = ltk_role(type);
- old_key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type, role);
+ old_key = hci_find_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type, role);
if (old_key)
key = old_key;
else {
@@ -3381,8 +3433,8 @@ int hci_remove_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
BT_DBG("%s removing %pMR", hdev->name, bdaddr);
- list_del(&key->list);
- kfree(key);
+ list_del_rcu(&key->list);
+ kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
return 0;
}
@@ -3441,26 +3493,31 @@ static void hci_cmd_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
}
struct oob_data *hci_find_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev,
- bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+ bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type)
{
struct oob_data *data;
- list_for_each_entry(data, &hdev->remote_oob_data, list)
- if (bacmp(bdaddr, &data->bdaddr) == 0)
- return data;
+ list_for_each_entry(data, &hdev->remote_oob_data, list) {
+ if (bacmp(bdaddr, &data->bdaddr) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (data->bdaddr_type != bdaddr_type)
+ continue;
+ return data;
+ }
return NULL;
}
-int hci_remove_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+int hci_remove_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
+ u8 bdaddr_type)
{
struct oob_data *data;
- data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, bdaddr);
+ data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type);
if (!data)
return -ENOENT;
- BT_DBG("%s removing %pMR", hdev->name, bdaddr);
+ BT_DBG("%s removing %pMR (%u)", hdev->name, bdaddr, bdaddr_type);
list_del(&data->list);
kfree(data);
@@ -3479,52 +3536,37 @@ void hci_remote_oob_data_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev)
}
int hci_add_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
- u8 *hash, u8 *rand)
+ u8 bdaddr_type, u8 *hash192, u8 *rand192,
+ u8 *hash256, u8 *rand256)
{
struct oob_data *data;
- data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, bdaddr);
+ data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type);
if (!data) {
data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
bacpy(&data->bdaddr, bdaddr);
+ data->bdaddr_type = bdaddr_type;
list_add(&data->list, &hdev->remote_oob_data);
}
- memcpy(data->hash192, hash, sizeof(data->hash192));
- memcpy(data->rand192, rand, sizeof(data->rand192));
-
- memset(data->hash256, 0, sizeof(data->hash256));
- memset(data->rand256, 0, sizeof(data->rand256));
-
- BT_DBG("%s for %pMR", hdev->name, bdaddr);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int hci_add_remote_oob_ext_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
- u8 *hash192, u8 *rand192,
- u8 *hash256, u8 *rand256)
-{
- struct oob_data *data;
-
- data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, bdaddr);
- if (!data) {
- data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- bacpy(&data->bdaddr, bdaddr);
- list_add(&data->list, &hdev->remote_oob_data);
+ if (hash192 && rand192) {
+ memcpy(data->hash192, hash192, sizeof(data->hash192));
+ memcpy(data->rand192, rand192, sizeof(data->rand192));
+ } else {
+ memset(data->hash192, 0, sizeof(data->hash192));
+ memset(data->rand192, 0, sizeof(data->rand192));
}
- memcpy(data->hash192, hash192, sizeof(data->hash192));
- memcpy(data->rand192, rand192, sizeof(data->rand192));
-
- memcpy(data->hash256, hash256, sizeof(data->hash256));
- memcpy(data->rand256, rand256, sizeof(data->rand256));
+ if (hash256 && rand256) {
+ memcpy(data->hash256, hash256, sizeof(data->hash256));
+ memcpy(data->rand256, rand256, sizeof(data->rand256));
+ } else {
+ memset(data->hash256, 0, sizeof(data->hash256));
+ memset(data->rand256, 0, sizeof(data->rand256));
+ }
BT_DBG("%s for %pMR", hdev->name, bdaddr);
@@ -4224,6 +4266,7 @@ void hci_unregister_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev)
hci_remote_oob_data_clear(hdev);
hci_bdaddr_list_clear(&hdev->le_white_list);
hci_conn_params_clear_all(hdev);
+ hci_discovery_filter_clear(hdev);
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
@@ -5596,6 +5639,19 @@ void hci_req_add_le_passive_scan(struct hci_request *req)
*/
filter_policy = update_white_list(req);
+ /* When the controller is using random resolvable addresses and
+ * with that having LE privacy enabled, then controllers with
+ * Extended Scanner Filter Policies support can now enable support
+ * for handling directed advertising.
+ *
+ * So instead of using filter polices 0x00 (no whitelist)
+ * and 0x01 (whitelist enabled) use the new filter policies
+ * 0x02 (no whitelist) and 0x03 (whitelist enabled).
+ */
+ if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+ (hdev->le_features[0] & HCI_LE_EXT_SCAN_POLICY))
+ filter_policy |= 0x02;
+
memset(&param_cp, 0, sizeof(param_cp));
param_cp.type = LE_SCAN_PASSIVE;
param_cp.interval = cpu_to_le16(hdev->le_scan_interval);
@@ -5647,6 +5703,15 @@ void hci_update_background_scan(struct hci_dev *hdev)
if (hdev->discovery.state != DISCOVERY_STOPPED)
return;
+ /* Reset RSSI and UUID filters when starting background scanning
+ * since these filters are meant for service discovery only.
+ *
+ * The Start Discovery and Start Service Discovery operations
+ * ensure to set proper values for RSSI threshold and UUID
+ * filter list. So it is safe to just reset them here.
+ */
+ hci_discovery_filter_clear(hdev);
+
hci_req_init(&req, hdev);
if (list_empty(&hdev->pend_le_conns) &&
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 844f7d1ff1cd..322abbbbcef9 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -2043,13 +2043,14 @@ static void hci_inquiry_result_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
data.pscan_mode = info->pscan_mode;
memcpy(data.dev_class, info->dev_class, 3);
data.clock_offset = info->clock_offset;
- data.rssi = 0x00;
+ data.rssi = HCI_RSSI_INVALID;
data.ssp_mode = 0x00;
flags = hci_inquiry_cache_update(hdev, &data, false);
mgmt_device_found(hdev, &info->bdaddr, ACL_LINK, 0x00,
- info->dev_class, 0, flags, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ info->dev_class, HCI_RSSI_INVALID,
+ flags, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
}
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
@@ -3191,6 +3192,38 @@ unlock:
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
}
+static void conn_set_key(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 key_type, u8 pin_len)
+{
+ if (key_type == HCI_LK_CHANGED_COMBINATION)
+ return;
+
+ conn->pin_length = pin_len;
+ conn->key_type = key_type;
+
+ switch (key_type) {
+ case HCI_LK_LOCAL_UNIT:
+ case HCI_LK_REMOTE_UNIT:
+ case HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION:
+ return;
+ case HCI_LK_COMBINATION:
+ if (pin_len == 16)
+ conn->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ else
+ conn->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+ break;
+ case HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P192:
+ case HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256:
+ conn->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+ break;
+ case HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P192:
+ conn->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ break;
+ case HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256:
+ conn->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
static void hci_link_key_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct hci_ev_link_key_req *ev = (void *) skb->data;
@@ -3217,6 +3250,8 @@ static void hci_link_key_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, ACL_LINK, &ev->bdaddr);
if (conn) {
+ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &conn->flags);
+
if ((key->type == HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P192 ||
key->type == HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256) &&
conn->auth_type != 0xff && (conn->auth_type & 0x01)) {
@@ -3232,8 +3267,7 @@ static void hci_link_key_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
goto not_found;
}
- conn->key_type = key->type;
- conn->pin_length = key->pin_len;
+ conn_set_key(conn, key->type, key->pin_len);
}
bacpy(&cp.bdaddr, &ev->bdaddr);
@@ -3263,16 +3297,15 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, ACL_LINK, &ev->bdaddr);
- if (conn) {
- hci_conn_hold(conn);
- conn->disc_timeout = HCI_DISCONN_TIMEOUT;
- pin_len = conn->pin_length;
+ if (!conn)
+ goto unlock;
- if (ev->key_type != HCI_LK_CHANGED_COMBINATION)
- conn->key_type = ev->key_type;
+ hci_conn_hold(conn);
+ conn->disc_timeout = HCI_DISCONN_TIMEOUT;
+ hci_conn_drop(conn);
- hci_conn_drop(conn);
- }
+ set_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &conn->flags);
+ conn_set_key(conn, ev->key_type, conn->pin_length);
if (!test_bit(HCI_MGMT, &hdev->dev_flags))
goto unlock;
@@ -3282,6 +3315,12 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!key)
goto unlock;
+ /* Update connection information since adding the key will have
+ * fixed up the type in the case of changed combination keys.
+ */
+ if (ev->key_type == HCI_LK_CHANGED_COMBINATION)
+ conn_set_key(conn, key->type, key->pin_len);
+
mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
/* Keep debug keys around only if the HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS flag
@@ -3291,15 +3330,16 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
*/
if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION &&
!test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
- list_del(&key->list);
- kfree(key);
- } else if (conn) {
- if (persistent)
- clear_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY, &conn->flags);
- else
- set_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY, &conn->flags);
+ list_del_rcu(&key->list);
+ kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
+ goto unlock;
}
+ if (persistent)
+ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY, &conn->flags);
+ else
+ set_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY, &conn->flags);
+
unlock:
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
}
@@ -3734,7 +3774,7 @@ static void hci_io_capa_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
cp.authentication = conn->auth_type;
- if (hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &conn->dst) &&
+ if (hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &conn->dst, BDADDR_BREDR) &&
(conn->out || test_bit(HCI_CONN_REMOTE_OOB, &conn->flags)))
cp.oob_data = 0x01;
else
@@ -3989,9 +4029,9 @@ static void hci_remote_oob_data_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
if (!test_bit(HCI_MGMT, &hdev->dev_flags))
goto unlock;
- data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &ev->bdaddr);
+ data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &ev->bdaddr, BDADDR_BREDR);
if (data) {
- if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ if (bredr_sc_enabled(hdev)) {
struct hci_cp_remote_oob_ext_data_reply cp;
bacpy(&cp.bdaddr, &ev->bdaddr);
@@ -4386,7 +4426,8 @@ static struct hci_conn *check_pending_le_conn(struct hci_dev *hdev,
}
static void process_adv_report(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 type, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
- u8 bdaddr_type, s8 rssi, u8 *data, u8 len)
+ u8 bdaddr_type, bdaddr_t *direct_addr,
+ u8 direct_addr_type, s8 rssi, u8 *data, u8 len)
{
struct discovery_state *d = &hdev->discovery;
struct smp_irk *irk;
@@ -4394,6 +4435,32 @@ static void process_adv_report(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 type, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
bool match;
u32 flags;
+ /* If the direct address is present, then this report is from
+ * a LE Direct Advertising Report event. In that case it is
+ * important to see if the address is matching the local
+ * controller address.
