diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-02-11 05:01:30 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-02-11 05:01:30 +0100 |
commit | c5ce28df0e7c01a1de23c36ebdefcd803f2b6cbb (patch) | |
tree | 9830baf38832769e1cf621708889111bbe3c93df /net/mac80211/wpa.c | |
parent | Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jik... (diff) | |
parent | crypto: fix af_alg_make_sg() conversion to iov_iter (diff) | |
download | linux-c5ce28df0e7c01a1de23c36ebdefcd803f2b6cbb.tar.xz linux-c5ce28df0e7c01a1de23c36ebdefcd803f2b6cbb.zip |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) More iov_iter conversion work from Al Viro.
[ The "crypto: switch af_alg_make_sg() to iov_iter" commit was
wrong, and this pull actually adds an extra commit on top of the
branch I'm pulling to fix that up, so that the pre-merge state is
ok. - Linus ]
2) Various optimizations to the ipv4 forwarding information base trie
lookup implementation. From Alexander Duyck.
3) Remove sock_iocb altogether, from CHristoph Hellwig.
4) Allow congestion control algorithm selection via routing metrics.
From Daniel Borkmann.
5) Make ipv4 uncached route list per-cpu, from Eric Dumazet.
6) Handle rfs hash collisions more gracefully, also from Eric Dumazet.
7) Add xmit_more support to r8169, e1000, and e1000e drivers. From
Florian Westphal.
8) Transparent Ethernet Bridging support for GRO, from Jesse Gross.
9) Add BPF packet actions to packet scheduler, from Jiri Pirko.
10) Add support for uniqu flow IDs to openvswitch, from Joe Stringer.
11) New NetCP ethernet driver, from Muralidharan Karicheri and Wingman
Kwok.
12) More sanely handle out-of-window dupacks, which can result in
serious ACK storms. From Neal Cardwell.
13) Various rhashtable bug fixes and enhancements, from Herbert Xu,
Patrick McHardy, and Thomas Graf.
14) Support xmit_more in be2net, from Sathya Perla.
15) Group Policy extensions for vxlan, from Thomas Graf.
16) Remove Checksum Offload support for vxlan, from Tom Herbert.
17) Like ipv4, support lockless transmit over ipv6 UDP sockets. From
Vlad Yasevich.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1494+1 commits)
crypto: fix af_alg_make_sg() conversion to iov_iter
ipv4: Namespecify TCP PMTU mechanism
i40e: Fix for stats init function call in Rx setup
tcp: don't include Fast Open option in SYN-ACK on pure SYN-data
openvswitch: Only set TUNNEL_VXLAN_OPT if VXLAN-GBP metadata is set
ipv6: Make __ipv6_select_ident static
ipv6: Fix fragment id assignment on LE arches.
bridge: Fix inability to add non-vlan fdb entry
net: Mellanox: Delete unnecessary checks before the function call "vunmap"
cxgb4: Add support in cxgb4 to get expansion rom version via ethtool
ethtool: rename reserved1 memeber in ethtool_drvinfo for expansion ROM version
net: dsa: Remove redundant phy_attach()
IB/mlx4: Reset flow support for IB kernel ULPs
IB/mlx4: Always use the correct port for mirrored multicast attachments
net/bonding: Fix potential bad memory access during bonding events
tipc: remove tipc_snprintf
tipc: nl compat add noop and remove legacy nl framework
tipc: convert legacy nl stats show to nl compat
tipc: convert legacy nl net id get to nl compat
tipc: convert legacy nl net id set to nl compat
...
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211/wpa.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/wpa.c | 443 |
1 files changed, 433 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index 12398fde02e8..75de6fac40d1 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ #include "tkip.h" #include "aes_ccm.h" #include "aes_cmac.h" +#include "aes_gmac.h" +#include "aes_gcm.h" #include "wpa.h" ieee80211_tx_result @@ -393,7 +395,8 @@ static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) } -static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) +static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int mic_len) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; @@ -424,7 +427,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) if (info->control.hw_key) tail = 0; else - tail = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN; + tail = mic_len; if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) @@ -459,21 +462,22 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len, - skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)); + skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len); return 0; } ieee80211_tx_result -ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) +ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, + unsigned int mic_len) { struct sk_buff *skb; ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { - if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) + if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0) return TX_DROP; } @@ -482,7 +486,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) ieee80211_rx_result -ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) +ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, + unsigned int mic_len) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; int hdrlen; @@ -499,8 +504,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) return RX_CONTINUE; - data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN; + data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; @@ -531,14 +535,14 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len, - skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)) + skb->data + skb->len - mic_len, mic_len)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ - if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)) + if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN); @@ -546,6 +550,229 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return RX_CONTINUE; } +static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad) +{ + __le16 mask_fc; + u8 qos_tid; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; + + memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); + j_0[13] = 0; + j_0[14] = 0; + j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01; + + /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header + * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] + */ + put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]); + /* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) + * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected + */ + mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; + mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | + IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); + if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) + mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070); + mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED); + + put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]); + memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); + + /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */ + aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f; + aad[23] = 0; + + if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) + qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK; + else + qos_tid = 0; + + if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) { + memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN); + aad[30] = qos_tid; + aad[31] = 0; + } else { + memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN); + aad[24] = qos_tid; + } +} + +static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id) +{ + hdr[0] = pn[5]; + hdr[1] = pn[4]; + hdr[2] = 0; + hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6); + hdr[4] = pn[3]; + hdr[5] = pn[2]; + hdr[6] = pn[1]; + hdr[7] = pn[0]; +} + +static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr) +{ + pn[0] = hdr[7]; + pn[1] = hdr[6]; + pn[2] = hdr[5]; + pn[3] = hdr[4]; + pn[4] = hdr[1]; + pn[5] = hdr[0]; +} + +static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; + struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; + struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); + int hdrlen, len, tail; + u8 *pos; + u8 pn[6]; + u64 pn64; + u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if (info->control.hw_key && + !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && + !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && + !((info->control.hw_key->flags & + IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) && + ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) { + /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP + * header or MIC fields + */ + return 0; + } + + hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); + len = skb->len - hdrlen; + + if (info->control.hw_key) + tail = 0; + else + tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; + + if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || + skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN)) + return -1; + + pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); + memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen); + skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); + + /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ + if (info->control.hw_key && + (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) + return 0; + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)pos; + pos += hdrlen; + + pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.gcmp.tx_pn); + + pn[5] = pn64; + pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; + pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; + pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; + pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; + pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; + + gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx); + + /* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */ + if (info->control.hw_key) + return 0; + + pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN; + gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad); + ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len, + skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)); + + return 0; +} + +ieee80211_tx_result +ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb; + + ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); + + skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { + if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) + return TX_DROP; + } + + return TX_CONTINUE; +} + +ieee80211_rx_result +ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) +{ + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; + int hdrlen; + struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; + struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); + u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN]; + int data_len; + int queue; + + hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); + + if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) && + !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) + return RX_CONTINUE; + + data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - + IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; + if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { + if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } else { + if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } + + gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); + + queue = rx->security_idx; + + if (memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) { + key->u.gcmp.replays++; + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } + + if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { + u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ + gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad); + + if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt( + key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, + skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, + data_len, + skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } + + memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); + + /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */ + if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); + skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); + + return RX_CONTINUE; +} + static ieee80211_tx_result ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -729,6 +956,48 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) return TX_CONTINUE; } +ieee80211_tx_result +ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb; + struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; + struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; + struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; + u8 aad[20]; + u64 pn64; + + if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) + return TX_DROP; + + skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); + + info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); + + if (info->control.hw_key) + return TX_CONTINUE; + + if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) + return TX_DROP; + + mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); + mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; + mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; + mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); + + /* PN = PN + 1 */ + pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn); + + bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); + + bip_aad(skb, aad); + + /* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) + */ + ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, + skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic); + + return TX_CONTINUE; +} ieee80211_rx_result ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) @@ -780,6 +1049,160 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return RX_CONTINUE; } +ieee80211_rx_result +ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); + struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; + struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; + u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6]; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; + + if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) + return RX_CONTINUE; + + /* management frames are already linear */ + + if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *) + (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); + if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || + mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ + + bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); + + if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { + key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } + + if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { + /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ + bip_aad(skb, aad); + ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, + skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic); + if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) { + key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } + } + + memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); + + /* Remove MMIE */ + skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); + + return RX_CONTINUE; +} + +ieee80211_tx_result +ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb; + struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; + struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; + struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + u8 aad[20]; + u64 pn64; + u8 nonce[12]; + + if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) + return TX_DROP; + + skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); + + info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); + + if (info->control.hw_key) + return TX_CONTINUE; + + if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) + return TX_DROP; + + mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); + mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; + mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; + mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); + + /* PN = PN + 1 */ + pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_gmac.tx_pn); + + bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); + + bip_aad(skb, aad); + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; + memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); + bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number); + + /* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */ + if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, + skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0) + return TX_DROP; + + return TX_CONTINUE; +} + +ieee80211_rx_result +ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); + struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; + struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; + u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6], nonce[12]; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; + + if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) + return RX_CONTINUE; + + /* management frames are already linear */ + + if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *) + (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); + if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || + mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ + + bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); + + if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { + key->u.aes_gmac.replays++; + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } + + if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { + /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ + bip_aad(skb, aad); + + memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6); + + if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, + skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, + mic) < 0 || + memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) { + key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++; + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } + } + + memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); + + /* Remove MMIE */ + skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); + + return RX_CONTINUE; +} + ieee80211_tx_result ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { |