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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2019-08-27 11:13:46 +0200
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2019-08-27 11:13:46 +0200
commitd0d5c0cd1e711c98703f3544c1e6fc1372898de5 (patch)
treee4070af80e16dca846e4734574270ff08ec65e74 /net/rxrpc/skbuff.c
parentrxrpc: Use the tx-phase skb flag to simplify tracing (diff)
downloadlinux-d0d5c0cd1e711c98703f3544c1e6fc1372898de5.tar.xz
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rxrpc: Use skb_unshare() rather than skb_cow_data()
The in-place decryption routines in AF_RXRPC's rxkad security module currently call skb_cow_data() to make sure the data isn't shared and that the skb can be written over. This has a problem, however, as the softirq handler may be still holding a ref or the Rx ring may be holding multiple refs when skb_cow_data() is called in rxkad_verify_packet() - and so skb_shared() returns true and __pskb_pull_tail() dislikes that. If this occurs, something like the following report will be generated. kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:1463! ... RIP: 0010:pskb_expand_head+0x253/0x2b0 ... Call Trace: __pskb_pull_tail+0x49/0x460 skb_cow_data+0x6f/0x300 rxkad_verify_packet+0x18b/0xb10 [rxrpc] rxrpc_recvmsg_data.isra.11+0x4a8/0xa10 [rxrpc] rxrpc_kernel_recv_data+0x126/0x240 [rxrpc] afs_extract_data+0x51/0x2d0 [kafs] afs_deliver_fs_fetch_data+0x188/0x400 [kafs] afs_deliver_to_call+0xac/0x430 [kafs] afs_wait_for_call_to_complete+0x22f/0x3d0 [kafs] afs_make_call+0x282/0x3f0 [kafs] afs_fs_fetch_data+0x164/0x300 [kafs] afs_fetch_data+0x54/0x130 [kafs] afs_readpages+0x20d/0x340 [kafs] read_pages+0x66/0x180 __do_page_cache_readahead+0x188/0x1a0 ondemand_readahead+0x17d/0x2e0 generic_file_read_iter+0x740/0xc10 __vfs_read+0x145/0x1a0 vfs_read+0x8c/0x140 ksys_read+0x4a/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fix this by using skb_unshare() instead in the input path for DATA packets that have a security index != 0. Non-DATA packets don't need in-place encryption and neither do unencrypted DATA packets. Fixes: 248f219cb8bc ("rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code") Reported-by: Julian Wollrath <jwollrath@web.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rxrpc/skbuff.c')
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/skbuff.c25
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c b/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c
index 8e6f45f84b9b..0348d2bf6f7d 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ void rxrpc_new_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace op)
{
const void *here = __builtin_return_address(0);
int n = atomic_inc_return(select_skb_count(skb));
- trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, op, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, here);
+ trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, op, refcount_read(&skb->users), n,
+ rxrpc_skb(skb)->rx_flags, here);
}
/*
@@ -35,7 +36,8 @@ void rxrpc_see_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace op)
const void *here = __builtin_return_address(0);
if (skb) {
int n = atomic_read(select_skb_count(skb));
- trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, op, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, here);
+ trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, op, refcount_read(&skb->users), n,
+ rxrpc_skb(skb)->rx_flags, here);
}
}
@@ -46,11 +48,22 @@ void rxrpc_get_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace op)
{
const void *here = __builtin_return_address(0);
int n = atomic_inc_return(select_skb_count(skb));
- trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, op, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, here);
+ trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, op, refcount_read(&skb->users), n,
+ rxrpc_skb(skb)->rx_flags, here);
skb_get(skb);
}
/*
+ * Note the dropping of a ref on a socket buffer by the core.
+ */
+void rxrpc_eaten_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace op)
+{
+ const void *here = __builtin_return_address(0);
+ int n = atomic_inc_return(&rxrpc_n_rx_skbs);
+ trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, op, 0, n, 0, here);
+}
+
+/*
* Note the destruction of a socket buffer.
*/
void rxrpc_free_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace op)
@@ -60,7 +73,8 @@ void rxrpc_free_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace op)
int n;
CHECK_SLAB_OKAY(&skb->users);
n = atomic_dec_return(select_skb_count(skb));
- trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, op, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, here);
+ trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, op, refcount_read(&skb->users), n,
+ rxrpc_skb(skb)->rx_flags, here);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
@@ -75,7 +89,8 @@ void rxrpc_purge_queue(struct sk_buff_head *list)
while ((skb = skb_dequeue((list))) != NULL) {
int n = atomic_dec_return(select_skb_count(skb));
trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_purged,
- refcount_read(&skb->users), n, here);
+ refcount_read(&skb->users), n,
+ rxrpc_skb(skb)->rx_flags, here);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}