+ */
+ if (direct_addr) {
+ /* Only resolvable random addresses are valid for these
+ * kind of reports and others can be ignored.
+ */
+ if (!hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(direct_addr, direct_addr_type))
+ return;
+
+ /* If the controller is not using resolvable random
+ * addresses, then this report can be ignored.
+ */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ return;
+
+ /* If the local IRK of the controller does not match
+ * with the resolvable random address provided, then
+ * this report can be ignored.
+ */
+ if (!smp_irk_matches(hdev, hdev->irk, direct_addr))
+ return;
+ }
+
/* Check if we need to convert to identity address */
irk = hci_get_irk(hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type);
if (irk) {
@@ -4530,7 +4597,8 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
rssi = ev->data[ev->length];
process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr,
- ev->bdaddr_type, rssi, ev->data, ev->length);
+ ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi,
+ ev->data, ev->length);
ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length + 1;
}
@@ -4554,10 +4622,20 @@ static void hci_le_ltk_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (conn == NULL)
goto not_found;
- ltk = hci_find_ltk(hdev, ev->ediv, ev->rand, conn->role);
- if (ltk == NULL)
+ ltk = hci_find_ltk(hdev, &conn->dst, conn->dst_type, conn->role);
+ if (!ltk)
goto not_found;
+ if (smp_ltk_is_sc(ltk)) {
+ /* With SC both EDiv and Rand are set to zero */
+ if (ev->ediv || ev->rand)
+ goto not_found;
+ } else {
+ /* For non-SC keys check that EDiv and Rand match */
+ if (ev->ediv != ltk->ediv || ev->rand != ltk->rand)
+ goto not_found;
+ }
+
memcpy(cp.ltk, ltk->val, sizeof(ltk->val));
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
@@ -4661,6 +4739,27 @@ static void hci_le_remote_conn_param_req_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_CONN_PARAM_REQ_REPLY, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
+static void hci_le_direct_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ u8 num_reports = skb->data[0];
+ void *ptr = &skb->data[1];
+
+ hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+
+ while (num_reports--) {
+ struct hci_ev_le_direct_adv_info *ev = ptr;
+
+ process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr,
+ ev->bdaddr_type, &ev->direct_addr,
+ ev->direct_addr_type, ev->rssi, NULL, 0);
+
+ ptr += sizeof(*ev);
+ }
+
+ hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+}
+
static void hci_le_meta_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct hci_ev_le_meta *le_ev = (void *) skb->data;
@@ -4688,6 +4787,10 @@ static void hci_le_meta_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
hci_le_remote_conn_param_req_evt(hdev, skb);
break;
+ case HCI_EV_LE_DIRECT_ADV_REPORT:
+ hci_le_direct_adv_report_evt(hdev, skb);
+ break;
+
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index 8e1273173020..a8da7ea9c2c0 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@
bool disable_ertm;
static u32 l2cap_feat_mask = L2CAP_FEAT_FIXED_CHAN | L2CAP_FEAT_UCD;
-static u8 l2cap_fixed_chan[8] = { L2CAP_FC_SIG_BREDR | L2CAP_FC_CONNLESS, };
static LIST_HEAD(chan_list);
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(chan_list_lock);
@@ -840,7 +839,10 @@ static void l2cap_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 ident, u8 code, u16 len,
if (!skb)
return;
- if (lmp_no_flush_capable(conn->hcon->hdev))
+ /* Use NO_FLUSH if supported or we have an LE link (which does
+ * not support auto-flushing packets) */
+ if (lmp_no_flush_capable(conn->hcon->hdev) ||
+ conn->hcon->type == LE_LINK)
flags = ACL_START_NO_FLUSH;
else
flags = ACL_START;
@@ -874,8 +876,13 @@ static void l2cap_do_send(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
}
- if (!test_bit(FLAG_FLUSHABLE, &chan->flags) &&
- lmp_no_flush_capable(hcon->hdev))
+ /* Use NO_FLUSH for LE links (where this is the only option) or
+ * if the BR/EDR link supports it and flushing has not been
+ * explicitly requested (through FLAG_FLUSHABLE).
+ */
+ if (hcon->type == LE_LINK ||
+ (!test_bit(FLAG_FLUSHABLE, &chan->flags) &&
+ lmp_no_flush_capable(hcon->hdev)))
flags = ACL_START_NO_FLUSH;
else
flags = ACL_START;
@@ -1112,10 +1119,10 @@ static bool __amp_capable(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
struct hci_dev *hdev;
bool amp_available = false;
- if (!conn->hs_enabled)
+ if (!(conn->local_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_A2MP))
return false;
- if (!(conn->fixed_chan_mask & L2CAP_FC_A2MP))
+ if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_A2MP))
return false;
read_lock(&hci_dev_list_lock);
@@ -3088,12 +3095,14 @@ static inline __u8 l2cap_select_mode(__u8 mode, __u16 remote_feat_mask)
static inline bool __l2cap_ews_supported(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
{
- return conn->hs_enabled && conn->feat_mask & L2CAP_FEAT_EXT_WINDOW;
+ return ((conn->local_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_A2MP) &&
+ (conn->feat_mask & L2CAP_FEAT_EXT_WINDOW));
}
static inline bool __l2cap_efs_supported(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
{
- return conn->hs_enabled && conn->feat_mask & L2CAP_FEAT_EXT_FLOW;
+ return ((conn->local_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_A2MP) &&
+ (conn->feat_mask & L2CAP_FEAT_EXT_FLOW));
}
static void __l2cap_set_ertm_timeouts(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
@@ -3322,7 +3331,7 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data)
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
- if (!chan->conn->hs_enabled)
+ if (!(chan->conn->local_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_A2MP))
return -ECONNREFUSED;
set_bit(FLAG_EXT_CTRL, &chan->flags);
@@ -4326,7 +4335,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_information_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
if (!disable_ertm)
feat_mask |= L2CAP_FEAT_ERTM | L2CAP_FEAT_STREAMING
| L2CAP_FEAT_FCS;
- if (conn->hs_enabled)
+ if (conn->local_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_A2MP)
feat_mask |= L2CAP_FEAT_EXT_FLOW
| L2CAP_FEAT_EXT_WINDOW;
@@ -4337,14 +4346,10 @@ static inline int l2cap_information_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
u8 buf[12];
struct l2cap_info_rsp *rsp = (struct l2cap_info_rsp *) buf;
- if (conn->hs_enabled)
- l2cap_fixed_chan[0] |= L2CAP_FC_A2MP;
- else
- l2cap_fixed_chan[0] &= ~L2CAP_FC_A2MP;
-
rsp->type = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_IT_FIXED_CHAN);
rsp->result = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_IR_SUCCESS);
- memcpy(rsp->data, l2cap_fixed_chan, sizeof(l2cap_fixed_chan));
+ rsp->data[0] = conn->local_fixed_chan;
+ memset(rsp->data + 1, 0, 7);
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, cmd->ident, L2CAP_INFO_RSP, sizeof(buf),
buf);
} else {
@@ -4410,7 +4415,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_information_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
break;
case L2CAP_IT_FIXED_CHAN:
- conn->fixed_chan_mask = rsp->data[0];
+ conn->remote_fixed_chan = rsp->data[0];
conn->info_state |= L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE;
conn->info_ident = 0;
@@ -4434,7 +4439,7 @@ static int l2cap_create_channel_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
if (cmd_len != sizeof(*req))
return -EPROTO;
- if (!conn->hs_enabled)
+ if (!(conn->local_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_A2MP))
return -EINVAL;
psm = le16_to_cpu(req->psm);
@@ -4864,7 +4869,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_move_channel_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
BT_DBG("icid 0x%4.4x, dest_amp_id %d", icid, req->dest_amp_id);
- if (!conn->hs_enabled)
+ if (!(conn->local_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_A2MP))
return -EINVAL;
chan = l2cap_get_chan_by_dcid(conn, icid);
@@ -6956,9 +6961,15 @@ static struct l2cap_conn *l2cap_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon)
conn->feat_mask = 0;
- if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK)
- conn->hs_enabled = test_bit(HCI_HS_ENABLED,
- &hcon->hdev->dev_flags);
+ conn->local_fixed_chan = L2CAP_FC_SIG_BREDR | L2CAP_FC_CONNLESS;
+
+ if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK &&
+ test_bit(HCI_HS_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
+ conn->local_fixed_chan |= L2CAP_FC_A2MP;
+
+ if (bredr_sc_enabled(hcon->hdev) &&
+ test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
+ conn->local_fixed_chan |= L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR;
mutex_init(&conn->ident_lock);
mutex_init(&conn->chan_lock);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
index f3e4a16fb157..7384f1161336 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
#include "smp.h"
#define MGMT_VERSION 1
-#define MGMT_REVISION 7
+#define MGMT_REVISION 8
static const u16 mgmt_commands[] = {
MGMT_OP_READ_INDEX_LIST,
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static const u16 mgmt_commands[] = {
MGMT_OP_READ_CONFIG_INFO,
MGMT_OP_SET_EXTERNAL_CONFIG,
MGMT_OP_SET_PUBLIC_ADDRESS,
+ MGMT_OP_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY,
};
static const u16 mgmt_events[] = {
@@ -134,8 +135,10 @@ struct pending_cmd {
u16 opcode;
int index;
void *param;
+ size_t param_len;
struct sock *sk;
void *user_data;
+ void (*cmd_complete)(struct pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status);
};
/* HCI to MGMT error code conversion table */
@@ -574,6 +577,7 @@ static u32 get_supported_settings(struct hci_dev *hdev)
if (lmp_le_capable(hdev)) {
settings |= MGMT_SETTING_LE;
settings |= MGMT_SETTING_ADVERTISING;
+ settings |= MGMT_SETTING_SECURE_CONN;
settings |= MGMT_SETTING_PRIVACY;
}
@@ -1202,14 +1206,13 @@ static struct pending_cmd *mgmt_pending_add(struct sock *sk, u16 opcode,
cmd->opcode = opcode;
cmd->index = hdev->id;
- cmd->param = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ cmd->param = kmemdup(data, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cmd->param) {
kfree(cmd);
return NULL;
}
- if (data)
- memcpy(cmd->param, data, len);
+ cmd->param_len = len;
cmd->sk = sk;
sock_hold(sk);
@@ -1469,6 +1472,32 @@ static void cmd_status_rsp(struct pending_cmd *cmd, void *data)
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
}
+static void cmd_complete_rsp(struct pending_cmd *cmd, void *data)
+{
+ if (cmd->cmd_complete) {
+ u8 *status = data;
+
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, *status);
+ mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cmd_status_rsp(cmd, data);
+}
+
+static void generic_cmd_complete(struct pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status)
+{
+ cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, status, cmd->param,
+ cmd->param_len);
+}
+
+static void addr_cmd_complete(struct pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status)
+{
+ cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, status, cmd->param,
+ sizeof(struct mgmt_addr_info));
+}
+
static u8 mgmt_bredr_support(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
if (!lmp_bredr_capable(hdev))
@@ -2792,6 +2821,8 @@ static int unpair_device(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
goto unlock;
}
+ cmd->cmd_complete = addr_cmd_complete;
+
dc.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
dc.reason = 0x13; /* Remote User Terminated Connection */
err = hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_DISCONNECT, sizeof(dc), &dc);
@@ -2855,6 +2886,8 @@ static int disconnect(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
goto failed;
}
+ cmd->cmd_complete = generic_cmd_complete;
+
err = hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
if (err < 0)
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
@@ -3007,6 +3040,8 @@ static int pin_code_reply(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
goto failed;
}
+ cmd->cmd_complete = addr_cmd_complete;
+
bacpy(&reply.bdaddr, &cp->addr.bdaddr);
reply.pin_len = cp->pin_len;
memcpy(reply.pin_code, cp->pin_code, sizeof(reply.pin_code));
@@ -3096,7 +3131,7 @@ void mgmt_smp_complete(struct hci_conn *conn, bool complete)
cmd = find_pairing(conn);
if (cmd)
- pairing_complete(cmd, status);
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, status);
}
static void pairing_complete_cb(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status)
@@ -3109,7 +3144,7 @@ static void pairing_complete_cb(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status)
if (!cmd)
BT_DBG("Unable to find a pending command");
else
- pairing_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
}
static void le_pairing_complete_cb(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status)
@@ -3125,7 +3160,7 @@ static void le_pairing_complete_cb(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status)
if (!cmd)
BT_DBG("Unable to find a pending command");
else
- pairing_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
}
static int pair_device(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
@@ -3222,6 +3257,8 @@ static int pair_device(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
goto unlock;
}
+ cmd->cmd_complete = pairing_complete;
+
/* For LE, just connecting isn't a proof that the pairing finished */
if (cp->addr.type == BDADDR_BREDR) {
conn->connect_cfm_cb = pairing_complete_cb;
@@ -3338,6 +3375,8 @@ static int user_pairing_resp(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
goto done;
}
+ cmd->cmd_complete = addr_cmd_complete;
+
/* Continue with pairing via HCI */
if (hci_op == HCI_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY) {
struct hci_cp_user_passkey_reply cp;
@@ -3562,7 +3601,7 @@ static int read_local_oob_data(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
goto unlock;
}
- if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ if (bredr_sc_enabled(hdev))
err = hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_READ_LOCAL_OOB_EXT_DATA,
0, NULL);
else
@@ -3598,7 +3637,8 @@ static int add_remote_oob_data(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
}
err = hci_add_remote_oob_data(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr,
- cp->hash, cp->rand);
+ cp->addr.type, cp->hash,
+ cp->rand, NULL, NULL);
if (err < 0)
status = MGMT_STATUS_FAILED;
else
@@ -3608,6 +3648,7 @@ static int add_remote_oob_data(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
status, &cp->addr, sizeof(cp->addr));
} else if (len == MGMT_ADD_REMOTE_OOB_EXT_DATA_SIZE) {
struct mgmt_cp_add_remote_oob_ext_data *cp = data;
+ u8 *rand192, *hash192;
u8 status;
if (cp->addr.type != BDADDR_BREDR) {
@@ -3618,9 +3659,17 @@ static int add_remote_oob_data(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
goto unlock;
}
- err = hci_add_remote_oob_ext_data(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr,
- cp->hash192, cp->rand192,
- cp->hash256, cp->rand256);
+ if (bdaddr_type_is_le(cp->addr.type)) {
+ rand192 = NULL;
+ hash192 = NULL;
+ } else {
+ rand192 = cp->rand192;
+ hash192 = cp->hash192;
+ }
+
+ err = hci_add_remote_oob_data(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr,
+ cp->addr.type, hash192, rand192,
+ cp->hash256, cp->rand256);
if (err < 0)
status = MGMT_STATUS_FAILED;
else
@@ -3661,7 +3710,7 @@ static int remove_remote_oob_data(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
goto done;
}
- err = hci_remove_remote_oob_data(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr);
+ err = hci_remove_remote_oob_data(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, cp->addr.type);
if (err < 0)
status = MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMS;
else
@@ -3675,64 +3724,150 @@ done:
return err;
}
-static int mgmt_start_discovery_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
+static bool trigger_discovery(struct hci_request *req, u8 *status)
{
- struct pending_cmd *cmd;
- u8 type;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = req->hdev;
+ struct hci_cp_le_set_scan_param param_cp;
+ struct hci_cp_le_set_scan_enable enable_cp;
+ struct hci_cp_inquiry inq_cp;
+ /* General inquiry access code (GIAC) */
+ u8 lap[3] = { 0x33, 0x8b, 0x9e };
+ u8 own_addr_type;
int err;
- hci_discovery_set_state(hdev, DISCOVERY_STOPPED);
+ switch (hdev->discovery.type) {
+ case DISCOV_TYPE_BREDR:
+ *status = mgmt_bredr_support(hdev);
+ if (*status)
+ return false;
- cmd = mgmt_pending_find(MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY, hdev);
- if (!cmd)
- return -ENOENT;
+ if (test_bit(HCI_INQUIRY, &hdev->flags)) {
+ *status = MGMT_STATUS_BUSY;
+ return false;
+ }
- type = hdev->discovery.type;
+ hci_inquiry_cache_flush(hdev);
- err = cmd_complete(cmd->sk, hdev->id, cmd->opcode, mgmt_status(status),
- &type, sizeof(type));
- mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
+ memset(&inq_cp, 0, sizeof(inq_cp));
+ memcpy(&inq_cp.lap, lap, sizeof(inq_cp.lap));
+ inq_cp.length = DISCOV_BREDR_INQUIRY_LEN;
+ hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_INQUIRY, sizeof(inq_cp), &inq_cp);
+ break;
- return err;
+ case DISCOV_TYPE_LE:
+ case DISCOV_TYPE_INTERLEAVED:
+ *status = mgmt_le_support(hdev);
+ if (*status)
+ return false;
+
+ if (hdev->discovery.type == DISCOV_TYPE_INTERLEAVED &&
+ !test_bit(HCI_BREDR_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ *status = MGMT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_LE_ADV, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ /* Don't let discovery abort an outgoing
+ * connection attempt that's using directed
+ * advertising.
+ */
+ if (hci_conn_hash_lookup_state(hdev, LE_LINK,
+ BT_CONNECT)) {
+ *status = MGMT_STATUS_REJECTED;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ disable_advertising(req);
+ }
+
+ /* If controller is scanning, it means the background scanning
+ * is running. Thus, we should temporarily stop it in order to
+ * set the discovery scanning parameters.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(HCI_LE_SCAN, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ hci_req_add_le_scan_disable(req);
+
+ memset(&param_cp, 0, sizeof(param_cp));
+
+ /* All active scans will be done with either a resolvable
+ * private address (when privacy feature has been enabled)
+ * or unresolvable private address.
+ */
+ err = hci_update_random_address(req, true, &own_addr_type);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ *status = MGMT_STATUS_FAILED;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ param_cp.type = LE_SCAN_ACTIVE;
+ param_cp.interval = cpu_to_le16(DISCOV_LE_SCAN_INT);
+ param_cp.window = cpu_to_le16(DISCOV_LE_SCAN_WIN);
+ param_cp.own_address_type = own_addr_type;
+ hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_SCAN_PARAM, sizeof(param_cp),
+ &param_cp);
+
+ memset(&enable_cp, 0, sizeof(enable_cp));
+ enable_cp.enable = LE_SCAN_ENABLE;
+ enable_cp.filter_dup = LE_SCAN_FILTER_DUP_ENABLE;
+ hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_SCAN_ENABLE, sizeof(enable_cp),
+ &enable_cp);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ *status = MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMS;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
}
static void start_discovery_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
{
- unsigned long timeout = 0;
+ struct pending_cmd *cmd;
+ unsigned long timeout;
BT_DBG("status %d", status);
+ hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+
+ cmd = mgmt_pending_find(MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY, hdev);
+ if (!cmd)
+ cmd = mgmt_pending_find(MGMT_OP_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY, hdev);
+
+ if (cmd) {
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
+ mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
+ }
+
if (status) {
- hci_dev_lock(hdev);
- mgmt_start_discovery_failed(hdev, status);
- hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
- return;
+ hci_discovery_set_state(hdev, DISCOVERY_STOPPED);
+ goto unlock;
}
- hci_dev_lock(hdev);
hci_discovery_set_state(hdev, DISCOVERY_FINDING);
- hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
switch (hdev->discovery.type) {
case DISCOV_TYPE_LE:
timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(DISCOV_LE_TIMEOUT);
break;
-
case DISCOV_TYPE_INTERLEAVED:
timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(hdev->discov_interleaved_timeout);
break;
-
case DISCOV_TYPE_BREDR:
+ timeout = 0;
break;
-
default:
BT_ERR("Invalid discovery type %d", hdev->discovery.type);
+ timeout = 0;
+ break;
}
- if (!timeout)
- return;
+ if (timeout)
+ queue_delayed_work(hdev->workqueue,
+ &hdev->le_scan_disable, timeout);
- queue_delayed_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->le_scan_disable, timeout);
+unlock:
+ hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
}
static int start_discovery(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
@@ -3740,13 +3875,8 @@ static int start_discovery(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
{
struct mgmt_cp_start_discovery *cp = data;
struct pending_cmd *cmd;
- struct hci_cp_le_set_scan_param param_cp;
- struct hci_cp_le_set_scan_enable enable_cp;
- struct hci_cp_inquiry inq_cp;
struct hci_request req;
- /* General inquiry access code (GIAC) */
- u8 lap[3] = { 0x33, 0x8b, 0x9e };
- u8 status, own_addr_type;
+ u8 status;
int err;
BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
@@ -3760,184 +3890,182 @@ static int start_discovery(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
goto failed;
}
- if (test_bit(HCI_PERIODIC_INQ, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ if (hdev->discovery.state != DISCOVERY_STOPPED ||
+ test_bit(HCI_PERIODIC_INQ, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY,
MGMT_STATUS_BUSY, &cp->type,
sizeof(cp->type));
goto failed;
}
- if (hdev->discovery.state != DISCOVERY_STOPPED) {
- err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY,
- MGMT_STATUS_BUSY, &cp->type,
- sizeof(cp->type));
- goto failed;
- }
-
- cmd = mgmt_pending_add(sk, MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY, hdev, NULL, 0);
+ cmd = mgmt_pending_add(sk, MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY, hdev, data, len);
if (!cmd) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto failed;
}
+ cmd->cmd_complete = generic_cmd_complete;
+
+ /* Clear the discovery filter first to free any previously
+ * allocated memory for the UUID list.
