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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-30 04:08:02 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-30 04:08:02 +0100 |
commit | 6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d (patch) | |
tree | 3f2d7fbaa9fe998787fa474c63fb1e6aa98090ab /scripts/mod/modpost.c | |
parent | Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/... (diff) | |
parent | x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() (diff) | |
download | linux-6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d.tar.xz linux-6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d.zip |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Another set of melted spectrum related changes:
- Code simplifications and cleanups for RSB and retpolines.
- Make the indirect calls in KVM speculation safe.
- Whitelist CPUs which are known not to speculate from Meltdown and
prepare for the new CPUID flag which tells the kernel that a CPU is
not affected.
- A less rigorous variant of the module retpoline check which merily
warns when a non-retpoline protected module is loaded and reflects
that fact in the sysfs file.
- Prepare for Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier support.
- Prepare for exposure of the Speculation Control MSRs to guests, so
guest OSes which depend on those "features" can use them. Includes
a blacklist of the broken microcodes. The actual exposure of the
MSRs through KVM is still being worked on"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()
x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg
x86/nospec: Fix header guards names
x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers
x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes
x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/mod/modpost.c')
-rw-r--r-- | scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index f51cf977c65b..6510536c06df 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -2165,6 +2165,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffer *b, int is_intree) buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n"); } +/* Cannot check for assembler */ +static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b) +{ + buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n"); + buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"); + buf_printf(b, "#endif\n"); +} + static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name) { static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging"; @@ -2506,6 +2514,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) err |= check_modname_len(mod); add_header(&buf, mod); add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module); + add_retpoline(&buf); add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name); err |= add_versions(&buf, mod); add_depends(&buf, mod, modules); |