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| author | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2014-07-17 21:45:08 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2014-07-17 21:45:08 +0200 |
| commit | 0c7774abb41bd00d5836d9ba098825a40fa94133 (patch) | |
| tree | d3c6cb9e81dd798b7383ed47a5fd5499b772a3ea /net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c | |
| parent | Merge branch 'stable-3.16' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux i... (diff) | |
| download | linux-0c7774abb41bd00d5836d9ba098825a40fa94133.tar.xz linux-0c7774abb41bd00d5836d9ba098825a40fa94133.zip | |
KEYS: Allow special keys (eg. DNS results) to be invalidated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Special kernel keys, such as those used to hold DNS results for AFS, CIFS and
NFS and those used to hold idmapper results for NFS, used to be
'invalidateable' with key_revoke(). However, since the default permissions for
keys were reduced:
Commit: 96b5c8fea6c0861621051290d705ec2e971963f1
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys
it has become impossible to do this.
Add a key flag (KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL) that will permit a key to be
invalidated by root. This should not be used for system keyrings as the
garbage collector will try and remove any invalidate key. For system keyrings,
KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR can be used instead.
After this, from userspace, keyctl_invalidate() and "keyctl invalidate" can be
used by any possessor of CAP_SYS_ADMIN (typically root) to invalidate DNS and
idmapper keys. Invalidated keys are immediately garbage collected and will be
immediately rerequested if needed again.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c index 9acec61f5433..9a32f55cf9b9 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ int dns_query(const char *type, const char *name, size_t namelen, } down_read(&rkey->sem); + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL, &rkey->flags); rkey->perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW; ret = key_validate(rkey); |