+ */
+ hci_discovery_filter_clear(hdev);
+
hdev->discovery.type = cp->type;
+ hdev->discovery.report_invalid_rssi = false;
hci_req_init(&req, hdev);
- switch (hdev->discovery.type) {
- case DISCOV_TYPE_BREDR:
- status = mgmt_bredr_support(hdev);
- if (status) {
- err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
- MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY, status,
- &cp->type, sizeof(cp->type));
- mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
- goto failed;
- }
+ if (!trigger_discovery(&req, &status)) {
+ err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY,
+ status, &cp->type, sizeof(cp->type));
+ mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
+ goto failed;
+ }
- if (test_bit(HCI_INQUIRY, &hdev->flags)) {
- err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
- MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY,
- MGMT_STATUS_BUSY, &cp->type,
- sizeof(cp->type));
- mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
- goto failed;
- }
+ err = hci_req_run(&req, start_discovery_complete);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
+ goto failed;
+ }
- hci_inquiry_cache_flush(hdev);
+ hci_discovery_set_state(hdev, DISCOVERY_STARTING);
- memset(&inq_cp, 0, sizeof(inq_cp));
- memcpy(&inq_cp.lap, lap, sizeof(inq_cp.lap));
- inq_cp.length = DISCOV_BREDR_INQUIRY_LEN;
- hci_req_add(&req, HCI_OP_INQUIRY, sizeof(inq_cp), &inq_cp);
- break;
+failed:
+ hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+ return err;
+}
- case DISCOV_TYPE_LE:
- case DISCOV_TYPE_INTERLEAVED:
- status = mgmt_le_support(hdev);
- if (status) {
- err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
- MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY, status,
- &cp->type, sizeof(cp->type));
- mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
- goto failed;
- }
+static void service_discovery_cmd_complete(struct pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status)
+{
+ cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, status, cmd->param, 1);
+}
- if (hdev->discovery.type == DISCOV_TYPE_INTERLEAVED &&
- !test_bit(HCI_BREDR_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
- err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
- MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY,
- MGMT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED,
- &cp->type, sizeof(cp->type));
- mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
- goto failed;
- }
+static int start_service_discovery(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
+ void *data, u16 len)
+{
+ struct mgmt_cp_start_service_discovery *cp = data;
+ struct pending_cmd *cmd;
+ struct hci_request req;
+ const u16 max_uuid_count = ((U16_MAX - sizeof(*cp)) / 16);
+ u16 uuid_count, expected_len;
+ u8 status;
+ int err;
- if (test_bit(HCI_LE_ADV, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
- /* Don't let discovery abort an outgoing
- * connection attempt that's using directed
- * advertising.
- */
- if (hci_conn_hash_lookup_state(hdev, LE_LINK,
- BT_CONNECT)) {
- err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
- MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY,
- MGMT_STATUS_REJECTED,
- &cp->type,
- sizeof(cp->type));
- mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
- goto failed;
- }
+ BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
- disable_advertising(&req);
- }
+ hci_dev_lock(hdev);
- /* If controller is scanning, it means the background scanning
- * is running. Thus, we should temporarily stop it in order to
- * set the discovery scanning parameters.
- */
- if (test_bit(HCI_LE_SCAN, &hdev->dev_flags))
- hci_req_add_le_scan_disable(&req);
+ if (!hdev_is_powered(hdev)) {
+ err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
+ MGMT_OP_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY,
+ MGMT_STATUS_NOT_POWERED,
+ &cp->type, sizeof(cp->type));
+ goto failed;
+ }
- memset(&param_cp, 0, sizeof(param_cp));
+ if (hdev->discovery.state != DISCOVERY_STOPPED ||
+ test_bit(HCI_PERIODIC_INQ, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
+ MGMT_OP_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY,
+ MGMT_STATUS_BUSY, &cp->type,
+ sizeof(cp->type));
+ goto failed;
+ }
- /* All active scans will be done with either a resolvable
- * private address (when privacy feature has been enabled)
- * or unresolvable private address.
- */
- err = hci_update_random_address(&req, true, &own_addr_type);
- if (err < 0) {
+ uuid_count = __le16_to_cpu(cp->uuid_count);
+ if (uuid_count > max_uuid_count) {
+ BT_ERR("service_discovery: too big uuid_count value %u",
+ uuid_count);
+ err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
+ MGMT_OP_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY,
+ MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMS, &cp->type,
+ sizeof(cp->type));
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ expected_len = sizeof(*cp) + uuid_count * 16;
+ if (expected_len != len) {
+ BT_ERR("service_discovery: expected %u bytes, got %u bytes",
+ expected_len, len);
+ err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
+ MGMT_OP_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY,
+ MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMS, &cp->type,
+ sizeof(cp->type));
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ cmd = mgmt_pending_add(sk, MGMT_OP_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY,
+ hdev, data, len);
+ if (!cmd) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ cmd->cmd_complete = service_discovery_cmd_complete;
+
+ /* Clear the discovery filter first to free any previously
+ * allocated memory for the UUID list.
+ */
+ hci_discovery_filter_clear(hdev);
+
+ hdev->discovery.type = cp->type;
+ hdev->discovery.rssi = cp->rssi;
+ hdev->discovery.uuid_count = uuid_count;
+
+ if (uuid_count > 0) {
+ hdev->discovery.uuids = kmemdup(cp->uuids, uuid_count * 16,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hdev->discovery.uuids) {
err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
- MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY,
+ MGMT_OP_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY,
MGMT_STATUS_FAILED,
&cp->type, sizeof(cp->type));
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
goto failed;
}
+ }
- param_cp.type = LE_SCAN_ACTIVE;
- param_cp.interval = cpu_to_le16(DISCOV_LE_SCAN_INT);
- param_cp.window = cpu_to_le16(DISCOV_LE_SCAN_WIN);
- param_cp.own_address_type = own_addr_type;
- hci_req_add(&req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_SCAN_PARAM, sizeof(param_cp),
- &param_cp);
-
- memset(&enable_cp, 0, sizeof(enable_cp));
- enable_cp.enable = LE_SCAN_ENABLE;
- enable_cp.filter_dup = LE_SCAN_FILTER_DUP_ENABLE;
- hci_req_add(&req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_SCAN_ENABLE, sizeof(enable_cp),
- &enable_cp);
- break;
+ hci_req_init(&req, hdev);
- default:
- err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY,
- MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMS,
- &cp->type, sizeof(cp->type));
+ if (!trigger_discovery(&req, &status)) {
+ err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id,
+ MGMT_OP_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY,
+ status, &cp->type, sizeof(cp->type));
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
goto failed;
}
err = hci_req_run(&req, start_discovery_complete);
- if (err < 0)
+ if (err < 0) {
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
- else
- hci_discovery_set_state(hdev, DISCOVERY_STARTING);
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ hci_discovery_set_state(hdev, DISCOVERY_STARTING);
failed:
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
return err;
}
-static int mgmt_stop_discovery_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
+static void stop_discovery_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
{
struct pending_cmd *cmd;
- int err;
- cmd = mgmt_pending_find(MGMT_OP_STOP_DISCOVERY, hdev);
- if (!cmd)
- return -ENOENT;
-
- err = cmd_complete(cmd->sk, hdev->id, cmd->opcode, mgmt_status(status),
- &hdev->discovery.type, sizeof(hdev->discovery.type));
- mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
-
- return err;
-}
-
-static void stop_discovery_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
-{
BT_DBG("status %d", status);
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
- if (status) {
- mgmt_stop_discovery_failed(hdev, status);
- goto unlock;
+ cmd = mgmt_pending_find(MGMT_OP_STOP_DISCOVERY, hdev);
+ if (cmd) {
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
+ mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
}
- hci_discovery_set_state(hdev, DISCOVERY_STOPPED);
+ if (!status)
+ hci_discovery_set_state(hdev, DISCOVERY_STOPPED);
-unlock:
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
}
@@ -3967,12 +4095,14 @@ static int stop_discovery(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
goto unlock;
}
- cmd = mgmt_pending_add(sk, MGMT_OP_STOP_DISCOVERY, hdev, NULL, 0);
+ cmd = mgmt_pending_add(sk, MGMT_OP_STOP_DISCOVERY, hdev, data, len);
if (!cmd) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto unlock;
}
+ cmd->cmd_complete = generic_cmd_complete;
+
hci_req_init(&req, hdev);
hci_stop_discovery(&req);
@@ -4572,18 +4702,13 @@ static int set_secure_conn(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
{
struct mgmt_mode *cp = data;
struct pending_cmd *cmd;
- u8 val, status;
+ u8 val;
int err;
BT_DBG("request for %s", hdev->name);
- status = mgmt_bredr_support(hdev);
- if (status)
- return cmd_status(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_SET_SECURE_CONN,
- status);
-
- if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev) &&
- !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_SC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+ !lmp_sc_capable(hdev) && !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_SC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
return cmd_status(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_SET_SECURE_CONN,
MGMT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
@@ -4593,7 +4718,10 @@ static int set_secure_conn(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
- if (!hdev_is_powered(hdev)) {
+ if (!hdev_is_powered(hdev) ||
+ (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev) &&
+ !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_SC, &hdev->dbg_flags)) ||
+ !test_bit(HCI_BREDR_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
bool changed;
if (cp->val) {
@@ -4910,18 +5038,26 @@ static int load_long_term_keys(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
else
addr_type = ADDR_LE_DEV_RANDOM;
- if (key->master)
- type = SMP_LTK;
- else
- type = SMP_LTK_SLAVE;
-
switch (key->type) {
case MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED:
authenticated = 0x00;
+ type = key->master ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_SLAVE;
break;
case MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED:
authenticated = 0x01;
+ type = key->master ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_SLAVE;
+ break;
+ case MGMT_LTK_P256_UNAUTH:
+ authenticated = 0x00;
+ type = SMP_LTK_P256;
break;
+ case MGMT_LTK_P256_AUTH:
+ authenticated = 0x01;
+ type = SMP_LTK_P256;
+ break;
+ case MGMT_LTK_P256_DEBUG:
+ authenticated = 0x00;
+ type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
default:
continue;
}
@@ -4939,67 +5075,42 @@ static int load_long_term_keys(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
return err;
}
-struct cmd_conn_lookup {
- struct hci_conn *conn;
- bool valid_tx_power;
- u8 mgmt_status;
-};
-
-static void get_conn_info_complete(struct pending_cmd *cmd, void *data)
+static void conn_info_cmd_complete(struct pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status)
{
- struct cmd_conn_lookup *match = data;
- struct mgmt_cp_get_conn_info *cp;
- struct mgmt_rp_get_conn_info rp;
struct hci_conn *conn = cmd->user_data;
+ struct mgmt_rp_get_conn_info rp;
- if (conn != match->conn)
- return;
-
- cp = (struct mgmt_cp_get_conn_info *) cmd->param;
-
- memset(&rp, 0, sizeof(rp));
- bacpy(&rp.addr.bdaddr, &cp->addr.bdaddr);
- rp.addr.type = cp->addr.type;
+ memcpy(&rp.addr, cmd->param, sizeof(rp.addr));
- if (!match->mgmt_status) {
+ if (status == MGMT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
rp.rssi = conn->rssi;
-
- if (match->valid_tx_power) {
- rp.tx_power = conn->tx_power;
- rp.max_tx_power = conn->max_tx_power;
- } else {
- rp.tx_power = HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID;
- rp.max_tx_power = HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID;
- }
+ rp.tx_power = conn->tx_power;
+ rp.max_tx_power = conn->max_tx_power;
+ } else {
+ rp.rssi = HCI_RSSI_INVALID;
+ rp.tx_power = HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID;
+ rp.max_tx_power = HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID;
}
- cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, MGMT_OP_GET_CONN_INFO,
- match->mgmt_status, &rp, sizeof(rp));
+ cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, MGMT_OP_GET_CONN_INFO, status,
+ &rp, sizeof(rp));
hci_conn_drop(conn);
hci_conn_put(conn);
-
- mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
}
-static void conn_info_refresh_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
+static void conn_info_refresh_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hci_status)
{
struct hci_cp_read_rssi *cp;
+ struct pending_cmd *cmd;
struct hci_conn *conn;
- struct cmd_conn_lookup match;
u16 handle;
+ u8 status;
- BT_DBG("status 0x%02x", status);
+ BT_DBG("status 0x%02x", hci_status);
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
- /* TX power data is valid in case request completed successfully,
- * otherwise we assume it's not valid. At the moment we assume that
- * either both or none of current and max values are valid to keep code
- * simple.
