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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2020-09-27 12:07:21 +0200
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2020-11-23 19:09:29 +0100
commitd2ae4e918218f543214fbd906db68a6c580efbbb (patch)
treeb240ab494a23255f2f8b59bd682c33420675fdd3 /net/rxrpc
parentrxrpc: Hand server key parsing off to the security class (diff)
downloadlinux-d2ae4e918218f543214fbd906db68a6c580efbbb.tar.xz
linux-d2ae4e918218f543214fbd906db68a6c580efbbb.zip
rxrpc: Don't leak the service-side session key to userspace
Don't let someone reading a service-side rxrpc-type key get access to the session key that was exchanged with the client. The server application will, at some point, need to be able to read the information in the ticket, but this probably shouldn't include the key material. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rxrpc')
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/key.c8
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/key.c b/net/rxrpc/key.c
index 3bd7b9d48d27..ed29ec01237b 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/key.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/key.c
@@ -579,7 +579,8 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key,
case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD:
toksize += 8 * 4; /* viceid, kvno, key*2, begin,
* end, primary, tktlen */
- toksize += RND(token->kad->ticket_len);
+ if (!token->no_leak_key)
+ toksize += RND(token->kad->ticket_len);
break;
default: /* we have a ticket we can't encode */
@@ -654,7 +655,10 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key,
ENCODE(token->kad->start);
ENCODE(token->kad->expiry);
ENCODE(token->kad->primary_flag);
- ENCODE_DATA(token->kad->ticket_len, token->kad->ticket);
+ if (token->no_leak_key)
+ ENCODE(0);
+ else
+ ENCODE_DATA(token->kad->ticket_len, token->kad->ticket);
break;
default: