diff options
| author | Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> | 2019-06-13 12:35:59 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2019-06-15 04:27:24 +0200 |
| commit | ce950f1050cece5e406a5cde723c69bba60e1b26 (patch) | |
| tree | 8aecfaeb0ff4506107ead6fad531a4b30c31633b /net/sctp | |
| parent | net: dsa: microchip: Don't try to read stats for unused ports (diff) | |
| download | linux-ce950f1050cece5e406a5cde723c69bba60e1b26.tar.xz linux-ce950f1050cece5e406a5cde723c69bba60e1b26.zip | |
sctp: Free cookie before we memdup a new one
Based on comments from Xin, even after fixes for our recent syzbot
report of cookie memory leaks, its possible to get a resend of an INIT
chunk which would lead to us leaking cookie memory.
To ensure that we don't leak cookie memory, free any previously
allocated cookie first.
Change notes
v1->v2
update subsystem tag in subject (davem)
repeat kfree check for peer_random and peer_hmacs (xin)
v2->v3
net->sctp
also free peer_chunks
v3->v4
fix subject tags
v4->v5
remove cut line
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+f7e9153b037eac9b1df8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
CC: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sctp')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index f17908f5c4f3..9b0e5b0d701a 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -2583,6 +2583,8 @@ do_addr_param: case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE: asoc->peer.cookie_len = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr); + if (asoc->peer.cookie) + kfree(asoc->peer.cookie); asoc->peer.cookie = kmemdup(param.cookie->body, asoc->peer.cookie_len, gfp); if (!asoc->peer.cookie) retval = 0; @@ -2647,6 +2649,8 @@ do_addr_param: goto fall_through; /* Save peer's random parameter */ + if (asoc->peer.peer_random) + kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random); asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p, ntohs(param.p->length), gfp); if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) { @@ -2660,6 +2664,8 @@ do_addr_param: goto fall_through; /* Save peer's HMAC list */ + if (asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) + kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs); asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p, ntohs(param.p->length), gfp); if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) { @@ -2675,6 +2681,8 @@ do_addr_param: if (!ep->auth_enable) goto fall_through; + if (asoc->peer.peer_chunks) + kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks); asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p, ntohs(param.p->length), gfp); if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks) |