- */
- match.valid_tx_power = !status;
-
/* Commands sent in request are either Read RSSI or Read Transmit Power
* Level so we check which one was last sent to retrieve connection
* handle. Both commands have handle as first parameter so it's safe to
@@ -5012,29 +5123,29 @@ static void conn_info_refresh_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
cp = hci_sent_cmd_data(hdev, HCI_OP_READ_RSSI);
if (!cp) {
cp = hci_sent_cmd_data(hdev, HCI_OP_READ_TX_POWER);
- status = 0;
+ status = MGMT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ status = mgmt_status(hci_status);
}
if (!cp) {
- BT_ERR("invalid sent_cmd in response");
+ BT_ERR("invalid sent_cmd in conn_info response");
goto unlock;
}
handle = __le16_to_cpu(cp->handle);
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, handle);
if (!conn) {
- BT_ERR("unknown handle (%d) in response", handle);
+ BT_ERR("unknown handle (%d) in conn_info response", handle);
goto unlock;
}
- match.conn = conn;
- match.mgmt_status = mgmt_status(status);
+ cmd = mgmt_pending_find_data(MGMT_OP_GET_CONN_INFO, hdev, conn);
+ if (!cmd)
+ goto unlock;
- /* Cache refresh is complete, now reply for mgmt request for given
- * connection only.
- */
- mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_GET_CONN_INFO, hdev,
- get_conn_info_complete, &match);
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, status);
+ mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
unlock:
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
@@ -5080,6 +5191,12 @@ static int get_conn_info(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
goto unlock;
}
+ if (mgmt_pending_find_data(MGMT_OP_GET_CONN_INFO, hdev, conn)) {
+ err = cmd_complete(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_GET_CONN_INFO,
+ MGMT_STATUS_BUSY, &rp, sizeof(rp));
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
/* To avoid client trying to guess when to poll again for information we
* calculate conn info age as random value between min/max set in hdev.
*/
@@ -5135,6 +5252,7 @@ static int get_conn_info(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
hci_conn_hold(conn);
cmd->user_data = hci_conn_get(conn);
+ cmd->cmd_complete = conn_info_cmd_complete;
conn->conn_info_timestamp = jiffies;
} else {
@@ -5152,10 +5270,40 @@ unlock:
return err;
}
-static void get_clock_info_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
+static void clock_info_cmd_complete(struct pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status)
{
- struct mgmt_cp_get_clock_info *cp;
+ struct hci_conn *conn = cmd->user_data;
struct mgmt_rp_get_clock_info rp;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev;
+
+ memset(&rp, 0, sizeof(rp));
+ memcpy(&rp.addr, &cmd->param, sizeof(rp.addr));
+
+ if (status)
+ goto complete;
+
+ hdev = hci_dev_get(cmd->index);
+ if (hdev) {
+ rp.local_clock = cpu_to_le32(hdev->clock);
+ hci_dev_put(hdev);
+ }
+
+ if (conn) {
+ rp.piconet_clock = cpu_to_le32(conn->clock);
+ rp.accuracy = cpu_to_le16(conn->clock_accuracy);
+ }
+
+complete:
+ cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, status, &rp, sizeof(rp));
+
+ if (conn) {
+ hci_conn_drop(conn);
+ hci_conn_put(conn);
+ }
+}
+
+static void get_clock_info_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
+{
struct hci_cp_read_clock *hci_cp;
struct pending_cmd *cmd;
struct hci_conn *conn;
@@ -5179,29 +5327,8 @@ static void get_clock_info_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
if (!cmd)
goto unlock;
- cp = cmd->param;
-
- memset(&rp, 0, sizeof(rp));
- memcpy(&rp.addr, &cp->addr, sizeof(rp.addr));
-
- if (status)
- goto send_rsp;
-
- rp.local_clock = cpu_to_le32(hdev->clock);
-
- if (conn) {
- rp.piconet_clock = cpu_to_le32(conn->clock);
- rp.accuracy = cpu_to_le16(conn->clock_accuracy);
- }
-
-send_rsp:
- cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, mgmt_status(status),
- &rp, sizeof(rp));
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
- if (conn) {
- hci_conn_drop(conn);
- hci_conn_put(conn);
- }
unlock:
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
@@ -5257,6 +5384,8 @@ static int get_clock_info(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
goto unlock;
}
+ cmd->cmd_complete = clock_info_cmd_complete;
+
hci_req_init(&req, hdev);
memset(&hci_cp, 0, sizeof(hci_cp));
@@ -5746,6 +5875,7 @@ static const struct mgmt_handler {
{ read_config_info, false, MGMT_READ_CONFIG_INFO_SIZE },
{ set_external_config, false, MGMT_SET_EXTERNAL_CONFIG_SIZE },
{ set_public_address, false, MGMT_SET_PUBLIC_ADDRESS_SIZE },
+ { start_service_discovery,true, MGMT_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY_SIZE },
};
int mgmt_control(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msglen)
@@ -5882,7 +6012,7 @@ void mgmt_index_removed(struct hci_dev *hdev)
if (test_bit(HCI_QUIRK_RAW_DEVICE, &hdev->quirks))
return;
- mgmt_pending_foreach(0, hdev, cmd_status_rsp, &status);
+ mgmt_pending_foreach(0, hdev, cmd_complete_rsp, &status);
if (test_bit(HCI_UNCONFIGURED, &hdev->dev_flags))
mgmt_event(MGMT_EV_UNCONF_INDEX_REMOVED, hdev, NULL, 0, NULL);
@@ -6017,7 +6147,7 @@ int mgmt_powered(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 powered)
}
mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_POWERED, hdev, settings_rsp, &match);
- mgmt_pending_foreach(0, hdev, cmd_status_rsp, &status_not_powered);
+ mgmt_pending_foreach(0, hdev, cmd_complete_rsp, &status_not_powered);
if (memcmp(hdev->dev_class, zero_cod, sizeof(zero_cod)) != 0)
mgmt_event(MGMT_EV_CLASS_OF_DEV_CHANGED, hdev,
@@ -6101,8 +6231,19 @@ void mgmt_new_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct link_key *key,
static u8 mgmt_ltk_type(struct smp_ltk *ltk)
{
- if (ltk->authenticated)
- return MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED;
+ switch (ltk->type) {
+ case SMP_LTK:
+ case SMP_LTK_SLAVE:
+ if (ltk->authenticated)
+ return MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED;
+ return MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED;
+ case SMP_LTK_P256:
+ if (ltk->authenticated)
+ return MGMT_LTK_P256_AUTH;
+ return MGMT_LTK_P256_UNAUTH;
+ case SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG:
+ return MGMT_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
+ }
return MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED;
}
@@ -6276,15 +6417,9 @@ void mgmt_device_connected(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn,
static void disconnect_rsp(struct pending_cmd *cmd, void *data)
{
- struct mgmt_cp_disconnect *cp = cmd->param;
struct sock **sk = data;
- struct mgmt_rp_disconnect rp;
- bacpy(&rp.addr.bdaddr, &cp->addr.bdaddr);
- rp.addr.type = cp->addr.type;
-
- cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, MGMT_OP_DISCONNECT, 0, &rp,
- sizeof(rp));
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, 0);
*sk = cmd->sk;
sock_hold(*sk);
@@ -6296,16 +6431,10 @@ static void unpair_device_rsp(struct pending_cmd *cmd, void *data)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = data;
struct mgmt_cp_unpair_device *cp = cmd->param;
- struct mgmt_rp_unpair_device rp;
-
- memset(&rp, 0, sizeof(rp));
- bacpy(&rp.addr.bdaddr, &cp->addr.bdaddr);
- rp.addr.type = cp->addr.type;
device_unpaired(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, cp->addr.type, cmd->sk);
- cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, 0, &rp, sizeof(rp));
-
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, 0);
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
}
@@ -6366,7 +6495,6 @@ void mgmt_disconnect_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
{
u8 bdaddr_type = link_to_bdaddr(link_type, addr_type);
struct mgmt_cp_disconnect *cp;
- struct mgmt_rp_disconnect rp;
struct pending_cmd *cmd;
mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_UNPAIR_DEVICE, hdev, unpair_device_rsp,
@@ -6384,12 +6512,7 @@ void mgmt_disconnect_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
if (cp->addr.type != bdaddr_type)
return;
- bacpy(&rp.addr.bdaddr, bdaddr);
- rp.addr.type = bdaddr_type;
-
- cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, MGMT_OP_DISCONNECT,
- mgmt_status(status), &rp, sizeof(rp));
-
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
}
@@ -6428,18 +6551,12 @@ void mgmt_pin_code_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 status)
{
struct pending_cmd *cmd;
- struct mgmt_rp_pin_code_reply rp;
cmd = mgmt_pending_find(MGMT_OP_PIN_CODE_REPLY, hdev);
if (!cmd)
return;
- bacpy(&rp.addr.bdaddr, bdaddr);
- rp.addr.type = BDADDR_BREDR;
-
- cmd_complete(cmd->sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_PIN_CODE_REPLY,
- mgmt_status(status), &rp, sizeof(rp));
-
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
}
@@ -6447,18 +6564,12 @@ void mgmt_pin_code_neg_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 status)
{
struct pending_cmd *cmd;
- struct mgmt_rp_pin_code_reply rp;
cmd = mgmt_pending_find(MGMT_OP_PIN_CODE_NEG_REPLY, hdev);
if (!cmd)
return;
- bacpy(&rp.addr.bdaddr, bdaddr);
- rp.addr.type = BDADDR_BREDR;
-
- cmd_complete(cmd->sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_PIN_CODE_NEG_REPLY,
- mgmt_status(status), &rp, sizeof(rp));
-
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
}
@@ -6498,21 +6609,15 @@ static int user_pairing_resp_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 opcode)
{
struct pending_cmd *cmd;
- struct mgmt_rp_user_confirm_reply rp;
- int err;
cmd = mgmt_pending_find(opcode, hdev);
if (!cmd)
return -ENOENT;
- bacpy(&rp.addr.bdaddr, bdaddr);
- rp.addr.type = link_to_bdaddr(link_type, addr_type);
- err = cmd_complete(cmd->sk, hdev->id, opcode, mgmt_status(status),
- &rp, sizeof(rp));
-
+ cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status));
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
- return err;
+ return 0;
}
int mgmt_user_confirm_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
@@ -6784,8 +6889,7 @@ void mgmt_read_local_oob_data_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *hash192,
cmd_status(cmd->sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_READ_LOCAL_OOB_DATA,
mgmt_status(status));
} else {
- if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
- hash256 && rand256) {
+ if (bredr_sc_enabled(hdev) && hash256 && rand256) {
struct mgmt_rp_read_local_oob_ext_data rp;
memcpy(rp.hash192, hash192, sizeof(rp.hash192));
@@ -6812,6 +6916,73 @@ void mgmt_read_local_oob_data_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *hash192,
mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
}
+static inline bool has_uuid(u8 *uuid, u16 uuid_count, u8 (*uuids)[16])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < uuid_count; i++) {
+ if (!memcmp(uuid, uuids[i], 16))
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool eir_has_uuids(u8 *eir, u16 eir_len, u16 uuid_count, u8 (*uuids)[16])
+{
+ u16 parsed = 0;
+
+ while (parsed < eir_len) {
+ u8 field_len = eir[0];
+ u8 uuid[16];
+ int i;
+
+ if (field_len == 0)
+ break;
+
+ if (eir_len - parsed < field_len + 1)
+ break;
+
+ switch (eir[1]) {
+ case EIR_UUID16_ALL:
+ case EIR_UUID16_SOME:
+ for (i = 0; i + 3 <= field_len; i += 2) {
+ memcpy(uuid, bluetooth_base_uuid, 16);
+ uuid[13] = eir[i + 3];
+ uuid[12] = eir[i + 2];
+ if (has_uuid(uuid, uuid_count, uuids))
+ return true;
+ }
+ break;
+ case EIR_UUID32_ALL:
+ case EIR_UUID32_SOME:
+ for (i = 0; i + 5 <= field_len; i += 4) {
+ memcpy(uuid, bluetooth_base_uuid, 16);
+ uuid[15] = eir[i + 5];
+ uuid[14] = eir[i + 4];
+ uuid[13] = eir[i + 3];
+ uuid[12] = eir[i + 2];
+ if (has_uuid(uuid, uuid_count, uuids))
+ return true;
+ }
+ break;
+ case EIR_UUID128_ALL:
+ case EIR_UUID128_SOME:
+ for (i = 0; i + 17 <= field_len; i += 16) {
+ memcpy(uuid, eir + i + 2, 16);
+ if (has_uuid(uuid, uuid_count, uuids))
+ return true;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ parsed += field_len + 1;
+ eir += field_len + 1;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
void mgmt_device_found(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type,
u8 addr_type, u8 *dev_class, s8 rssi, u32 flags,
u8 *eir, u16 eir_len, u8 *scan_rsp, u8 scan_rsp_len)
@@ -6819,6 +6990,7 @@ void mgmt_device_found(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type,
char buf[512];
struct mgmt_ev_device_found *ev = (void *) buf;
size_t ev_size;
+ bool match;
/* Don't send events for a non-kernel initiated discovery. With
* LE one exception is if we have pend_le_reports > 0 in which
@@ -6831,6 +7003,18 @@ void mgmt_device_found(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type,
return;
}
+ /* When using service discovery with a RSSI threshold, then check
+ * if such a RSSI threshold is specified. If a RSSI threshold has
+ * been specified, then all results with a RSSI smaller than the
+ * RSSI threshold will be dropped.
+ *
+ * For BR/EDR devices (pre 1.2) providing no RSSI during inquiry,
+ * the results are also dropped.
+ */
+ if (hdev->discovery.rssi != HCI_RSSI_INVALID &&
+ (rssi < hdev->discovery.rssi || rssi == HCI_RSSI_INVALID))
+ return;
+
/* Make sure that the buffer is big enough. The 5 extra bytes
* are for the potential CoD field.
*/
@@ -6839,20 +7023,75 @@ void mgmt_device_found(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type,
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ /* In case of device discovery with BR/EDR devices (pre 1.2), the
+ * RSSI value was reported as 0 when not available. This behavior
+ * is kept when using device discovery. This is required for full
+ * backwards compatibility with the API.
+ *
+ * However when using service discovery, the value 127 will be
+ * returned when the RSSI is not available.
+ */
+ if (rssi == HCI_RSSI_INVALID && !hdev->discovery.report_invalid_rssi)
+ rssi = 0;
+
bacpy(&ev->addr.bdaddr, bdaddr);
ev->addr.type = link_to_bdaddr(link_type, addr_type);
ev->rssi = rssi;
ev->flags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
- if (eir_len > 0)
+ if (eir_len > 0) {
+ /* When using service discovery and a list of UUID is
+ * provided, results with no matching UUID should be
+ * dropped. In case there is a match the result is
+ * kept and checking possible scan response data
+ * will be skipped.
+ */
+ if (hdev->discovery.uuid_count > 0) {
+ match = eir_has_uuids(eir, eir_len,
+ hdev->discovery.uuid_count,
+ hdev->discovery.uuids);
+ if (!match)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy EIR or advertising data into event */
memcpy(ev->eir, eir, eir_len);
+ } else {
+ /* When using service discovery and a list of UUID is
+ * provided, results with empty EIR or advertising data
+ * should be dropped since they do not match any UUID.
+ */
+ if (hdev->discovery.uuid_count > 0)
+ return;
+ }
if (dev_class && !eir_has_data_type(ev->eir, eir_len, EIR_CLASS_OF_DEV))
eir_len = eir_append_data(ev->eir, eir_len, EIR_CLASS_OF_DEV,
dev_class, 3);
- if (scan_rsp_len > 0)
+ if (scan_rsp_len > 0) {
+ /* When using service discovery and a list of UUID is
+ * provided, results with no matching UUID should be
+ * dropped if there is no previous match from the
+ * advertising data.
+ */
+ if (hdev->discovery.uuid_count > 0) {
+ if (!match && !eir_has_uuids(scan_rsp, scan_rsp_len,
+ hdev->discovery.uuid_count,
+ hdev->discovery.uuids))
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Append scan response data to event */
memcpy(ev->eir + eir_len, scan_rsp, scan_rsp_len);
+ } else {
+ /* When using service discovery and a list of UUID is
+ * provided, results with empty scan response and no
+ * previous matched advertising data should be dropped.
+ */
+ if (hdev->discovery.uuid_count > 0 && !match)
+ return;
+ }
ev->eir_len = cpu_to_le16(eir_len + scan_rsp_len);
ev_size = sizeof(*ev) + eir_len + scan_rsp_len;
@@ -6886,23 +7125,9 @@ void mgmt_remote_name(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type,
void mgmt_discovering(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 discovering)
{
struct mgmt_ev_discovering ev;
- struct pending_cmd *cmd;
BT_DBG("%s discovering %u", hdev->name, discovering);
- if (discovering)
- cmd = mgmt_pending_find(MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY, hdev);
- else
- cmd = mgmt_pending_find(MGMT_OP_STOP_DISCOVERY, hdev);
-
- if (cmd != NULL) {
- u8 type = hdev->discovery.type;
-
- cmd_complete(cmd->sk, hdev->id, cmd->opcode, 0, &type,
- sizeof(type));
- mgmt_pending_remove(cmd);
- }
-
memset(&ev, 0, sizeof(ev));
ev.type = hdev->discovery.type;
ev.discovering = discovering;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 069b76e03b57..96bf16dcd9e9 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -29,14 +29,34 @@
#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
+#include "ecc.h"
#include "smp.h"
+/* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
+ * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
+ * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
+ ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
+ ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+
#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
+/* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
+#define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
+
#define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
-#define AUTH_REQ_MASK 0x07
-#define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
+#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &(dev)->dev_flags) ? \
+ 0x1f : 0x07)
+#define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
+
+/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
+#define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
enum {
SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
@@ -44,6 +64,12 @@ enum {
SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+ SMP_FLAG_SC,
+ SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
+ SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
+ SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
+ SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
+ SMP_FLAG_OOB,
};
struct smp_chan {
@@ -57,6 +83,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
+ u8 rr[16];
u8 enc_key_size;
u8 remote_key_dist;
bdaddr_t id_addr;
@@ -67,9 +94,43 @@ struct smp_chan {
struct smp_ltk *ltk;
struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
+ u8 *link_key;
unsigned long flags;
+ u8 method;
+ u8 passkey_round;
+
+ /* Secure Connections variables */
+ u8 local_pk[64];
+ u8 local_sk[32];
+ u8 remote_pk[64];
+ u8 dhkey[32];
+ u8 mackey[16];
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
+ struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac;
+};
+
+/* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
+ * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
+ * private debug key.
+ */
+static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
+ 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+ 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+ 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+ 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
+
+ 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
+ 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
+ 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
+ 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
+};
+
+static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
+ 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
+ 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
+ 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
+ 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
};
static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
@@ -80,14 +141,22 @@ static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
}
-static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+/* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
+ * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
+ */
+
+static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
+ size_t len, u8 mac[16])
{
- struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+ uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
+ struct hash_desc desc;
struct scatterlist sg;
- uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
int err;
- if (tfm == NULL) {
+ if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
+ return -EFBIG;
+
+ if (!tfm) {
BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -95,105 +164,233 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
desc.tfm = tfm;
desc.flags = 0;
- /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
+ crypto_hash_init(&desc);
+
+ /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
+ swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
- err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
+ SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
+ SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
+
+ err = crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
return err;
}
- /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
- swap_buf(r, data, 16);
+ sg_init_one(&sg, msg_msb, len);
- sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16);
+ err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, len);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("Hash update error %d", err);
+ return err;
+ }
- err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
+ err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, mac_msb);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("Hash final error %d", err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
+
+ SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
+ const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
+{
+ u8 m[65];
+ int err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+ SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+ SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
+
+ m[0] = z;
+ memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
+ memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
if (err)
- BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
+ return err;
- /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
- swap_buf(data, r, 16);
+ SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
return err;
}
-static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
+static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, u8 w[32], u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16],
+ u8 a1[7], u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
{
- u8 _res[16];
+ /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
+ * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
+ * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
+ * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
+ * endian format.
+ */
+ const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
+ const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
+ 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
+ const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
+ u8 m[53], t[16];
int err;
- /* r' = padding || r */
- memcpy(_res, r, 3);
- memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
+ SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
+ SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+ SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
- err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
- if (err) {
- BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
+ if (err)
return err;
- }
- /* The output of the random address function ah is:
- * ah(h, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
- * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
- * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
- * result of ah.
- */
- memcpy(res, _res, 3);
+ SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
+
+ memcpy(m, length, 2);
+ memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
+ memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
+ memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
+ memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
+ memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
+
+ m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
+
+ m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
return 0;
}
-bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+static int smp_f6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+ const u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
+ const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
+ u8 res[16])
{
- struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
- struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
- u8 hash[3];
+ u8 m[65];
int err;
- if (!chan || !chan->data)
- return false;
+ SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
+ SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+ SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
- tfm = chan->data;
+ memcpy(m, a2, 7);
+ memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
+ memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
+ memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
+ memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
+ memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
- BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
- err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
+ BT_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
+ const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
+{
+ u8 m[80], tmp[16];
+ int err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+ SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+ SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
+
+ memcpy(m, y, 16);
+ memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
+ memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
if (err)
- return false;
+ return err;
- return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
+ *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
+ *val %= 1000000;
+
+ SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
+
+ return 0;
}
-int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
+static int smp_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+ const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
{
- struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
- struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
int err;
- if (!chan || !chan->data)
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
- tfm = chan->data;
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
- get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
+ SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
- rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
- rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
+ return err;
+}
- err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
- if (err < 0)
+/* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
+ * s1 and ah.
+ */
+
+static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+ uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
+ int err;
+
+ if (!tfm) {
+ BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ desc.tfm = tfm;
+ desc.flags = 0;
+
+ /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
+ swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
+
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
return err;
+ }
- BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
+ /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
+ swap_buf(r, data, 16);
- return 0;
+ sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16);
+
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
+ if (err)
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
+
+ /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
+ swap_buf(data, r, 16);
+
+ return err;
}
-static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
- u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat,
- bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+ const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
+ const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
{
u8 p1[16], p2[16];
int err;
@@ -232,8 +429,8 @@ static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
return err;
}
-static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16],
- u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+ const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
{
int err;
@@ -248,6 +445,80 @@ static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16],
return err;
}
+static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16],
+ const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
+{
+ u8 _res[16];
+ int err;
+
+ /* r' = padding || r */
+ memcpy(_res, r, 3);
+ memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
+
+ err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* The output of the random address function ah is:
+ * ah(h, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
+ * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
+ * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
+ * result of ah.
+ */
+ memcpy(res, _res, 3);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
+ const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+ u8 hash[3];
+ int err;
+
+ if (!chan || !chan->data)
+ return false;
+
+ tfm = chan->data;
+
+ BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
+
+ err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
+}
+
+int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!chan || !chan->data)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ tfm = chan->data;
+
+ get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
+
+ rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
+ rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
+
+ err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -282,17 +553,22 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
}
-static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
+static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
{
- if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM)
- return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
- else
+ if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
+ if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
+ return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+ else
+ return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ } else {
return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+ }
}
static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
{
switch (sec_level) {
+ case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
@@ -310,7 +586,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
- u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
+ u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
@@ -326,24 +602,52 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+ if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+ (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
+ struct oob_data *oob_data;
+ u8 bdaddr_type;
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_SSP_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
+ remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
+ bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+ else
+ bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
+
+ oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
+ bdaddr_type);
+ if (oob_data) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags);
+ oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
+ memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
+ memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
+ }
+
if (rsp == NULL) {
req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
- req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+ req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
- req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
+ req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
return;
}
rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
- rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+ rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
- rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
+ rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
}
@@ -366,6 +670,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
bool complete;
BUG_ON(!smp);
@@ -373,12 +678,24 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
- mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
+ mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
kfree(smp->csrk);
kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
+ kfree(smp->link_key);
crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+ crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+
+ /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
+ * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
+ */
+ if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
+ !test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
+ kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
+ smp->ltk = NULL;
+ }
/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
if (!complete) {
@@ -400,7 +717,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
chan->data = NULL;
kfree(smp);
- hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon);
+ hci_conn_drop(hcon);
}
static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
@@ -424,6 +741,7 @@ static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
#define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
#define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
#define REQ_OOB 0x04
+#define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
#define OVERLAP 0xFF
static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
@@ -434,6 +752,14 @@ static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
};
+static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
+ { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+ { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+ { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
+ { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
+ { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+};
+
static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
{
/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
@@ -443,6 +769,9 @@ static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
return JUST_CFM;
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+ return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
+
return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
}
@@ -452,7 +781,6 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
- u8 method;
u32 passkey = 0;
int ret = 0;
@@ -469,26 +797,28 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
* table.
*/
if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
- method = JUST_CFM;
+ smp->method = JUST_CFM;
else
- method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
+ smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
- if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
- method = JUST_WORKS;
+ if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+ &smp->flags))
+ smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
/* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
- if (method == JUST_CFM && hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
- method = JUST_WORKS;
+ if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
+ hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+ smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
- if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
+ if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
return 0;
}
/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
- if (method != JUST_CFM) {
+ if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
@@ -497,15 +827,15 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
/* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
* Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
*/
- if (method == OVERLAP) {
+ if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
- method = CFM_PASSKEY;
+ smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
else
- method = REQ_PASSKEY;
+ smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
}
/* Generate random passkey. */
- if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
+ if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
passkey %= 1000000;
@@ -514,10 +844,10 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
}
- if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
- else if (method == JUST_CFM)
+ else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
passkey, 1);
@@ -638,11 +968,13 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
/* Now that user space can be considered to know the
* identity address track the connection based on it
- * from now on.
+ * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
*/
- bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
- hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
- queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
+ if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
+ bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
+ hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
+ queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
+ }
/* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
* a remote device that does not use a resolvable
@@ -661,10 +993,20 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
}
}
- /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
- * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
- */
- persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+ if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+ if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
+ persistent = false;
+ else
+ persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
+ &hcon->flags);
+ } else {
+ /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
+ * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
+ */
+ persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
+ SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+ }
+
if (smp->csrk) {
smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
@@ -689,6 +1031,81 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
}
+
+ if (smp->link_key) {
+ struct link_key *key;
+ u8 type;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+ type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
+ else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+ type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
+ else
+ type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
+
+ key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
+ smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
+ if (key) {
+ mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
+
+ /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
+ * flag is not set.
+ */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+ key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
+ list_del_rcu(&key->list);
+ kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+ u8 key_type, auth;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+ key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
+ else
+ key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
+
+ if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+ auth = 1;
+ else
+ auth = 0;
+
+ memset(smp->tk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+ SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
+
+ smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+ 0, 0);
+}
+
+static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ /* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
+ * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp1' and 'lebr'.
+ */
+ const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+ const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
+
+ smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!smp->link_key)
+ return;
+
+ if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
+ kfree(smp->link_key);
+ smp->link_key = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
+ kfree(smp->link_key);
+ smp->link_key = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
}
static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
@@ -705,6 +1122,35 @@ static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
}
+static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ /* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
+ * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp2' and 'brle'.
+ */
+ const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+ const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct link_key *key;
+
+ key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
+ if (!key) {
+ BT_ERR("%s No Link Key found to generate LTK", hdev->name);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+ if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
+ return;
+
+ if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
+ return;
+
+ sc_add_ltk(smp);
+}
+
static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
@@ -733,6 +1179,16 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
}
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+ if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
+ sc_generate_link_key(smp);
+ if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
+ sc_generate_ltk(smp);
+
+ /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+ }
+
BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
@@ -844,6 +1300,14 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
return NULL;
}
+ smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+ kfree(smp);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
smp->conn = conn;
chan->data = smp;
@@ -856,6 +1320,213 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
return smp;
}
+static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+ u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ na = smp->prnd;
+ nb = smp->rrnd;
+ } else {
+ na = smp->rrnd;
+ nb = smp->prnd;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+ memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+ a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+ b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+ return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
+}
+
+static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
+ u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+ u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
+
+ memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+ memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+ a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+ b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ local_addr = a;
+ remote_addr = b;
+ memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+ } else {
+ local_addr = b;
+ remote_addr = a;
+ memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+ }
+
+ memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+ put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
+ memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
+
+ smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
+ local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
+}
+
+static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
+ u8 r;
+
+ r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
+ r |= 0x80;
+
+ get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
+
+ if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
+ cfm.confirm_val))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ u8 cfm[16], r;
+
+ /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
+ if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (smp_op) {
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+ r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
+ r |= 0x80;
+
+ if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+
+ smp->passkey_round++;
+
+ if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
+ /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
+ if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ }
+
+ /* The round is only complete when the initiator
+ * receives pairing random.
+ */
+ if (!hcon->out) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+ if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ else
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Start the next round */
+ if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
+ return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
+
+ /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ default:
+ /* Initiating device starts the round */
+ if (!hcon->out)
+ return 0;
+
+ BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
+ smp->passkey_round + 1);
+
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+ return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ u8 smp_op;
+
+ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+
+ switch (mgmt_op) {
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+ smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+ smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+ hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+ smp->passkey_round = 0;
+
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
+ smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
+ else
+ smp_op = 0;
+
+ if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ sc_add_ltk(smp);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
@@ -881,6 +1552,11 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
smp = chan->data;
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+ err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
switch (mgmt_op) {
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
@@ -916,6 +1592,46 @@ unlock:
return err;
}
+static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+ u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+ if (!rsp) {
+ memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
+
+ req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
+ req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
+ req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+ rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+ rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
+ rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
+
+ smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
+}
+
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
@@ -942,16 +1658,49 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
- auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+ auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+ if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
+ /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
+ if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+ /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags))
+ return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+ build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
+
+ key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+ if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+
+ smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+ memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+
+ smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
+
+ if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
else
@@ -970,8 +1719,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
}
- build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
-
key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
@@ -982,7 +1729,18 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
- SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+ /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+ }
/* Request setup of TK */
ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
@@ -992,11 +1750,46 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}
+static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
+
+ BT_DBG("");
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+ memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
+ memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+ } else {
+ while (true) {
+ /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
+ if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
+ * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
+ SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->local_pk[32]);
+ SMP_DBG("Local Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
u8 key_size, auth;
int ret;
@@ -1016,7 +1809,31 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
- auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+ auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
+ smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+ memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+ /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
+ * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
+ */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
+
+ /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
+ if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+ /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+ smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+ else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+ conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
@@ -1030,14 +1847,18 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
- smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
- memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
-
/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
* some bits that we had enabled in our request.
*/
smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+ /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ return sc_send_public_key(smp);
+ }
+
auth |= req->auth_req;
ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
@@ -1053,6 +1874,28 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}
+static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+
+ BT_DBG("");
+
+ /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
+ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+ return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+ smp->prnd);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -1066,6 +1909,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+ return sc_check_confirm(smp);
+
if (conn->hcon->out) {
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
smp->prnd);
@@ -1085,6 +1931,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
+ u32 passkey;
+ int err;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@@ -1094,7 +1944,75 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
- return smp_random(smp);
+ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+ return smp_random(smp);
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ pkax = smp->local_pk;
+ pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
+ na = smp->prnd;
+ nb = smp->rrnd;
+ } else {
+ pkax = smp->remote_pk;
+ pkbx = smp->local_pk;
+ na = smp->rrnd;
+ nb = smp->prnd;
+ }
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+ if (!hcon->out)
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ goto mackey_and_ltk;
+ }
+
+ /* Passkey entry has special treatment */
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+ return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ u8 cfm[16];
+
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->rrnd, 0, cfm);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+ } else {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+ smp->prnd);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ }
+
+mackey_and_ltk:
+ /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
+ err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+ hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+
+ return 0;
}
static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
@@ -1102,8 +2020,7 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
struct smp_ltk *key;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
- key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
- hcon->role);
+ key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
if (!key)
return false;
@@ -1136,8 +2053,7 @@ bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
*/
if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
- hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
- hcon->role))
+ hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
return false;
if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
@@ -1151,6 +2067,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
struct smp_chan *smp;
u8 sec_level, auth;
@@ -1162,7 +2079,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
- auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+ auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
@@ -1245,6 +2165,9 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
+ if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
+ authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
+
/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
* requires it.
*/
@@ -1432,6 +2355,234 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}
+static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
+ u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags))
+ return REQ_OOB;
+
+ /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
+ * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
+ * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
+ * first byte which contains the opcode.
+ */
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+ } else {
+ local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+ remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ }
+
+ local_io = local->io_capability;
+ remote_io = remote->io_capability;
+
+ local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+ remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+
+ /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
+ * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
+ */
+ if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
+ method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
+ else
+ method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+ /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
+ if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+ return method;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
+ int err;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
+
+ /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
+ * the key from the initiating device.
+ */
+ if (!hcon->out) {
+ err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
+ SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->remote_pk[32]);
+
+ if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
+
+ smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
+
+ BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
+
+ /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
+ if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+ else
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+
+ if (!memcmp(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+ if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
+ get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
+ sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
+ hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
+ hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
+ smp->passkey_round = 0;
+ if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+ hcon->dst_type,
+ hcon->passkey_notify,
+ hcon->passkey_entered))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+ return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
+ smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+
+ if (hcon->out)
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (hcon->out)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
+ if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+ hcon->dst_type))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
+ * send the confirm value.
+ */
+ if (conn->hcon->out)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
+ 0, cfm.confirm_val);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+ u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
+ int err;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+ memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+ a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+ b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ local_addr = a;
+ remote_addr = b;
+ memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+ } else {
+ local_addr = b;
+ remote_addr = a;
+ memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+ }
+
+ memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+ put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+
+ err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
+ io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16))
+ return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
+
+ if (!hcon->out) {
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ }
+
+ sc_add_ltk(smp);
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk);
+ hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+ BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
@@ -1440,11 +2591,6 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
__u8 code, reason;
int err = 0;
- if (hcon->type != LE_LINK) {
- kfree_skb(skb);
- return 0;
- }
-
if (skb->len < 1)
return -EILSEQ;
@@ -1516,6 +2662,18 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
break;
+ case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
+ reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
+ reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
default:
BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
@@ -1551,6 +2709,74 @@ static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
l2cap_chan_put(chan);
}
+static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+ /* Only new pairings are interesting */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
+ return;
+
+ /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+ return;
+
+ /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
+ if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+ return;
+
+ /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ return;
+
+ /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
+ !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+ return;
+
+ /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ return;
+
+ /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
+ if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
+ return;
+
+ /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
+ if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
+ return;
+
+ /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
+ if (chan->data)
+ return;
+
+ smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+ if (!smp) {
+ BT_ERR("%s unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR",
+ hdev->name);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+ BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
+
+ /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
+ build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
+
+ smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+}
+
static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
{
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
@@ -1559,6 +2785,11 @@ static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+ if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+ bredr_pairing(chan);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (!smp)
return;
@@ -1573,11 +2804,15 @@ static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
conn->smp = chan;
l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
+
+ if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+ bredr_pairing(chan);
}
static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1682,34 +2917,40 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
.memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
};
-int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
- BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+ if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
+ tfm_aes = NULL;
+ goto create_chan;
+ }
tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
- int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context");
- return err;
+ return ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(tfm_aes));
}
+create_chan:
chan = l2cap_chan_create();
if (!chan) {
crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
chan->data = tfm_aes;
- l2cap_add_scid(chan, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+ l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
- chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+ if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP)
+ chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+ else
+ chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
@@ -1718,20 +2959,14 @@ int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
/* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
- hdev->smp_data = chan;
-
- return 0;
+ return chan;
}
-void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
{
- struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
- struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
-
- if (!chan)
- return;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
- BT_DBG("%s chan %p", hdev->name, chan);
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
tfm_aes = chan->data;
if (tfm_aes) {
@@ -1739,6 +2974,52 @@ void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
}
- hdev->smp_data = NULL;
l2cap_chan_put(chan);
}
+
+int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+ BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+
+ chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+ if (IS_ERR(chan))
+ return PTR_ERR(chan);
+
+ hdev->smp_data = chan;
+
+ if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev) &&
+ !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+ return 0;
+
+ chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
+ if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
+ int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
+ chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+ smp_del_chan(chan);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+ if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
+ chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+ hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+ smp_del_chan(chan);
+ }
+
+ if (hdev->smp_data) {
+ chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+ smp_del_chan(chan);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index f76083b85005..3296bf42ae80 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -50,10 +50,13 @@ struct smp_cmd_pairing {
#define SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY 0x01
#define SMP_DIST_ID_KEY 0x02
#define SMP_DIST_SIGN 0x04
+#define SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY 0x08
#define SMP_AUTH_NONE 0x00
#define SMP_AUTH_BONDING 0x01
#define SMP_AUTH_MITM 0x04
+#define SMP_AUTH_SC 0x08
+#define SMP_AUTH_KEYPRESS 0x10
#define SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM 0x03
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm {
@@ -102,7 +105,23 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req {
__u8 auth_req;
} __packed;
-#define SMP_CMD_MAX 0x0b
+#define SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0c
+struct smp_cmd_public_key {
+ __u8 x[32];
+ __u8 y[32];
+} __packed;
+
+#define SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK 0x0d
+struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check {
+ __u8 e[16];
+} __packed;
+
+#define SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY 0x0e
+struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify {
+ __u8 value;
+} __packed;
+
+#define SMP_CMD_MAX 0x0e
#define SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED 0x01
#define SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL 0x02
@@ -114,6 +133,10 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req {
#define SMP_UNSPECIFIED 0x08
#define SMP_REPEATED_ATTEMPTS 0x09
#define SMP_INVALID_PARAMS 0x0a
+#define SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED 0x0b
+#define SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED 0x0c
+#define SMP_BREDR_PAIRING_IN_PROGRESS 0x0d
+#define SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED 0x0e
#define SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE 7
#define SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE 16
@@ -123,12 +146,29 @@ enum {
SMP_STK,
SMP_LTK,
SMP_LTK_SLAVE,
+ SMP_LTK_P256,
+ SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG,
};
+static inline bool smp_ltk_is_sc(struct smp_ltk *key)
+{
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case SMP_LTK_P256:
+ case SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG:
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
static inline u8 smp_ltk_sec_level(struct smp_ltk *key)
{
- if (key->authenticated)
- return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ if (key->authenticated) {
+ if (smp_ltk_is_sc(key))
+ return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+ else
+ return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ }
return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
}
@@ -145,8 +185,9 @@ bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level);
int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey);
-bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
-int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa);
+bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
+ const bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
+int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa);
int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev);